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The Administration of Justice in the Wake of the
Detroit Civil Disorder of July 1967
I. INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court of the United States and the Court of Appeals
will take care of themselves. Look after the courts of the poor, who
stand most in need of justice. The security of the Republic will be
found in the treatment of the poor and ignorant; in indifference
to their misery and helplessness lies disaster.1
The belief is pervasive among ghetto residents that lower courts
in our urban communities dispense "assembly-line" justice; that
. . . the poor and uneducated are denied equal justice with the
affluent .... Too often the courts have operated to aggravate rather
than relieve the tensions that ignite and fire disorders.2
Early Sunday morning, July 23, 1967, the Detroit Police Depart-
ment raided a "blind pig" at the corner of Twelfth Street and
Clairmont Street. An unexpectedly large number of patrons were
present at the after-hours drinking establishment, and it took the
police over an hour to remove them all from the scene. The weather
was warm and humid-despite the time, many people were still on
the streets. A crowd of about two hundred gathered while the police
were occupied with the individuals arrested in the raid. The last
of the arrestees were removed shortly after 5:00 a.m. At that moment
an empty bottle broke the rear window of a police car and an empty
litter can was thrown through the window of a nearby store.
By 6:00 a.m. there were thousands of people on Twelfth Street.
Widespread looting began as windows were broken over a wide area.
Civil disorder had come to Detroit. It was to continue until Friday,
July 28, 1967. In the interim, thousands of state police, Michigan
National Guardsmen, and federal troops were called in to contain
reported disorder activity within the city.3 Over seven thousand
people were arrested during this six-day period.
4
The mass arrests imposed a tremendous burden on the legal
establishment of Detroit; fair and speedy processing of the arrestees
was required. The Michigan Law Review sent two observers into
1. Address by Charles E. Hughes, N.Y. State Bar Ass'n, 42d Annual Meeting, in
1919 PROCEE INGS OF N.Y. STATE BAR Ass'N 224, 240-41.
2. REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CnVIr DISORDERS 183 (Gov-
ernment Printing Office ed. 1968), 837 (Bantam paper ed.). [Hereinafter COMMISSION
REPORT].
3. For a complete account of all disorder-related activity in Detroit during July
1967, see COMMISSION REPORT 47-61 (GPO ed.), 84-108 (paper ed.).
4. Cahalan, The Detroit Riot, 3 THE PROSECuTOR 430 (1967).
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Detroit on August 1 to measure the response of the legal establish-
ment. The observers spent countless hours in Detroit Recorder's
Court. Interviewing of defense attorneys, prosecutors, judges, defen-
dants, and others who were concerned with the proceedings con-
tinued until March of 1968. Others who studied the administration
of criminal justice following the disorder volunteered pertinent
information throughout the year. This Comment is the result of
these efforts.
Since the focus of this Comment is the legal establishment's
response to the burdens imposed by the disorder, the early stages in
the processing of the arrestees were of primary importance. The
further away in time any legal stage was from the disorder itself,
the less effect the disorder had on the proceedings. Accordingly,
the most intensive effort was directed at study of the arraignment-
on-the-warrant proceedings which took place during the week of the
disorder. The preliminary examinations began on August 1 and con-
tinued for four to five weeks. The earliest preliminary examinations
highlighted the greatest number of disorder-related problems. As
the sheer volume of examinations decreased, so did the legal diffi-
culties. The arraignment-on-the-information proceedings were the
last to be significantly affected by the disorder; this stage began im-
mediately after the preliminary examinations and continued well
into March 1968. This Comment does not examine the trials of
disorder defendants; over 1,361 felony cases related to the disorder
were still awaiting trial as of January 1968, 5 and most of the felony
cases related to the disorder were disposed of at the arraignment-on-
the-information stage.6
II. ARRAIGNMENT ON THE WARRANT
A. Purpose and Normal Operation
Under normal circumstances, people arrested in Detroit are
brought to one of thirteen police precincts for booking, finger-
printing, and interrogation. Each case is then assigned to a detec-
tive who investigates the charges and confers with the prosecutor
to determine whether a warrant should be issued. If a warrant is
authorized, the prisoner's file is sent to the warrant clerk's office
in the Recorder's Court where a complaint and an affidavit are
prepared. The prisoner is then brought before the court for the
arraignment on the warrant.7
5. See 1967 ANN. REP. OF THE RiECORDER'S COURT OF THE CITY OF DETROIT 4.
6. See part IV infra.
7. Arraignment on the warrant must be conducted for persons arrested for a felony
without a warrant "without unnecessary delay." MicH. Com'. LAws § 764.12 (1964). The
judges generally rotate the job of conducting arraignments on the warrant and exam-
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The primary functions of the arraignment on the warrant are
to inform the defendant of the charge against him,8 to advise him
of his constitutional rights, to set bail,9 and to ascertain whether the
defendant wishes a preliminary examination and, if so, to set a date
for it.10 The merits of the case are not considered, and any evidence
received is directed toward the setting of bail." Moreover, there
are no defenses which must be asserted at this stage, no pleas are
required,12 and, except for the arresting officer, no prosecution wit-
nesses are present. The defendant may, if he so desires and can
afford it, be represented by retained counsel at the arraignment on
the warrant. The court, however, will not appoint counsel for the
indigent, having adopted the view that there are no rights of the
defendant which can be jeopardized or need to be protected by
counsel at this stage.'
3
With regard to the amount of bail to be set, there are statutory
guidelines in Michigan which require consideration by the judge
of the seriousness of the offense charged, the previous criminal rec-
inations on a daily or weekly basis. For the arraignment on the warrant, the arraigning
judge sits as a magistrate, and the normal procedure is to have one judge each day
conducting both examinations and arraignment while the remaining judges handle
trials or other functions. Thus, the specific judge before whom one is arraigned is
determined by the luck of the draw and the prosecutor has little opportunity to select
any particular judge before whom to bring his case.
8. MICH. CoMp. LAWS § 764.12 (1948).
9. Recorder's Court judges are given statutory authority to set bail in all cases
in which a justice of the Supreme Court would be so authorized. MICH. CoMsP. LAws
§ 765.2 (1948).
10. If an examination is desired, a date must be set not more than ten days after
the arraignment on the warrant. MICH. Com. LAws § 774.1 (1948). For further dis-
cussion of the "ten-day rule," see part III.B.l.a. infra.
11. See AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION, LAW ENFORCEMENT IN THE MlErROPOLis 119
(1967):
Arraignments on warrants are conducted in a very brief and routine manner,
and the arraigning judge rarely considers the facts of the case in any detail, con-
centrating instead on the setting of bond. Because of this, the warrant arraignment
does not serve as a means of judicial control over the police or prosecuting at-
torney. Routinely, the arresting officer is requested either to read or to show the
court his report on the case, including a list of the defendant's prior convictions,
chiefly to assist the court in fixing appropriate bond.
12. Several judges of the Recorder's Court, in interviews, asserted that no guilty
pleas were "accepted" during the disorder, suggesting that perhaps under normal cir-
cumstances, a plea of guilty might be entertained. Their reference to guilty pleas
apparently stems from a now generally discarded practice of Recorder's Court judges
to ask the defendant for a plea to the charge contained in the warrant. The only
purpose of such a plea seems to have been to give the prosecutor's office an indication
of whether a waiver of the preliminary examination might be obtained from the de-
fendant. Thus, if the defendant pleaded guilty, the prosecutor would contact his
attorney and try to obtain a waiver of the examination, saving time and work for
himself and the court. Although this practice may still be followed by certain judges,
it is of little consequence because a plea at this stage cannot be introduced at trial
and is in no way binding on the defendant. For a description of the way in which
this plea operated in practice as a method of determining the desire for a preliminary
examination, see AMERI cAN BAR FOUNDATION, supra note 11, at 118.
13. See part l.D.I.a. infra.
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ord of the defendant, and the probability of his appearance at trial.14
Therefore, in setting bail the judges normally consult the prisoner's
file, which contains his past record, the police write-up, the com-
plaint, and any other relevant material that may have been accu-
mulated by the police department. In addition, they will usually
question the defendant with regard to such information as his em-
ployment, marital, and residence status. 5 Bail is then set and the
defendant is either remanded to custody (if he cannot post bail)
or released (if he can post bail, or if he is placed on personal
recognizance).
B. Arraignment on the Warrant During the Disorder-
An Overview' 6
Lining up a group of fifteen or twenty unrepresented prisoners
before the bench, the judge said, "You're accused of entering with-
out breaking, your bond is $10,000, your examination is set for
August 1." Calling the next group, he continued, "You heard what
14. MICH. COMp. LAws § 750.196 (1948).
15. According to Professor Frank Sengstock of the University of Detroit Law School,
consideration of factors relative to the probability of the defendant's appearance at
trial, other than the seriousness of the offense charged and the defendant's prior
criminal record, is largely conjectural. Professor Sengstock asserted, in an interview,
that preventive detention is a normally accepted practice in the Recorder's Court, that
bonds are set primarily on the basis of the type of crime charged, and that factors
relevant to assuring appearance at trial are not considered unless brought to the
attention of the court by counsel for the defendant.
The same conclusions apparently motivated the Neighborhood Legal Services (NLS)
to institute their Bail Bond Project under the direction of Detroit attorney Dennis
James, a program coincidentally slated to begin operation July 24, 1967, the day
after disorder erupted. The purpose of the Bail Bond Project is to assist both de-
fendants and the court in obtaining and verifying information relative to the proba-
bility of defendants' appearance at trial. The mechanics of the program include
interviews of defendants by NLS volunteers and the completion of a questionnaire
by defendants, the results of which are verified and presented to the court, along with
the recommendation of the interviewer, for consideration in setting bond. The ques-
tionnaire asks the defendant such things as where and with whom he lives, how long
he has lived in the Detroit area, what relatives he has and sees often, his marital
status, whether, by whom, and for how long, he has been employed, whom he sup-
ports, the state of his health, his prior criminal record, and what documents or which
persons can verify the information given.
See also AMmRuCAN BAR FOUNDATION, supra note 11, at 120-21, concluding that in
the Recorder's Court, "[t]hese [statutory guidelines] are but three of the criteria that,
in practice, are considered in setting bail . . .The seriousness of the offense is the
most important consideration in the setting of bail and the one in which there is most
agreement among the judges."
16. Information as to what transpired during the arraignments on the warrant for
persons arrested on charges related to the disorder was obtained pimarily from private
inteviews with the principals involved, including Recorder's Court judges, the prose-
cutor and his staff, the county sheriff, members of the Detroit Police Department,
defense counsel, defendants, and interested observers present during this stage.
Personal observation of court proceedings did not begin until August 1, 1967, when




I said to them, the same applies to you." This incident, witnessed
by at least two observers,17 illustrates what might be termed the
salient features of the arraignment on the warrant during the dis-
order: high bail, absence of counsel, failure to consider individual
circumstances, failure to inform defendants of their constitutional
rights, and an emphasis on expediency. Although each of these
things did not necessarily occur at every arraignment or in every
courtroom, each was present all too often. Secondary factors con-
tributing to and exacerbating the elements listed included a short-
age of judicial manpower coupled with a desire by the court to go-
it-alone, a logistics problem in keeping track of and identifying
prisoners, and an atmosphere prevaded by mass confusion, fear, and
panic.1 s
By far the most pervasive aspect of the arraignment on the war-
rant, and for that matter of all judicial proceedings in the Re-
corder's Court, involved in the processing of cases during the
disorder was a major breakdown in the adversarial process. The
court made a basic policy decision to aid the executive branch in
every possible way to break the back of the disorder and restore
order to the community. This decision was in some cases made ex-
plicit by public statements of the judges;' 9 in others, it was implicit,
manifested by the conduct of the court.
20
1. High Bail
Although complete statistics were not immediately available, it
was readily apparent that the judicial policy during the early stages
of the disorder was to set extremely high bail. An unofficial sam-
17. Professor Frank Sengstock, University of Detroit Law School, who related the
incident in an address given before the American Association of Law Schools at their
Annual Convention on Dec. 29, 1967 (available for inspection in Michigan Law Review
files), and Judge John Emery, municipal judge of Birmingham, Michigan, chairman of
the Civil Liberties Committee of the Michigan State Bar, and chairman of the Crimi-
nal Law Committee of the Detroit Bar, who related the incident at a Panel Discussion,
The Detroit "Riot": A Challenge to Society and the Legal Profession, presented at the
University of Michigan Law School, Oct. 11, 1967. (A transcript is available for inspec-
tion in Michigan Law Review files).
18. According to Professor Frank Sengstock, University of Detroit Law School,
this atmosphere was not confined to the community outside the courtroom but also
affected the judges and the performance of their judicial functions. In an address to
the American Association of Law Schools (see note 17 supra) he said:
A significant number of these [Recorder's Court] judges have conceded privately
that they were filled with fears and doubts about the capacity of structured so-
ciety to resist the riots, as they watched, from their courtroom windows, smoke
filling the sky from fires burning in the city. These fears and apprehensions
affected them in the manner in which they were discharging their official re-
sponsibilities.
19. See especially public statements made by the judges as to their reasons for
setting high bail, notes 28 and 29 infra and accompanying text.
20. See especially note 30 infra.
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pling2 ' of court files covering the first two or three days of the dis-
order reveals that bonds ranged from $200,000 (for a sniper) to
personal recognizance 22 (for a curfew violating female), but the most
popular figures were $10,000 and $25,000. Thus, one judge set 161
bonds out of 175 at $10,000, another set 121 at $25,000 and 42 at
$10,000 out of a total of 171, and a third set 81 at $10,000 and 39
at $5,000 out of a total of 130. Interviews with 1,014 prisoners who
were arrested during the disorder and incarcerated at Jackson State
Prison disclosed that at least 50 per cent of them were being held
subject to bonds in excess of $10,000 and at least 70 per cent on
bonds of over $5,000.23
The initial decision on the bond policy seems to have been made
by Wayne County Prosecutor William Cahalan some time during
the first Sunday of the disorder. He publicly stated that his office
would ask for bonds of $10,000 and up on all persons arrested "so
that even though they had not been adjudged guilty, we would elim-
inate the danger of returning some of those who had caused the riot
to the street during the time of stress." 24
Recorder's Court judges were almost unanimous in their adop-
tion of the prosecutor's suggestion. According to Cyrus Vance, Spe-
cial Assistant to the Secretary of Defense:
[T]he judge who was on duty Sunday night and the additional
judges who came on during the night followed [the prosecutor's]
recommendation to the letter.... By Monday morning, twelve of
the thirteen judges in the Recorder's Court had begun to uniformly
follow the recommendation of the prosecutor and set extremely high
bail on each of the prisoners arrested.25
The dissenting judge was George W. Crockett, Jr. who, on
Wednesday, July 26, wrote a letter26 to his fellow judges on the
21. The sampling was made by the writers. The statistics that follow were derived
from an examination of court files, drawn at random and representing 1,271 defendants
arraigned on July 23, 24, and 25 by twelve judges. Of the total sample of 1,271, 942,
or 74%, were placed on bonds of over $5,000.
22. Personal recognizance or release on personal bond has been described as follows:
Personal bonds require no tangible security. Immediately after the court orders
a personal bond, the clerk of the court administers an oath to the defendant to
the effect that he promises to appear on the prescribed date subject to a forfei-
ture of the amount fixed by the judge for failure to appear. A civil action must be
filed by the prosecuting attorney to collect a forfeiture of this bond, but in prac-
tice it is seldom, if ever, done.
AMEmcAN BAR FOUNDATION, supra note 11, at 119 n.17. $10,000 bail was fixed by some
judges even for many charged only with curfew violation.
23. University of Detroit Law School, Urban Law Program, Preliminary Data on
Detroit Riot Defendants (Oct. 1967) (unpublished statistics available for inspection in
Michigan Law Review files). The margin of error was estimated to be about 10%.
24. C. VANCE, SPEciAL ASSISTANT TO THE SEcRErARY OF DEFENSE, FINAL Rz PORT CON-
CERNING THE DExorr Riors 44 (1967) [hereinafter VANCE REPORT].
25. VANCE REPORT 44.
26. Quoted with permission of Judge George W. Crockett, Jr., of the Recorder's
Court. (The letter is available for inspection in Michigan Law Review files.)
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Recorder's Court informing them of his "disagreement with [the]
suggested 'high bond policy'" and of his view that
each of us has the sole responsibility of fixing bonds in cases assigned
to us. I intend to exercise that responsibility as well as accept the re-
sponsibility for my action.... In my judgment [ten and twenty-five
thousand dollar] bonds are not only excessive, they are prohibitive. 27
On the Monday morning following the start of the disorder,
executive Judge Brennan called a meeting of the bench. It was at
this meeting that the bond policy was formally agreed on by the
twelve judges other than Crockett. Their rationale, like Cahalan's,
was that high bonds would help control the disorder by keeping
those apprehended from returning to the streets. Brennan was
quoted in The Detroit News as saying, "We will, in matters of this
kind, allocate an extraordinary bond. We must keep these people
off the streets. We will keep them off."'28 In the same article, Judge
Robert J. Colombo declared, "What we're trying to do here is keep
them off the streets. And apparently we're being successful at that.
If we let them back on, you know what would happen .... In a
way we're doing what the police didn't do." 29 "Doing what the
police didn't do" is not the typical analysis of the bail-setting func-
tion of an independent judiciary.
Although there was no explicit change in policy, on Wednesday,
July 26, individual judges did begin to depart from the uniformly
high bails, and some defendants were released.30 By this time the
27. Although Judge Crockett admitted the amount of bond set by him was some-
what higher than under normal circumstances, an examination of court files reveals
that it was considerably lower than that of his fellow judges. Out of 114 defendants
whose bonds Judge Crockett set on July 25, five were placed on bonds of $5,000, the
highest he set, while seven were given suspended sentences, eleven were placed on
personal bond, six were released on $100 cash bonds, four bonds were set at $500,
thirty-two at $1,000, twenty-seven at $2,000, and twenty-two at $3,000.
28. The Detroit News, July 26, Doc Greene's Column, § A, at 12, col. 6.
29. Id. It should also be noted at this point that Justice Thomas E. Brennan of
the Michigan Supreme Court, not speaking for that body, assured Recorder's Court
judges that whatever the latter felt necessary to do to cope with civil disorder de-
fendants would be upheld by the Supreme Court. (This information was volunteered
independently by several trustworthy persons who asked that they not be named.)
It can only be conjectured what effect this might have had on the attitude of Recorder's
Court judges in adopting a high bond policy. Professor Frank Sengstock concluded
(address supra note 17) that the prohibitively high bond set in Detroit during the
disorder was in fact a dishonest way of denying bail altogether:
[Ait no time did [Recorder's Court judges] refuse to set a bond for any accused.
If the object in setting a bond was to keep an individual in jail, the intellectually
honest way of accomplishing this goal was to deny bond altogether and let the
denial be tested with a writ of habeas corpus. The dishonest approach, which was
in fact adopted by the court, to a basic constitutional right can only produce
extreme skepticism about the value of constitutional liberties for those detained by
this procedural subterfuge.
30. See VANcE REPoRT 46. At some point during the early part of the week of the
disorder, Wayne County Sheriff Peter Buback was ordered by Judge Vincent J. Bren-
nan, Executive Judge of the Recorder's Court, to report back to the court before re-
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community had begun to return to normal, and the jails in the city
and throughout the state were filled beyond capacity.31 Therefore,
"at the urging of a number of persons including federal officials,
[the prosecutor's office] began to think in terms of releasing pris-
oners on personal bond or on reasonable bond."3 2
It is significant that once again it was the prosecutor's office that
initiated a judicial policy. According to Cahalan, his office engi-
neered the major part of the release program by undertaking an
examination of all the prisoners' files in regard to prior criminal
records.33 If the defendant had no prior convictions, he was recom-
mended for personal recognizance; otherwise, no further investi-
gation was made and the original bond was maintained. Since the
court invariably approved the prosecutor's recommendations, this
program resulted in the release of 3,000 prisoners on personal
recognizance in a period of a few days.34 An additional 650 were
also released on personal bond after a review of their files by
the judges themselves. The arraignments on the warrant were com-
pleted by August 1, at which time the preliminary examinations
began. At this later stage those people still in custody who had not
been charged with serious offenses such as sniping or arson were
either released on personal bond or their bonds were lowered to
what they probably would have been under normal circumstances. 5
leasing a prisoner who had met bond. According to Judge Brennan, this was done so
that a check on the prisoner's record could be made to see whether he had been
involved in disorders elsewhere around the country, especially Newark, or had a
"wanted" or "parole" status. If the man's record was dear, his bond was reduced and
he was released; if not, the bond was not to be honored by the sheriff until further
notice. According to Sheriff Buback and some Detroit attorneys who attempted to
obtain release for clients, a notice was posted on the door of the sheriff's office on
Tuesday and Wednesday of the week of the disorders saying that no bonds would
be honored until further notice. Thus, although bonds were beginning to be set at
lower amounts, within the financial reach of some defendants, there was a great deal
of difficulty in obtaining release even if the bond could be met.
This practice of refusing release until records were checked met with considerable
resistance from some Recorder's Court judges, notably Judges Crockett and Schemanske.
Judge Crockett in fact told Sheriff Buback that if the bonds he had set were not
honored, he would cite the sheriff for contempt of court. The notice was soon there-
after removed from the sheriff's door and what few prisoners could meet bond were
released.
Charles Goldfarb, one of the principal professional bondsmen in Detroit, reported
that he wrote about 700 bonds, 80% of which were for less than $2,000, and only two
or three of which were for $10,000. Although he did three months business in one week,
most of this was done during the latter part of the week when the bonds were con-
siderably lower.
31. See COMMIssIoN REPORT 60 (GPO ed.), 106-07 (paper ed.).
32. VANCE REPORT 45.
83. Cahalan, supra note 4, at 432. According to Recorder's Court statistics, 48.6%
of all disorder defendants (51.7% of the males and 26A% of the females) had previous
criminal records; 51.4% (48.3% of the males, 73.6% of the females) did not.
34. See COMMISSION REPORT 185 (GPO ed.), 342 (paper ed.) n.9.
35. Vance reports that as of July 31, 1967, the number of disorder prisoners still
confined was 2,200, and by August 4, the number was down to 1,200. The number
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It was noted earlier36 that a Recorder's Court judge ordinarily
has the prisoner's file before him when he sets bond. Because of a
clerical log jam,37 those files were unavailable during the disorder.
Although the Clerk's Office of the Recorder's Court operated around
the clock, the attempt to process within one week the equivalent of
one half of the entire caseload for all of 196638 proved understand-
ably impossible for an office unprepared for such an emergency.
In addition, the Records Bureau of the Detroit Police Department
bogged down and was unable to supply necessary records at the pace
they were demanded. 39 Finally, the task was complicated even fur-
ther by the fact that many prisoners gave incorrect names or had
the same name as other prisoners.
Many of the judges, including Judge Brennan, asserted that this
absence of records was an additional factor necessitating the high
bonds.40 They took the position that since they were unable to tell
which of those appearing before them required custody to insure
their appearance at trial, prohibitively high bails had to be set until
a judgment could be made on the basis of prior record. Whether
this approach was consistent with the presumption of innocence will
be examined later.4 1 At this point it is enough to note that Judge
Crockett was unimpressed with the argument that the serious cleri-
cal problem necessitated high bonds,42 and that in light of the an-
nounced policy of "trying to ... keep them off the streets, ' 48 it is
continued to fall as the examinations proceeded. "However," notes Vance, "the actual
release of the prisoners was very slow even after the court had ordered their release.
The reason for this appears to be that the Sheriff's Office could not cope with develop-
ing a system which could locate a prisoner in the various places of confinement in
short order." VANcF REPoRT 48. This difficulty was confirmed by defense attorneys
attempting to locate prisoners released on a writ of habeas corpus. (See notes 153-54
infra and accompanying text.)
36. See text accompanying note 15 supra.
37. Cahalan, supra note 4, at 431.
38. There was a total of 3,166 felony cases processed by the Recorder's Court during
the disorder. In all of 1966, there were approximately 7,200 felony cases processed by
the Recorder's Court.
39. The difficulty here was primarily in fingerprint analysis, necessary to insure
that the proper records got before the court. According to Judge Vincent Brennan
(interview in Detroit, Feb. 12, 1968), the Identification Bureau of the Police Depart-
ment is capable of making about 200 fingerprint analyses in a twenty-four hour
period, far short of what was needed to keep up with the arraignment rate. According
to Lt. Berry of that department (interview in Detroit, Feb. 12, 1968), a plan is being for-
mulated to obtain fingerprint technicians from suburban Detroit areas to augment the
services of the Detroit Police Department in the event of another civil disturbance.
At one point, 1,000 fingerprints were flown to Washington for the FBI to check in
hopes that that organization could do the job faster. See Cahalan, supra note 3, at 432.
40. See Detroit Free Press, July 26, 1967, § A, at 4, col. 1,
41. See text accompanying notes 101-02 infra.
42. See note 27 supra and text accompanying notes 26-27. For an indication of how
Judge Crockett handled the problem of lack of prior records in arraigning civil dis-
order defendants, see text accompanying notes 53-56 infra.
43. See text accompanying note 29 supra.
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questionable whether the absence of records actually did account
for the high bails.
2. Representation by Counsel
Since Recorder's Court does not consider it necessary to appoint
counsel at the arraignment on the warrant, the existence of the dis-
order did not alter the situation in regard to the representation of in-
digent defendants at this stage. As usual, there was no representation.
The disorder did, however, have an effect on the representation of
those who had retained counsel. In most instances the efforts of
those retained attorneys who were present at this stage were greatly
impaired by the mass confusion in the community, the courtroom,
and the jails. As one attorney put it:
There was no real effort to comply with the elementary right of a
defendant to see his lawyer. You couldn't find your client at all ex-
cept by blind luck. When I did find somebody, I couldn't get to him
as there was no procedure by which a lawyer could interfere with
the administrative procedures of the police. It was futile to try
anything.4
4
Also, the organized bar, which later responded so well to the
need for counsel at the preliminary examinations, 45 made no effort
to intervene during the arraignments on the warrant. According to
Judge John Emery, a municipal judge of Birmingham, Michigan,
the bar was wholly inactive during the disorder period, which is
when the arraignments were being conducted.46 Similarly, Professor
Frank Sengstock of the University of Detroit Law School observed
that "the legal profession in Detroit did not check the court of
justice throughout most of the week in which the riot occurred. In
fact, the profession was paralyzed." 47
Although the organized bar as such did not come forward to
assist defendants during the early stages of the disorder, several indi-
viduals did. On Monday of the week of the disorder Emery suggested
to the judges that they consider providing representation for indi-
gents, and volunteered his own services, and those of a few other at-
torneys, for this purpose. Most of the judges, however, were opposed
to the idea. They thought that providing counsel at the arraignments
was unnecessary and would only impair the process of appointing
counsel at later stages in the proceedings; initially, only three judges
44. Interview with Detroit Attorney Ernest Goodman in Detroit, Feb. 5, 1968.
Mr. Goodman also related that during the first few days of the disorder, "[g]oing
into the court building was a devastating experience. It was surrounded by armed
guards with machine guns. The building was practically a tomb and prisoners were
being processed by some method I couldn't fathom."
45. See part III.C. infra.
46. Panel Discussion, supra note 17.
47. Address, supra note 17.
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permitted attorneys to be present in their courtrooms to "assist"
those who requested it, and even they did not formally assign coun-
sel to any one case.
48
When the volunteer attorneys were present, they attempted to
induce over-all reductions in the amounts of bail and to increase
judicial sensitivity to individual circumstances and hardship cases.
In some cases involving pregnant women, although not in all, this
resulted in a release on personal bond. But their efforts on the
whole were described by Emery as "perfunctory and ineffectual."
"We were running around, frustrated, helpless, not able to accom-
plish much of anything."
49
3. Failure To Consider Cases Individually5
Apparently it was commonplace during the disorder for a group
of suspects to be "rounded up" and arrested at the same place (often
a store which had already been broken into or burned), charged
with the same offense (typically, entering without breaking but with
intent to commit larceny),51 brought to a police station for booking,
and taken to the court to be arraigned-still as a group-before one
judge. Moreover, most of the judges continued the pattern of group
treatment by addressing the defendants collectively, rather than as
individuals, and by setting identical bails for all. Obviously the adop-
tion of these procedures precluded any consideration of individual
circumstances or of the probability that any particular defendant
48. Interview with John Emery, municipal judge of Birmingham, Michigan, in
Detroit, Aug. 2, 1967. It has become customary in the practice of Recorder's Court
judges to appoint counsel for trial of indigent defendants primarily from a group of
Detroit attorneys known pejoratively as the "Clinton Street Gang" (so named because
of the site of the courthouse on Clinton Street in Detroit-see note 246 infra), who
devote the bulk of their practice to court appointments and are paid by the state.
49. Panel Discussion, supra note 17.
50. According to mimeographed Recorder's Court statistics, there was a total of
8,166 felony defendants on 1,390 separate files, or an average of slightly over two and
one quarter defendants per file. A sampling of the files by the writers revealed that
files of six to eight defendants were not uncommon. Further analysis of the informa-
tion included in the files suggests a pattern of group treatment from the arrest through,
in some instances, the arraignment on the information. See part IV.B.2. infra.
51. "Entering without breaking but with intent to commit larceny" was the legal
translation of "looting" settled upon by the prosecutor. Cahalan, supra note 4, at 431.
Prosecutor Cahalan, in an interview in Detroit, Sept. 7, 1967, emphasized the im-
portance of settling upon this charge, a felony (maximum, five years) to the imple-
mentation of a high bond policy and thus keeping people off the streets. He felt that
had the looting charges been designated as misdemeanors it would have been far
more difficult to justify high bonds.
As might have been expected in a disorder, by far the greatest number of arrests
were for looting. Thus, Recorder's Court statistics show 2,694 arrests for entering
without breaking, followed distantly by 1,337 for violation of the Governor's Emergency
Proclamation (curfew violation, the greatest single misdemeanor charge), 623 for break-
ing and entering a business place, 337 for larceny over $50, and 288 for receiving
stolen property. A number of other offenses with considerably fewer offenders follow
these in order of frequency.
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would return for trial on the appointed day. Bail was set for offenses,
not for people.
52
Again, the notable exception was Judge Crockett, who attempted
to individualize the bail procedure and adhere to the statutory guide-
lines.53 He took advantage of the offers of help from attorneys and
members of the Neighborhood Legal Service (NLS) Bail Bond
Project, 4 using them to aid in the gathering of the information
necessary to set an appropriate amount of bail. According to Dennis
James, head of the Bail Bond Project, defendants were interviewed
privately, the information was presented to the judge, the advice of
the interviewer was requested, and bond was then set.55 And, a stern
and clear warning was given on the consequences of lying to the
court.
The chief reasons given by the other judges for not employing
Judge Crockett's procedure were the lack of time, the conviction that
the defendants could not be believed, and the fear that dangerous
individuals would be freed to engage in further destruction. How-
ever, Judge Crockett's experience indicates that in fact it took very
little extra time to arraign defendants his way, and that in the long
run it actually saved his court a great deal of time by eliminating the
necessity of reviewing every bond at a later date. Moreover, he felt
there was very little misrepresentation by defendants, and that ques-
tionable bail risks and dangerous persons could be weeded out by
the volunteers or the court. In addition to the warning to the de-
fendant about lying, telephones were available to the volunteers to
aid in verifying information when that was possible and necessary.
Finally, Crockett did not think that the absence of any official report
of the defendant's prior record precluded individualizing the bond
procedure, or that setting bonds at an amount within the financial
reach of the defendant jeopardized the safety of the community. 56
It should be noted that there were a few judges, besides Crockett,
who made some attempt to individualize the bond procedure. Ac-
52. See Preliminary Data, supra note 23.
53. See text accompanying notes 26-27 supra.
54. See note 15 supra.
55. Judge Crockett's bonds were somewhat higher than normal. See Crockett, Detroit
Recorder's Court and the 1967 Civil Disturbance, 27 NAT'L GUILD P'AC'rrIONER 39
(1968). According to Mr. James, his organization did not live up to Judge Crockett's
standards. This was apparently because of inexperience and failure always to have
enough persons available to assist when assistance could have been used.
56. There is very little evidence of persons being re-arrested after release on per-
sonal bond or payment of the bond set. See COA[MSSION REPORT 185 (GPO ed.), 342
(paper ed.) n.9. Judges Brennan and Crockett did not know of anyone re-arrested
after release. Judge Colombo reported that one person charged with a curfew violation
whom he had released was re-arrested the following night on the same charge. Since
nearly everyone arrested was initially remanded to custody, it is difficult to place any
significance on the presence or absence of cases of re-arrest after release during the
height of the disorder. See note 92 infra and text accompanying notes 92-100 infra.
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cording to James, Judge Davenport followed Crockett's lead on the
second day of arraignments and began to utilize the services of NLS,
and to provide a phone for verification purposes; but he also con-
tinued to set bonds which were higher than those of Judge Crockett.
Two other judges had defendants interviewed and received advice
from volunteers in the courtroom-only, apparently, to ignore
completely the information and continue to set 10,000 and 25,000
dollar bails across the board.
4. Failure To Inform Defendants of Their Constitutional Rights
Many of the people who witnessed the arraignments on the war-
rant during the early part of the disorder have expressed the view
that Recorder's Court judges failed to explain adequately to defen-
dants the offenses with which they were charged and to inform them
of their constitutional rights. According to Professor Sengstock,
The right to counsel was not adequately explained to the accused.
His right to have an attorney appointed, if he could not retain one,
was not explored. He was not advised what a preliminary examina-
tion was .... The nature of his offense was not explained to the
accused and often he was not informed of his right to a jury trial.
The assembly line technique adopted by the court left those unedu-
cated in the process as bewildered after their arraignments as before.57
Similarly, Judge Emery has maintained that "[p]eople just were not
advised of their constitutional rights at the arraignment on the
warrant-they were shuffled through the line."r s8
Recorder's Court judges reject these assertions. Judges Brennan
and Gillis, for example, claim that in their courtrooms each defen-
dant was advised of the charges against him, his right to counsel,
and his right to remain silent. 59
The discrepancy between these two accounts is probably due to
a difference of opinion in regard to what constitutes an "adequate"
explanation of a defendant's rights. Those who criticize the court's
performance may feel that it performs unsatisfactorily even under
normal circumstances, since ordinarily the accused is not informed
that he has a right to have counsel "appointed," or that he can exer-
cise this right "immediately." On the other hand, if less than the
usual amount of time was devoted to this aspect of the arraignment
as a result of the pressure on the court to process suspects quickly,
the disorder may also have exacerbated any deficiencies which nor-
mally inhere in the court's warning procedure.
57. Address, supra note 17.
58. Panel Discussion, supra note 17.




Many of the previously mentioned features of the arraignment
on the warrant can also be explained by the Recorder's Court's pre-
occupation with expediency. Indeed, expediency seemed to be the
prevailing philosophy during this stage of the proceedings. Thus,
the high bail policy was a means of removing those allegedly engaged
in the disorder from the streets with a minimum of legal complica-
tions, and the failure to provide counsel or to accept the offers of
assistance from various volunteers reflected a desire to dispense with
interruptions on behalf of defendants which would slow the work of
the court. The group arraignments, too, indicated a predisposition to
proceed as quickly as possible. And even the alleged failure to pro-
vide adequate warnings of constitutional rights may be attributed
in part to an attempt to dispose of cases rapidly.
The reasons for this judicial commitment to expediency are read-
ily apparent. According to Recorder's Court statistics a total of 7,231
persons were arrested on charges related to the disorder. This means
that nearly one half of the entire caseload for 1966 was thrust upon
the court within one week in 1967. By the night of July 23, the first
day of the disorder, 255 people had already been arrested; that num-
ber climbed to 3,740 by July 27, when the worst of the disturbance
ended and the rate of arrests per day began to decline. To cope
with this onslaught of prisoners the court remained open around
the clock. The judges divided the day into four six-hour shifts,
each of which had one judge handling misdemeanors and the rest
handling felony arraignments. 60 This left only three judges at any
given time to handle felony arraignments, and forced each to arraign
approximately eighty prisoners per shift, or an average of one pris-
oner every four and one-half minutes, in order to keep up with the
pace of arrests.
Despite these enormous burdens, it is questionable whether the
expedient measures employed by the court were in fact necessary.61
60. The situation confronting the Recorder's Court is forcefully demonstrated by
the fact that within a period of six days there were as many felony arrests as normally
occur in a six-month period. Thus, while in 1966 the total number of felony warrants
issued was 7,360 and in 1965 the number was 6,307, there were 3,164 felony warrants
issued during the period of the disorder alone. In addition, there were 1,014 misde-
meanor arrests prosecuted. Recorder's Court Statistics on Civil Disturbance Cases
(unpublished mimeos).
61. Despite the generally hectic atmosphere, it was asserted by Dennis James, head
of the Bail Bond Project, that conditions in the courtrooms were much better than
under normal circumstances because all other business had been suspended and un-
authorized persons were excluded from the courtroom. According to Mr. James these
conditions contrast markedly with the normal "squeezing in" of arraignments among
other business of the court, and extensive commotion caused by officers, bondsmen,
attorneys, spectators, and others. He added that in his opinion the judges had ample
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During the week of the disorder, the Circuit Court of Wayne
County had suspended its operations, leaving twenty-six judges with
no official duties. On July 25 the services of these judges, and the
facilities of the Circuit Court, were offered to the Recorder's Court
to aid in the arraignments. Moreover, a number of municipal judges
from nearby communities also offered their services.62 Although
accepting these offers would have resulted in at least tripling the
judicial manpower available to process the disorder defendants, they
were rejected by the Recorder's Court. 63 The reasons given were that
the Circuit Court judges would be unfamiliar with the procedures of
the Recorder's Court, which has jurisdiction over all criminal cases
within the corporate limits of Detroit, that in any event the problem
was not judicial manpower but a clerical impasse, and that an at-
tempt was made to use clerks from the Circuit Court but they could
not be taught the necessary clerical procedures in time to be of any
assistance.64
These reasons are self-defeating. If there was in fact no problem
with judicial manpower (there are reports that some judges were
often waiting for people to arraign), then whatever justification did
exist for employing the "assembly-line techniques" disappears. If,
on the other hand, the concern was that a more deliberate approach
would put the court behind schedule, even though it was at the
time caught up, then the extra manpower should have been wel-
come, especially since the claim that it would have been difficult
to inform judges from another court how to perform what in essence
time to arraign individually and according to statutory guidelines. Interview with
Dennis James in Detroit, Aug. 8, 1967.
62. According to Judge Horace Gilmore, Wayne County Circuit Judge, some
thirty-five municipal judges from Wayne County and nine judges from Common Pleas
Court would have been available in addition to the twenty-six circuit court judges.
Interview with Judge Gilmore in Detroit, Aug. 17, 1967.
63. The offer of assistance by the Circuit Court was accepted during the second
week of the disorder insofar as the Recorder's Court transferred to the Circuit Court
old cases pending on its docket. No part of any case related to the disorder, however,
was handled by any court other than Recorder's Court. Interview, supra note 62.
64. Cyrus Vance reports that on Tuesday morning of the disorder the prosecutor
estimated that arraignments were about eight hours behind arrests, that by Wednesday
morning a police survey indicated that 2,200 prisoners were waiting in various precincts
to be recorded and that by Thursday morning there were still 1,500 prisoners in
precinct stations. VANCE REPORT 47. Some have suggested that a major contributing
factor to the refusal of the court to accept help is the present controversy in Detroit
over whether to continue the existing court structure or to abolish the Recorder's
Court and merge its functions with those of the Circuit Court. The proffer of judicial
assistance might have been regarded as an implicit criticism suggesting the Recorder's
Court was incapable of performing its function in times of stress. See 47 MICH. ST. B. J.
31 (1968), which quotes a post-disorder "resolution of policy" by the Michigan supreme
court on the orderly treatment of persons accused of crime during a civil disturbance.
Adopted pursuant to MICH. CONST. art. VI, § 4, which vests the Michigan supreme
court with superintending control over all courts, the resolution states that, in the
event of a judicial emergency, the Chief Justice or his designate "shall direct and
coordinate the work of all affected courts, court employees, court officers and judicial
personnel for the duration of the emergency."
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is a simple procedure lacks conviction. Finally, if it is urged that the
lack of records was the key factor compelling the procedures used
and that expediency was merely a by-product, the experience of
Judge Crockett would be evidence to the contrary.6 5
The explanation one is left with is that the expedient procedures
were actually the result of a policy decision by a majority of the
court to forgo their judicial function and act instead as an arm of
the executive and administrative branches in an effort to help quell
the disorder. Given this judicial attitude, it is doubtful that the
presence of records would have resulted in any significant differences
in the court's approach. Their absence merely provided a conveni-
ent explanation for the procedures used, albeit a weak one--con-
sidering the experiences of one or two judges and the candid
remarks of some members of the court. It remains to be considered
whether the court's approach to restoring order did in fact con-
tribute to the immediate, or ultimate, good of the community, and
whether it was constitutional.
C. The Bail Policy Reconsidered
1. Constitutional and Statutory Requirements
a. Introductory considerations-applicability of the eighth amend-
ment and Michigan provisions on bail. The United States Supreme
Court has not yet incorporated the eighth amendment's prohibition
against excessive bail into the fourteenth amendment's due process
clause.66 However, several lower courts have recently adopted the
position that this part of the eighth amendment does now apply to
the states, 7 and most commentators agree that the Supreme Court
will so hold when it finally does rule on the issue.68 In view of the
Court's treatment of other provisions of the Bill of Rights,6 9 and the
65. See text accompanying notes 53-56 supra.
66. However, a very old case [O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323, 332 (1892)], holding
that the eighth amendment does not apply to the states, has been limited by Robinson
v. California, 370 US. 880 (1962), holding the eighth amendment prohibition of cruel
and unusual punishment applicable to the states by way of the fourteenth amendment.
67. See, e.g., two recent cases from the Eighth Circuit: Mastrian v. Hedman, 326
F.2d 708, 711 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 965 (1964), and Pilkington v. Circuit
Court, 324 F.2d 45 (8th Cir. 1963), both containing dictum that "the excessive bail
prohibition of the Eighth Amendment [is] applicable to the states through the Four-
teenth Amendment." See also Dye v. Cox, 125 F. Supp. 714, 715 (E.D. Va. 1954) (incorpo-
ration through the fourteenth amendment assumed) and People ex rel. Schildhaus v.
Warden, 37 Misc.2d 660, 672, 235 N.Y.S.2d 531, 546 (1962) (incorporation through the
fourteenth amendment assumed).
68. E.g., Foote, The Coming Constitutional Crisis in Bail (pts. 1-2), 113 U. PA. L.
REv. 959, 1125 (1965); Silverstein, Bail in the State Courts-A Field and Study Report,
50 MINN. L. Pv. 621, 644 (1966).
69. See, e.g., Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965) (sixth amendment right of ac-
cused to be confronted with witnesses against him); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964)
(fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372
U.S. 335 (1963) (sixth amendment right to counsel applicable to states); Mapp v.




fundamental character of the bail provision,70 it would be somewhat
incongruous to decide otherwise. It will therefore be necessary to
consider both the state and the federal law applicable to this area
in assessing the performance of the Recorder's Court during the
disorder.
Michigan is one of those states whose constitution prohibits ex-
cessive bail in language identical to that of the eighth amendment
of the federal Constitution.71 However, unlike the federal Consti-
tution, the Michigan Constitution also provides an express right
to bail prior to conviction, except where the charge is murder or
treason and "the proof is evident or the presumption great.172 More-
over, there are guidelines in the Michigan Code indicating the fac-
tors to be considered in effectuating this right.73
b. Constitutionality of the high bail policy. At the outset it is
helpful to distinguish the use of high bail as a detention device
from the concept of preventive detention, which has the same ob-
jective but accomplishes it by denying bail altogether. Although the
result of employing either procedure is the same for the defendant,
different arguments are germane to a consideration of their legality
and practicality. Initially the focus of discussion here will be the
constitutionality of high bails, since this was the device used in
Detroit. In theory, the bail system is essentially a delicate compro-
mise between the legitimate conflicting interests of the defendant
and the state. At the time bail is set the accused has merely been
charged with, not convicted of, an offense, and the presumption of
innocence and a sensitivity to punishment prior to conviction cut
against the imposition of pretrial detention. As one court put it,
"Release on bond is a concomitant of the presumption of innocence.
Refusal of freedom in violation of the mandate of our organic law
would constitute punishment before conviction, a notion abhorrent
to our democratic system."74 On the other hand, the state does have
70. For an excellent short review of the role of bail as an essential safeguard against
imposition on and harassment of the defendant in criminal cases in both early English
and American colonial law, see Foote, supra note 68, at 965-92.
71. "Excessive bail shall not be required." MICH. CoNsT. art. 1, § 16.
72. MIcH. CONsr. art. 1, § 15.
73. MICH. CoAip. LAws §§ 765.5, 766.6 (1948). Section 766.6 provides: "The amount
of recognizance shall be fixed with consideration of the seriousness of the offense
charged, the previous criminal record of the defendant, and the probability of his
appearing at the trial of the cause."
Cf. FED. R. CRIm. P. 46(c):
If the defendant is admitted to bail, the amount thereof shall be such as in the
judgment of the commissioner or court or judge or justice will insure the presence
of the defendant, having regard to the nature and circumstances of the offense
charged, the weight of the evidence against him, the financial ability of the de-
fendant to give bail, and the character of the defendant.
74. New Jersey v. Konigsberg, 33 N.J. 367, 373, 164 A.2d 740, 745 (1960). See also
Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 4 (1951): "Unless this right to bail before trial is preserved,




a legitimate interest in securing the presence of the defendant within
its jurisdiction at the time of the trial so that it will have an oppor-
tunity to rebut the presumption of innocence. Bail accommodates
these competing interests by preserving the defendant's freedom
pending trial if he provides sufficient security, in the judgment of
the court, to insure his appearance at the trial.
It follows from this that imposing bail will be justified only
when it is in fact necessary to assure the presence of the accused
at his trial, and that if it is set, the amount must be reasonably
related to achieving that end. The Supreme Court seemed to recog-
nize this in Stack v. Boyle76 when it held that the standards of rule
46(c) 76 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure established the
proper criteria for setting bail in federal noncapital cases. And
Michigan's courts, as well as those in most other states, have also
expressed their agreement with this principle. 77
Since the purpose of bail is to insure the presence of the accused,
it also follows, and the Supreme Court has held, that "bail set
[at] a figure higher than an amount reasonably calculated to fulfill
this purpose is excessive under the Eighth Amendment."78 The
75. 342 U.S. 1 (1951). See also United States v. Radford, 361 F.2d 777 (4th Cir.
1966); United States v. Foster, 278 F.2d 567 (2d Cir. 1960); Heikkinen v. United States,
208 F.2d 788 (7th Cir. 1953); United States ex rel. Rubinstein v. Mulcahy, 155 F.2d 1002
(2d Cir. 1946).
76. See note 73 supra.
77. E.g., People v. Benmore, 298 Mich. 701, 299 N.W. 773 (1941); People v. Mc-
Donald, 233 Mich. 98, 266 N.V. 516 (1925); Isbell v. Bay, 215 Mich. 384, 183 N.W.
721 (1921). See also State v. Clark, 234 Iowa 333, 341, 11 N.W.2d 722, 724, cert. denied,
323 U.S. 739 (1944); Craig v. Commonwealth, 288 Ky. 157, 161, 155 S.W.2d 768, 770
(1941); State v. Chivers, 198 La. 1098, 1102, 5 S.2d 363, 364 (1941).
Although appellate courts consistently espouse assurance of the presence of the
accused at trial as the foundation of the bail rationale, studies indicate that at the
trial level a different story may appear. Thus, "in practice, probably because of
inadequate factual information, bail is usually set solely according to the offense
charged, with little consideration given to the likelihood of flight in the particular
case or to the accused's financial means." Note, Preventive Detention Before Trial, 79
HARv. L. REv. 1489, 1491 (1966). See also D. FaRPa & P. WtA, BAIL IN THE UN=T
STATEs: 1964, at 116 (1964): "In many localities, the police, prosecutor and judge simply
adhere to a fixed schedule geared to the nature of the offense. As a rule, little or no
inquiry or allowance is made for individual differences between defendants based on
their likelihood to appear at trial." Other studies reaching similar conclusions include:
REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMMITTEE ON POVERTY AND THE ADMINISTRATION
OF FEDERAL CIMINAL JUSTIcE 62 (1963) [hereinafter ATr'Y GENs. CoMMrrrE REPORT];
Foote, Compelling Appearance in Court: Administration of Bail in Philadelphia, 102
U. PA. L. REv. 1031, 1043 (1954); Note, A Study of the Administration of Bail in New
York City, 106 U. PA. L. REV. 693, 712-15 (1958). See also note 15 supra.
78. Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 4 (1951). The same rule applies in Michigan [People
v. McDonald, 233 Mich. 98, 206 N.W. 516 (1925)] and in most other states, e.g., Gusick
v. Boles, 72 Ariz. 233, 233 P.2d 446 (1951); In re Stegman, 112 N.J. Eq. 72, 163 A. 422
(1932); People ex rel. Sammons v. Snow, 340 Ill. 464, 173 N.E. 8 (1930).
The logical extension of this argument is that when the defendant for whom bail
is being set is an indigent, any bail at all is excessive. The whole bail system, as an
equitable method of dealing with the pretrial period, has come under increasing
attack in recent years for just this reason. Since the bail policy in Detroit during the
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problem, however, is to determine when an amount is "reasonably
calculated" to achieve the permissible purpose. Because this will
vary depending on the circumstances of any particular case, bail-
setting magistrates have been accorded broad discretion in deter-
mining the requisite figure. Both federal and state appellate courts
generally refrain from altering the bail set, unless there has been a
gross abuse of discretion.7 9 And if the original bail-setter has given
consideration, even ostensibly, to the applicable statutory guidelines,
there will rarely be occasion for finding such an abuse. As one com-
mentator has put it, "the issue [of what standards were used in set-
ting bail] is likely to come up only if the judge lets the cat out of
the bag by explicitly verbalizing his improper motive."8' 0
Turning to a consideration of the bail policy during the dis-
order, it is readily apparent that the fundamental purpose of bail
was disregarded in favor of the more immediate objective of con-
trolling the disturbance. Indeed, it was publicly acknowledged by
riots was such that substantially everyone, indigent and nonindigent alike, was sub-
jected to the same detention because of inability to pay, it is unnecessary to reach
this specific in appraising its constitutionality. Nevertheless, the problems involved are
so substantial and timely that some mention is merited. The Eighth Circuit has
recently stated that "[t]he mere financial inability of the defendant to post an
amount otherwise meeting the aforesaid standard [assurance of appearance at trial]
does not automatically indicate excessiveness. The purpose for bail cannot in all
instances be served by only accommodating the defendant's pocketbook and his desire
to be free pending possible conviction." White v. United States, 330 F.2d 811, 814 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 855 (1964). On the other hand, Justice Douglas has asserted:
"Further reflection has led me to conclude that no man should be denied release
because of indigence," Bandy v. United States, 82 S. Ct. 11, 13 (1960) (in chambers).
Foote, supra note 68, is primarily concerned with the problem of bail for indigents.
His premise is that "it is a fair guess that the next major clash between our norms of
actual administration and the constitutional theories expounded in recent years by
the Supreme Court will revolve around the discrimination against the poor which is
inherent in the bail system." His conclusion on this issue is that the rule of Griffin v.
Illinois, 351 US. 12 (1955), should be extended to the bail situation and that pretrial
detention of an accused who would go free but for his indigence is a violation of the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.
See also ATr'Y GENS. CoMAirrEE REPORT; D. FREED & P. WALD, BAIL IN THE UNrrED
STATSs: 1964, 15-16 (1964); Foote, Comment on the New York Bail Study, 106 U. PA.
L. REv. 686 (1959); Foote, Compelling Appearance in Court: Administration of Bail in
Philadelphia, 102 U. PA. L. REv. 1031, 1032-33 (1954); Packer, Two Models of the
Criminal Process, 113 U. PA. L. REv. 1 (1964); Note, Administration of Bail in New
York City, 106 U. PA. L. RLv. 693, 711-12 (1958); Rankin, The Effect of Pretrial Reten-
tion, 39 N.Y.U.L. REv. 641 (1964).
79. "A federal court would not be entitled to act in substitution of judgment for
that of the state court. What the state did would have to be beyond the range within
which judgments could rationally differ in relation to the apparent elements of the
situation." Mastrian v. Hedman, 326 F.2d 708, 711 (8th Cir. 1964). See also United
States v. Radford, 361 F.2d 777 (4th Cir. 1966); United States v. Foster, 296 F.2d 249, 251
(4th Cir. 1961); Kaufnan v. United States, 325 F.2d 305 (1963); Gusick v. Boies, 72
Ariz. 233, 233 P.2d 446 (1951); Application of Friedman, 46 Cal. 2d 810, 299 P.2d 217
(1956); Green v. Pettit, 222 Ind. 467, 54 N.E.2d 281 (1944); Ex parte Espinosa, 144
Tex. 121, 188 S.W.2d 576 (1945).
80. Foote, supra note 68, at 994 n.160.
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some Recorder's Court judges that they used bail as a device to keep
people off the streets.8 This candor would itself seem to establish
a prima facie case of an abuse of discretion. Yet, even in the absence
of admissions, the case for an abuse of discretion would be sub-
stantial. For one thing, the only information relevant to insuring
the presence of the accused which was available to the judges was
the nature of the offense charged. The defendant's prior criminal
record was unavailable at the bail-setting stage, and the factors indi-
cating whether he would appear at trial, such as his marital and
employment status and his residential ties to the community, were
generally disregarded. Indeed, the uniformity of the bails set, seem-
ingly irrespective of the offense charged, makes it questionable
whether even that factor was seriously considered.
Moreover, the drastic reductions in the amount of bail for prac-
tically every defendant once the disorder had ended 2 is further
evidence that the original figure bore little relation to assuring his
presence at trial. Of course, it might be argued that these reductions
reflected a bona fide judicial assessment of a change in the proba-
bility that defendants would return for trial. But that suggestion
seems unrealistic in light of the fact that no effort was made during,
or following, the civil disorder to analyze what effect such a disorder
might have on the probabilities of future appearance by defendants.
A more realistic interpretation, and one supported by the perfor-
mance of the court throughout the period of the arraignments on
the warrant, 3 is that in the eyes of the judges there was no longer
a compelling need to keep people off the streets, and it was there-
fore "safe" to return to normal amounts of bail.
Since the risk of nonappearance at trial was still very much at
issue when the bonds were reduced, the assumption seems warranted
that the new amounts, although based exclusively on prior criminal
record, reflected a truer judicial assessment of the probabilities of
subsequent appearance by defendants. It follows from this that the
original bails were not only based on improper considerations, but
were arbitrary and excessive as well.
Finally, even if these factors are disregarded, it is arguable that
the bails set during the disorder present that unique situation in which
an abuse of discretion is indicated by the amount alone. It is cer-
tainly questionable, except in the most unusual case, whether a
10,000 or 25,000 dollar bond is necessary to insure the pres-
ence at trial of someone charged with "looting"-entering without
breaking but with intent to commit larceny8 4 The maximum sen-
81. See text accompanying notes 28-29 supra.
82. See notes 30-35 supra and accompanying text.
83. See part II.B.1. supra.
84. See note 51 supra.
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tence for this offense, which was the most prevalent charge during
the disorder, is five years. If the accused jumps bail he risks recap-
ture and the possibility of another four years in prison."8 It would
seem that this alone would be sufficient in most cases to prevent
him from absconding.
Since bail has a direct effect on the liberty of the accused, the
due process requirements of the fourteenth amendment were appli-
cable to the arraignments on the warrant. 81 And yet, the most fun-
damental aspect of due process8 7 was apparently ignored during the
disorder. As the Supreme Court stated in Stack v. Boyle, "[t]he tradi-
tional standards as expressed in the Federal Rules of Criminal Pro-
cedure [46(c)] are to be applied in each case to each defendant....
To infer from the fact of indictment alone a need for bail in an
unusually high amount is an arbitrary act."88 Recorder's Court
judges ignored both of these precepts by arraigning defendants in
groups according to the offense charged and then setting bail on
the basis of that charge.
Having thus concluded that the high bail policy adopted by the
Recorder's Court during the disorder was both excessive and arbitrary
under settled constitutional standards, it now becomes necessary
to deal with the contention that the existence of a disorder justifies
deviations from these standards.
One reason advanced for circumventing constitutional standards
during a civil disorder is that any offense committed during such a
disturbance is, because of the circumstances, more serious than it
otherwise would be. In assessing this argument, it is helpful to dis-
tinguish between the two types of criminal conduct which are likely
to occur during a disorder. The first type involves conduct which initi-
85. Micrr. Con. LAws § 750.199a: "Any person who shall abscond on or forfeit a
bond given in any criminal proceedings wherein a felony is charged shall be deemed
guilty of a felony." MicH. Comp. LAws § 750.503 (1948) provides that a felony for which
no punishment is specifically provided the punishment shall be four years imprison-
ment or $2,000 or both. Foote, supra note 68, at 1163 says that "[t]he principal deterrent
against flight is the danger of being caught again and suffering added detriment as a
result." See also ATr'Y GENs. CoMMrrEE REPORT 78; Hearings on Making Bail Jump-
ing a Separate Crime, Before the Subcommittee of the House Committee on the Judi-
ciary, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., at 2 (1954).
86. "[A state] may not, any more than as to other substantive or procedural benefits
under its criminal law system, engage in such administration as arbitrarily or dis-
criminatorily to effect denial or deprivation of the right [to bail, where provided by
the state] to a particular accused." Mastrian v. Hedman, 326 F.2d 708, 711 (8th Cir.
1964). But see Foote, supra note 68, at 1181: "Where we have a specific provision which,
given a reasonable interpretation, deals satisfactorily with today's manifestations of
the problem concerned, it seems far better to use that provision than to load pretrial
detention problems upon the already overburdened and not very secure shoulders of
due process."
87. "Protection of the individual against arbitrary action is the very essence of due
process." Slochower v. Bd. of Higher Educ. of New York, 350 U.S. 551, 559 (1956); Ohio
Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 301 U.S. 292, 301 (1937).
88. 342 U.S. 1, 5 (1951).
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ates or perpetuates the violence in the community. It would include
such offenses as inciting to riot, arson, sniping, or other acts of a
particularly violent nature. Because of their probable catalytic effect,
it seems justified to say that the fact that these offenses occur in the
context of a disorder makes them more serious than they otherwise
would have been. The imposition of higher bails for those charged
with committing such offenses may therefore be warranted.
The second type of civil disorder offense, by far the more nu-
merous,"' does not usually involve particularly destructive or vio-
lent conduct. It consists of looting, violating the curfew, or possibly
even resisting arrest. As to this type of offense it would seem an
oversimplification to say that because it occurs in the context of a
civil disorder it is necessarily more serious. Certainly some of the
people who committed these types of offenses were exploiting the
situation and perpetuating the disorder, and in that sense their
conduct was particularly reprehensible. 0 However, much of the
looting or curfew violating which took place during the Detroit
disorder was also due to a carnival atmosphere in the ghetto.9 1
Swept up in the excitement and confusion, led on by bolder asso-
ciates, and enticed by the opportunity to get something for nothing,
people who normally obey the law engaged in criminal conduct
during the disturbance. Naturally, those who did so should be pun-
ished. However, as to the amount of bail to be set for this kind of
conduct, it may have been fallacious to assume that because it oc-
cured during a civil disorder, it was a fortiori more serious and re-
quired a higher bail to insure the presence of the defendant at trial.
Another argument advanced in support of high bails during a
disorder is that persons released on bond are more likely to commit
new crimes following their release than they would be if there were
not a disturbance in progress. Apparently, the reasoning is that
since more people commit crimes during a civil disorder than when
there is not such a disorder, it follows that more will do so if re-
leased back into the fray. This argument, however, ignores the fact
that prior to release there has been an arrest with its attendant
89. "Fifty-five per cent of all prosecuted arrests were for looting." COMMISSION
REPORT 184 (GPO ed.), 339 (paper ed.) n.4 "Looting charges comprised 84% of the
felony arrests in Detroit." Id. at 184 (GPO ed.), 339 (paper ed.).
90. Some states make special provision for persons who attempt to take advantage
of a disorder and as a consequence make the disorder even worse. See, e.g., MINN.
STAT. § 609.52(3) (1965).
91. This observation was made by William Bledsoe, Assistant State Attorney Gen-
eral assigned to the Michigan Civil Rights Commission in a Panel Discussion, The
Detroit "Riot": A Challenge to Society and the Legal Profession presented at the
University of Michigan Law School, Oct. 11, 1967. (A transcript is available for inspec-
tion in Michigan Law Review files.) See COMMISSION REPORT 51 (GPO ed.), 91 (paper
ed.): "A spirit of carefree nihilism was taking hold. To riot and destroy appeared
more and more to become ends in themselves. Late Sunday afternoon it appeared to
one observer that the young people were 'dancing amidst the flames."'
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formalities, a period of detention, and an appearance before a judge
who undoubtedly impressed upon the accused the possible conse-
quences of reinvolvement in the lawlessness. Such exposure to the
criminal system may be sufficiently sobering for the defendant to
lead him to conclude that for him the party is over. This would
seem to be particularly true in regard to those persons who became
involved in the first place only because of the excitement and novelty
of the disorder.
Admittedly, this analysis is largely conjecture, and, due to a lack
of available empirical data,92 it can be no more than that. However,
it does suffice to cast doubt on the validity of the assumption that
persons released on bond during a riot are likely to commit new
offenses.
Moreover, even if such an assumption is warranted, it should
have no bearing on the amount of bail to be set. Because it so
plainly offends the presumption of innocence and constitutes pun-
ishment prior to conviction,93 the likelihood of future crimes has
always been considered an inappropriate criterion for the bail
decision. As Justice Jackson declared in Williamson v. United
States, "[i]mprisonment to protect society from predicted but uncon-
summated offenses is so unprecedented in this country and so
fraught with danger of excesses and injustice that I am loath to
resort to it .... ,9
And yet, predicted future offenses were obviously considered by
some of the Recorder's Court judges during the Detroit disorders.
Typical of their attitude was one judge's statement that "[y]ou
know what would happen if we let them [apprehended persons]
back on [the streets]." 95 Indeed, in personal interviews some of
these judges argued that the "effect of release on the community"
92. See Foote, supra note 71, at 1170. "Probably we know least about the degree of
probability that a defendant during the period of pretrial release will commit a
serious crime. Here we have no data at all, but it is inconceivable that the prob-
ability is higher than five per cent and more likely it is considerably lower." Some
statistical evidence as set out in Note, Preventive Detention Before Trial, 79 HAtv. L.
REv. 1489, 1496 (1966):
Statistics provided by release-on-recognizance projects show that few of the de-
fendants are rearrested while on pretrial release. In St. Louis four defendants out
of 170 released were rearrested; in Des Moines, 2 out of 160. . . .Of the over
3,200 accused persons released on the recommendation of the Vera Foundation,
about 20, or less than one per cent, are known to have been arrested while await-
ing trial.
93. See Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1951) (Jackson, concurring): "[T]he spirit of
the [bail] procedure is to enable ...[defendants] to stay out of jail until a trial has
found them guilty"; the resulting danger to society "is a calculated risk which the
law takes as the price of our system of justice." See also Packer, supra note 81, at 1:
"To speak of the possibility that the accused many commit further crimes if left at
large begs the question, since it has not yet been determined that he has committed
any crime at all."
94. 184 F.2d 280, 282 (1950) (Jackson, Circuit Justice).
95. See notes 28-29 supra.
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was a legitimate concern in setting bail, supported by case law.
Apparently this "case law" is the recent Michigan Court of Appeals
decision in In re Colacasides, where the statement appears: "In de-
ciding whether to set bail on appeal, courts consider not only the
likelihood of appearance, but also the possible harm to the com-
munity."9 Colacasides, however, is distinguishable from a civil
disorder situation in several respects: (1) it was a civil contempt
case arising under Michigan's one-man grand jury statute; 97 (2) the
issue was not the amount of bail but whether to set any bail at all,
a question not open in a criminal case in Michigan unless the charge
is murder or treason; 98 (3) the bail question came up on appeal
rather than pending initial trial; and (4) the court limited its hold-
ing by stating that "[w]e regard [the public interest] as a valid con-
sideration in a case such as this."' 9 Colacasides is therefore dubious
authority for the proposition that the likelihood of future criminal
conduct is generally an appropriate consideration in setting bail.100
Nor is it easy to see why the existence of a civil disorder should
somehow make the effect of release on the community suddenly
relevant to the bail decision. The constitutional objections to con-
sidering this factor outside the civil disorder context are still ap-
plicable, and the purpose of bail-insuring the presence of the
accused at trial-remains the same.
It has also been suggested that the urgency of a civil disorder
situation forces judges to set bail without adequate information and
that this justifies high bonds, and the resultant detention, until the
necessary data become available. But the experience of Judge
Crockett' 01 would seem to reveal the flaw in this logic. He demon-
strated that to the extent volunteers are available to assist in gather-
ing and verifying the information relevant to the bail decision,
amounts which are within constitutional and statutory limits can
be set.
Unfortunately, there may not always be sufficient volunteers to
perform this vital function, particularly in the early stages of a riot,
and thus the judge may well have little relevant data on which to
96. 6 Mich. App. 292, 300, 148 N.W.2d 898, 900 (1967).
97. MicH. CoMP. LAws § 767.3 (1948).
98. MICH. CONsT. art. 1, § 15.
99. 6 Mich. App. at 292, 148 N.V.2d at 901.
100. Cases in which endangering the safety of the community has been thought
to be relevant [e.g., Rehman v. California, 85 S. Ct. 8, cert. denied, 379 U.S. 930
(Douglas, Circuit Justice 1964), Carbo v. United States, 82 S. Ct. 662 (Douglas, Circuit
Justice 1962), Leigh v. United States, 82 S. Ct. 994 (Warren, Circuit Justice 1962)] all ap-
pear to have involved issue of bail pending appeal where the defendant has already
been convicted and the question is whether bail should be set at all, rather than at
what amount it should be set. In Carbo, Justice Douglas gave some indication of
the judicial attitude toward the degree of proof required in this type of case when
he said "[mIt is my reluctant conclusion that there is a substantial probability of danger
to the witnesses . . ." (emphasis added).
101. See text accompanying notes 53-56 supra.
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base his decision. However, this would not seem to be a factor
which reinforces the concept of high bails during a civil disorder.
Indeed, due process and the presumption of innocence would seem
to require that "to the extent adequate investigative and other fact-
finding resources are not brought to bear, the defendant is entitled
to go free on nominal or no bail. '102 The high bail solution to the
problem, on the other hand, would result in clearly illegal detention
as has already been indicated.
c. The possibilities of preventive detention in the context of a
civil disorder. An alternative to prohibitively high bonds as a means
of preventing rioters from returning to the streets is the concept of
preventive detention. This approach, whereby bail is denied alto-
gether, is based on the notion that some defendants are "dangerous"
and would pose a threat to the community if released. 1 3 The advo-
cates of preventive detention 04 argue that it is more honest and
more consonant with due process than "the practice of setting exor-
bitant bail as an indirect means of detaining persons considered
dangerous .. . ."105 That it is more honest is obvious. That it is
more consonant with due process, or that it is even practicable in
the context of a civil disorder, is less evident.
The first constitutional impediment to preventive detention is
the contention that the eighth amendment or comparable state con-
stitutional and statutory provisions establish an absolute right to
bail for all, or certain classes of, cases. Naturally, if there is a right
to bail, as distinguished from a mere prohibition of excessive bail
102. Packer, supra note 78, at 1. A possible alternative to releasing civil disorder
prisoners on nominal or no bail is to delay their arraignments until sufficient data
is available to make an informed decision on the amount of bail which should be set.
Under this procedure there remains a period of detention which would be unnecessary
under most circumstances and the rule under Michigan law is that the arraignment of
an accused must be held "without unnecessary delay," [MicH. CoMP. LAws § 764.13
(1948)] but arguably detention which is due to a clerical log-jam like that which oc-
curred in Detroit is "necessary." The problem with such an approach is that even though
"necessary," such detention still may not conform with the presumption of innocence.
Moreover, this approach makes it possible to achieve the same results those of pro-
hibitively high bonds by inducing clerks to "slow down" their ordinary pace. See Foote,
supra note 68, at 964:
Any resolution of the detention problem involves an allocation of inescapable
costs. Someone has to pay a price for the fact that we have to have a pretrial period
between accusation and final adjudication. If defendants are locked up, the cost is
borne by those among them who are innocent or prejudiced by the detention. If
they are all released, society pays in those cases where the defendant flies or
commits new crimes. In theory our system inclines to the second alternative.
103. See Note, Preventive Detention, 36 Gao. WAsH L. Rav. 178, 179 (1967): "The
need for separate, formal preventive detention procedures is based on the assumption
that there are violent defendants who would pose a substantial threat to community
safety if released prior to trial." See also DisTRacr OF COLUMBIA COAIMI=rE ON THE
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTIc E UNDER EMERGENcY CONDITIONS, INTERI u REPORT 82-94
(1968).
104. E.g., Note, supra note 103.
105. Note, supra note 103, at 178.
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in those cases in which bail is set, utilization of preventive detention
would require constitutional amendment, or suspension of the right
during a civil disorder. 0 6
Those who contend that eighth amendment-type prohibitions
against excessive bail do not imply an absolute right to bail point
to Carlsen v. Landon,10 7 where a sharply divided Supreme Court
upheld the denial of bail to alien Communists pending a deter-
mination of their deportability under the Internal Security Act.
The majority relied on the fact that "the very language of the
Amendment fails to say all arrests must be bailable."' 08 However,
in addition to the fact that the decision was five-to-four, with vig-
orous dissents, the case was only quasi-criminal in nature and was
decided during an era of strong anti-Communist sentiment. It is
therefore unique and would not seem to be sufficient authority to
compel a similar result in criminal cases.
Other support for the view that the federal Constitution grants
no absolute right to bail is derived from the fact that bail is not
mandatory in federal capital cases, 0 9 or on appeal," 0 or in certain
civil proceedings."' Moreover, various courts have classified the
right to bail as exclusively statutory." 2 These types of cases, how-
ever, may be distinguishable and not conclusive with regard to non-
capital criminal cases. Furthermore, there are decisions which do
imply a right to bail from provisions prohibiting excessive bail,1
8
and it has been argued that if this is not the case, a fundamental
constitutional provision could be subjected to the vagaries of legis-
lative and judicial action, creating an anomaly in the Bill of
Rights."
4
Whatever may be the definitive answer to this question of an
absolute right to bail, it is enough to point out that the problem
will have to be met before preventive detention can be constitu-
tionally justified. This is particularly true in Michigan, where by
constitution and statute it is provided there shall be absolute right
106. See Ex parte Ball, 106 Kan. 536, 188 P. 424 (1920); Note, supra note 80, at 1500.
107. 342 U.S. 524 (1952).
108. 342 U.S. at 546.
109. 342 U.S. at 546 (dictum).
110. Rehman v. California, 85 S. Ct. 8 (Douglas, Circuit Justice), cert. denied, 379
U.S. 930 (1964); Leigh v. United States, 82 S. Ct. 994 (Warren, Circuit Justice 1962);
Carbo v. United States, 82 S. Ct. 662 (Douglas, Circuit Justice 1962).
111. E.g., Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 534 (1962); In re Colacasides, 6 Mich. App.
296, 148 N.W.2d 898 (1967).
112. See, e.g., Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1 (1951); Hudson v. Parker, 156 U.S. 277, 285
(1895); Mastrian v. Hedman, 326 F.2d 708, 710 (8th Cir. 1964) ("Neither the Eighth
Amendment nor the Fourteenth Amendment requires that everyone charged with a
state offense must be given his liberty pending trial.'); Prentis v. Manoogian, 16 F.2d
422 (1926).
113. E.g., Trimble v. Stone, 187 F. Supp. 483 (1960); United States v. Motlow, 10
F.2d 657 (7th Cir. 1926). See also Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524 (1952) (dissent).
114. Foote, supra note 68, at 965-89.
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to bail in all cases except murder or treason where the proof is
evident or the presumption great." 5 Of course, the recent case of
In re Colacasides,16 noted earlier in the discussion of high bail
policy, is a Michigan case in which bail was denied. That case, how-
ever, distinguishable from civil disorder cases in the context of high
bail, is also distinguishable, for much the same reasons," 7 in the
context of preventive detention, and cannot be presumed to be au-
thority for the proposition that Michigan's statutory or constitu-
tional provisions with respect to bail would presently permit pre-
ventive detention in criminal cases where the charge was other than
treason or murder.
Even if the eighth amendment were read as not implying a right
to bail and the Michigan provisions did not exist, pretrial preventive
detention would face formidable due process problems."18 The fact
that it is constitutionally permissible to confine persons following
arrest on probable cause and pending arraignment, and in some
cases to confine persons without bail for capital offenses and certain
civil offenses, indicates that despite the presumption of innocence
due process does not prohibit all confinement prior to conviction.
Nevertheless, the standards frequently advanced" 9 as possible bases
for preventive detention, such as dangerousness to the community,
risk of nonappearance, the danger that the accused will commit a
crime following release, or the possibility that he will intimidate
witnesses, harm the complainant, or attempt to influence a juror,
may be so immeasurable or elusive that they would be improper
criteria for pretrial confinement. Surely, in order to be consistent
with due process, standards would at least have to be "sufficiently
narrow to require proof of particular circumstances which set the
individual case apart from the general run of cases, [or] there [would
be] no real limits on detention.' 12 Whether such precise standards
could in fact be formulated is questionable.
Assuming, however, that sufficiently precise standards could be
devised, the concept of preventive detention would also create prob-
lems of a practical nature. Preventive detention schemes generally
envision "that there is or will be an investigatory system before a
115. MICH. CONsr. art. 1, §§ 15, 16; MICH. COMP. LAws §§ 765.5, 765.6 (1948).
116. 6 Mich. App. 298, 148 N.W.2d 898 (1967).
117. See text accompanying notes 96-99 supra.
118. "Such proposals [for preventive detention] have all the seductive appeal of the
maxim that an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure, but the impropriety of
the application of that maxim to a democratic system of criminal law should give one
pause." Foote, The Coming Constitutional Crisis in Bail, 113 U. PA. L. Rav. 1125, 1165
(1965).
119. See, e.g., Foote, supra note 118, at 1166.
120. Foote, supra note 118, at 1167. See also Note, supra note 92, at 1505, 1507:
"One great danger of a preventive detention system is that, once established, it might
not be restricted to the cases presenting the clear and substantial danger which required
its establishment... A broad standard would also provide a shield for some of the
abuses which exist under the present system."
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person competent to make the necessary prediction, with right to
counsel, a hearing, an opportunity to contest the facts and their
application to law, and provisions for appellate review."'121 This
necessarily means that there will be delay and confinement of the
defendant while such a procedure is conducted. Therefore, while in
theory preventive detention may be a significant improvement over
"a bail magistrate's instinct or quiet conclusion that the defendant
constitutes a threat to society,"'122 in practice it could result in long
periods of detention for many defendants who would not ultimately
be found detainable under standards sufficiently narrow to satisfy
due process. And indeed, it is even questionable whether in fact
any standard of dangerousness could be formulated which would
be any more reliable than the "instinct or quiet conclusion" of a
bail magistrate.
23
It is also important to realize that the application of preventive
detention principles during a disorder would present all of the above
difficulties, and probably others. Any notion of dangerousness to
the community would still have to focus on the specific characteris-
tics of the individual defendant which make him dangerous enough
to detain. Even if it is assumed that the existence of a civil disorder
might, consonant with due process, justify less evidence of danger-
ousness, it hardly follows that the disorder could act as a substitute
for all evidence of this characteristic. And since the typical offender
in a civil disorder may just as plausibly be viewed as less of a
hardened criminal and threat to the community 24 than someone
charged with the same offense under normal circumstances, it may
be more, rather than less, difficult to establish the requisite element
of dangerousness during a disorder.
An even more serious consequence of a disorder on any preven-
tive detention scheme would be the practical problem of administra-
tion. The Detroit experience is adequate evidence that clerical and
administrative problems can contribute to a disregard for proper bail
standards. 25 Add to this the need for information to make a judi-
cious prediction of dangerousness, full-scale hearings, appellate re-
121. Foote, supra note 118, at 1165. See also Note, supra note 103, at 180.
122. Note, supra note 103, at 180.
123. See the statement of Deputy Attorney General, Hearings on S. 1357, S. 646,
S. 617, and S. 648 Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights and the Subcomm. on
Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th
Cong., 1st Sess. 26 (1965):
Under all the circumstances, legislative authorization of preventive detention at
this time seems unwarranted. Too much progress has been made and can be made
within the framework of the techniques available under the present law and the
proposed conventional approach to risk the great uncertainties, legal and practical,
which follow preventive detention.
See also THE ABA PROJECT ON MINIMUMa STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: STANDARDS
RELATING TO PRETRIAL RELEASE 69 (1968) concludes "reluctantly," after a discussion of the
many problems involved, that it should not recommend the adoption of preventive
detention.
124. See text accompanying note 91 supra.
125. See text accompanying notes 86-43 supra.
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view, and the probability of requiring written opinions for each
defendant in order to make review effective, 126 and preventive deten-
tion would seem to be prohibitive on the basis of volume of work
and delay alone. The concept therefore seems to be an impractical
if not unconstitutional approach to handling defendants during a
disorder.
2. The Wisdom of the High Bail Policy
Having considered the legality of the bail policy adopted by the
Recorder's Court during the disorder, it is now pertinent to inquire
into the effects of that policy. In this regard, it should be remem-
bered that the court employed uniformly high bonds in order ex-
pediently to process disorder-related defendants and aid the au-
thorities in the task of control by preventing those arrested from
returning to the streets.
a. Added burdens on the court and detention facilities. Notwith-
standing the fact that it was thought to be expedient to conduct
speedy arraignments and to remand practically all arrested persons
to jail on prohibitively high bail, in the long run this procedure
resulted in greater burdens, in terms of the amount of time required
to arraign defendants, on the court. This was because for each pris-
oner so arraigned it was necessary to repeat the procedure at a later
time utilizing proper information and judicial standards. 127 At least
one means of avoiding this repetition would have been to adopt the
procedure used by Judge Crockett 28 or some similar procedure
designed to compensate for the lack of appropriate bail-setting in-
formation. 2
9
A more serious impact of the court's bail policy was the resulting
pressure on detention facilities and the officials responsible for hous-
ing, feeding, and administering the sudden influx of prisoners.
According to the report of the President's National Advisory Com-
mission on Civil Disorders,
Detroit's main city jail, built for 1,200 persons, was crammed with
over 1,700. Precinct lockups built for 50 prisoners received 150 or
more. The juvenile detention home built for 120 held over 600
during the riot. Makeshift detention facilities were commandeered;
1,000 arrestees were held in an underground police garage for several
days, many without food or water. Others were held for over 24
hours inside city buses. Adults of both sexes were sometimes locked
up together.130
126. See Foote, supra note 118, at 1175; Note, supra note 92, at 1506.
127. See text accompanying notes 33-35 supra.
128. See text accompanying notes 53-56 supra.
129. See note 102 supra.
130. COMMISsION REPORT 184-85 (GPO ed.), 340 (paper ed.).
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Another observer reported that "in regard to the use of police
garages, there was often no room to lie down, and if a person did,
he couldn't get up or he would lose his space. Men and women
were locked up together with no sanitary facilities and only a couple
of bologna sandwiches a day, in some cases thrown on the floor
... ."131 Certainly a policy resulting in reasonable bails at the ar-
raignment would have alleviated much of this overcrowding, not
to mention the cost incurred in detaining these prisoners.
b. The effect of the high bail policy on the community. It is also
significant to consider the reactions, or apparent reactions, to the
court's procedures during the disorder of that segment of the com-
munity which participated in or supported the lawlessness. Defen-
dants were embittered by the lack of individual consideration and
an apparent presumption of guilt at the arraignments on the war-
rant.132 According to one expert 133 who conducted extensive inter-
views in Detroit's ghetto areas immediately after the disorder, a typi-
cal response from defendants was, "When the judge said, 'Your
bond is $10,000,' he didn't even look up." This, of course, is hardly
surprising, considering the group arraignments used by the court.
In regard to the presumption of guilt entertained by at least some
judges, the following account, which appeared in The Detroit News,134
is instructive:
An accused looter was arraigned before one judge and requested a
personal bond. The judge responded,
"You can't get a personal bond in this court. You're nothing but
lousy, thieving looters."
The accused replied,
"You have to prove that."
The judge reddened and shot back,
"We will."
The inevitable consequence of this judicial attitude is increased
bitterness on the part of those who came in contact with the judicial
process. The view, already "pervasive among ghetto residents," that
"lower courts in our urban communities dispense 'assembly-line'
131. Remarks of Mr. Bledsoe, Panel Discussion, supra note 91.
132. E.g., the following interview with a prisoner conducted by Professor Nathan
Caplan of the University of Michigan:
Q: How do you feel today?
A: I could knock some man's head off. I feel like this now; if one of you should
dare touch me again, try to dehumanize me again, I'd kill you. Just like that
-outright kill you. And I ain't gonna have no compunctions about it. Kill
you.
Q: Are there many people who feel like you because they were arrested?
A: We all do. We all do. Those people are talking about... you know they kept
them there so long that everybody just said, we're going to do something when
we get out of here.
133. Professor Nathan Caplan, University of Michigan, who discussed some of his
preliminary observations and conclusions in Panel Discussion, supra note 91.
134. July 25, 1967, § A, at 4, col. 5.
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justice; that.., the poor and uneducated are denied equal justice
with the affluent . . ."13 was confirmed.
Moreover, the bitterness engendered by the court's methods was
not confined to the defendants themselves. Attitudes of friends and
relatives of those accused who could not communicate with or often
even locate them were also affected.136 As Professor Caleb Foote has
stated, "[a]mong the entire population subjected to pretrial detention
-and their relatives and friends-the felt injustices of punishment
without a finding of guilt cannot but impair that confidence in the
law's fairness which must be the touchstone of a jurisprudence dedi-
cated to respect for human dignity."' 37 This seems to be a partic-
ularly appropriate comment following the Detroit civil disorder.
Of course, it cannot be denied that the court's policy did achieve
the desired objective of keeping those arrested off the streets. On the
other hand, there is little factual support for the view that releasing
prisoners on bail would necessarily have resulted in greater disrup-
tion in the community. It is at least plausible that as to many of the
arrestees fair treatment by the court and release on bond with ap-
propriate judicial admonitions would have been a sufficiently sober-
ing experience to prevent reinvolvement.138 Such an approach might
also have been interpreted by the community involved in civil dis-
order as a gesture of good faith and helped to refute the claims of
those predicting injustice at the hands of the court. In this respect it
is interesting to note that "[c]ourts in several of the smaller cities
successfully experimented with release of offenders on their own re-
cognizance from the beginning of the riot."' 39
Although the Recorder's Court's policies made it impossible to
test these hypotheses, it seems important to raise them as possibilities.
Although the court's procedures may have succeeded as instruments
of control, they may also have sowed the seeds of future dis-
orders. As stated by the President's National Advisory Commission
135. COMMISSION REPORT 183 (GPO ed.), 337 (paper ed.).
136. Attorney Donald Hobson related several cases in which his clients had been
arrested the first Sunday and in which he could not even find out where they were being
detained until the following Friday, and could not secure their release until mid-way
through the following week. Hobson strongly felt that "being a lawyer was of no ad-
vantage whatever." Interview with Donald Hobson, in Detroit, Feb. 5, 1968.
Through interviews with the families of several defendants at the preliminary
examinations, it generally seemed to be the case that they had not seen each other
since before the time of arrest. Several stated they did not know where the object of
their concern was being held, and others that they had not been allowed to visit even
after they had found out where he was being held.
137. Foote, supra note 118, at 1137 (emphasis added).
138. See p. 1555 supra.
139. COMMISSION REPORT 185 (GPO ed.), 342 (paper ed.) The Dayton and New
Haven experiences are illustrative.
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on Civil Disorders, "[t]oo often the courts have operated to aggra-
vate rather than relieve the tensions that ignite and fire disorders.'
140
In that segment of the community which did not participate in
the disorder the high bail policy of the court seems to have met, on
the whole, with warm approval. Perhaps an editorial comment by
WXYZ-TV, a major Detroit television station, best reflected the
mood at the time: applauding Recorder's Court Judge Vincent Bren-
nan for his "firm and reassuring voice" in making it "clear to the
people that the rioters are not going to be treated gently in his
court," the editorial also commended "the Recorders Judges for mak-
ing sure the rioters weren't returned to the streets to continue their
violence. The idea of demanding high bonds .. . and keeping the
rioters in jail was proper support for our hard-working riot pa-
trols."141
It is probable that the judiciary's attitude and policies during the
early part of the disorder also had an effect on the way the police
and other law enforcement agencies performed their duties. Rather
140. CoMMIoN REPORT 183 (GPO ed.), 337 (paper ed.) This conclusion may be
strengthened by a consideration of the type of person who is most likely to be in-
volved in a disorder. In addition to the fact that this was the first contact with the
judicial process for over half of those arrested during the disorders, preliminary data
from both Detroit and Watts support the conclusion that the typical defendant is not
likely to be the traditional criminal type; according to Professor Nathan Caplan he
may in fact be quite the opposite. For instance, according to Caplan, while those
found to be most likely to be criminals are those new to a community and having
trouble assimilating, those most likely to participate in the disorder are those who have
lived in the community for a substantial period of time and have roots and a stake in
it. Moreover, Caplan's data indicates that there is good evidence that those who
might have been expected to participate but did not in Detroit were from areas of
high crime rates. Panel Discussion, The Detroit "Riot": A Challenge to Society and the
Legal Profession, presented at the University of Michigan Law School, Oct. 11, 1967. (A
transcript is available for inspection in Michigan Law Review files). T. M. Tomlinson
of the University of California, Los Angeles, reaches much the same conclusions in
Negro Reaction to the Los Angeles Riot and the Development of a Riot Ideology
(unpublished mimeo, 1967).
If in fact participants are not typically from the hardened criminal element, it is
likely that their reactions, and especially those of the participants facing a court for
the first time, would reflect greater sensitivity to judicial process than would the
usual criminal court clientele. According to the CoMtMIssIoN REPORT 185 (GPO ed.),
341 (paper ed.) n.9, only one of the several thousands released in Detroit after bail
review was known to have been rearrested, and then only for curfew violation.
141. Editorial, A Welcome Strong Voice, WXYZ-TV, Detroit, Michigan, telecast
Aug. 4, 7, 8, 10, 11, 13, 1967. The editorial went on to agree with Brennan's "suggestion
that the rioters, themselves, be forced to clean up the city .... In our view, the rioters
should not just go free after paying a fine ... or sit in jail while others clean up the
destruction they caused."
Time to reply to this editorial was granted to Ernest Mazey, Executive Director of
the Detroit Office of the American Civil Liberties Union, who said, inter alia, "The
arbitrary blanket policy of most Recorder's Court judges relative to high bonds, ir-
respective of either the charges against an individual or the individual's personal cir-
cumstances, constituted an abdication of judicial responsibility. We have a right to
expect more from our courts." His reply was telecast Aug. 16, 17, 18, 21, 422 24. 1967.
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than serve as a check on the enforcement branch, the court seemed
to join with them in the task of controlling the disturbance. Accord-
ing to Professor Frank Sengstock,
[t]he action of the court served as a green light for the police to
operate without reflecting on the limitations prescribed by the Con-
stitution. It was as though the court was saying: "We, the highest
authority of society not only condone, but approve of your actions.
Law and order must be established and damned be the price" ....
Police officers expressed in private conversations a feeling that the
courts and society were blessing their actions. 142
Although the courts and society should in fact bless the legitimate
efforts of the police in restoring order, an independent judiciary ca-
pable of overseeing police action is essential even in-perhaps espe-
cially in-a civil disorder situation.143 When a court compromises its
position as the impartial arbiter between the individual (or masses)
and the state, it is at best a tacit admission that the law enforcement
agencies cannot adequately maintain order on their own.
In any massive civil disturbance such as occurred in Detroit, a
basic policy decision will have to be made with regard to the role of
the courts. But the permissible limits of choice seem to be confined
to whether there will be a properly functioning court system or no
court system at all. In other words, the choice in each instance will
be whether the rule of law can be adhered to consistent with the
total welfare of the community or whether it must be abandoned and
supplanted by temporary martial law.144 Regardless of which of these
alternatives may have been proper under the circumstances existing
in Detroit, the middle ground of converting the court into an instru-
ment to control the disorder was constitutionally unacceptable, as
well as practically unsound.
3. Avenues of Remedy and Review of Excessive
Bail for Civil Disorder Defendants
a. Habeas corpus. (1) Availability of the writ at Recorder's Court
during the disorder. Given the constitutionally questionable stan-
dards used by the Recorder's Court judges in setting bail and the
resultant detention of thousands of persons throughout the state14 5
142. Sengstock, Address to American Association of Law Schools at their Annual
Convention, Dec. 29, 1967.
143. See COMMISSlON REPORT 186 (GPO ed.), 344 (paper ed.): "Dispassionate ob-
jectivity on the part of both the bench and the bar-always required and always diffli-
cult-becomes even more necessary when civil disorders occur. The passions of the
street must not enter the courtroom, to affect any step in the administration of
justice ......
144. For a quasi-martial law approach to dealing with disorder "ringleaders," see
Weiner, Helping To Cool the Long Hot Summers, 53 A.B.A.J. 713 (1967).
145. The Wayne County Jail, across the street from the Recorder's Court, was
filled with some 1,000 prisoners. Thereafter, penal and other facilities throughout the
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under less than satisfactory conditions, 146 one would have expected
a flood of habeas corpus petitions contesting the bases of detention.
To the contrary, very few writ petitions were ever filed on behalf of
disorder-related defendants, 47 and as a result the high bail policy was
not seriously challenged during the arraignments on the warrant.
One reason for the sparcity of writ applications was an absence of
attorneys ready and willing to file such petitions. Although a few
volunteer attorneys were present, there was no effort by the organized
bar on behalf of disorder defendants during the arraignments on the
warrant. 48 Another reason might have been the time element. As
noted earlier, many of the high bails set during the early days of the
disorder were systematically reconsidered and reduced to more rea-
sonable amounts by the end of the first week of disorder. 49 Also, the
original bonds for those arrested at this time were considerably
lower. This meant that prior to the time a defendant could secure
counsel he may have been released or had his bail reduced, thereby
eliminating the need for a review of the legality of his detention by
means of a petition for habeas corpus. Nevertheless, there was a sig-
nificant number of prisoners for whom high bails were retained, at
least until their preliminary examinations. Moreover, some of these
prisoners had defense attorneys who did petition the Recorder's
Court for writs of habeas corpus. Their experiences provide yet an-
other reason why others failed to attempt a similar effort.
The Recorder's Court did not formally suspend the writ of ha-
beas corpus during the disorder. However, there is evidence that at
least some judges employed the delay tactic of making writ applica-
tions returnable within a week or ten days after petition and thereby
destroyed the effectiveness of the writ. 50 Dennis James, director of
state were utilized to house the overflow. These included Jackson State Prison, where
1,200 were sent, Milan County Jail (200). Ionia (175), Monroe County Jail (50), Wash-
tenaw County Jail (50), Ingham County Jail (105). See The Detroit Free Press, July 29,
1967, § A, at 3, col. 3. In addition, 450 were housed in a makeshift compound at the
women's bathhouse on Belle Isle, a small island off Detroit in the Detroit River. An
unknown number of others were confined in bullpens at the Recorder's Court itself,
in vacant courtrooms under guard, and on buses. (Estimates run as high as seventy-five
prisoners per bus.)
146. See text accompanying notes 130-31 supra and note 262 infra.
147. See note 148 infra.
148. This information is based on an interview with Judge George W. Crockett.
Judge Crockett handled only one habeas corpus petition during the entire period of
the arraignments, and that one he himself suggested for a prisoner in the court bullpen
who had been seriously beaten, allegedly by a policeman, and for whom insufficient
information was available for arraignment. Judge Crockett appointed an attorney, told
him to petition for a writ, granted the writ, and released the man on personal bond.
149. See text accompanying notes 33-35 supra.
150. See Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 4 (1951): "Relief in this type of case must be
speedy if it is to be effective." Recorder's Court judges, by limiting confinement on
excessive bail largely to the worst period of the disorder made this maxim especially
applicable to disorder defendants.
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the NLS Bail Bond Project, 51 brought four writ petitions before
Judge Geraldine B. Ford on July 24. She ordered them returnable
on July 31, choosing to ignore the normal practice in Recorder's
Court of making writs returnable immediately.152 Since the prisoners
who were the subjects of these petitions were released on July 26,
when the court ordered personal recognizance for some 1,500
prisoners without prior criminal records, the effect of postponing
the writ hearing was to forestall a challenge to detention until the
question was mooted.
Ernest Goodman, another Detroit attorney with considerable ex-
perience in Recorder's Court, submitted writ petitions on Tuesday
of the disorder week for two of his clients. The writs were made re-
turnable and granted eight days later, his clients not having been
released in the meantime. However, before Goodman could actually
obtain his clients' release it took two more days for the sheriff to lo-
cate them, 15 and thus a total of ten days elapsed between the petition
for release on habeas corpus and the release itself.154 Goodman had
in the meantime attempted to secure a writ from the federal court,
but was told first to exhaust his state remedies.155
Whether it was the result of an agreed-upon policy or merely the
reaction of individual judges under pressure, the effect of this delay
tactic was to forestall challenges to the detention procedures of the
151. See note 15 supra.
152. A recent study of operations in Detroit Recorder's Court describes the normal
procedure for securing a writ of habeas corpus as follows:
An attorney's first step in securing a writ of habeas corpus is to notify the office of
the court clerk that he is requesting a writ. A hearing on the application is fixed,
usually within a few hours. The clerk notifies a supervisory officer in charge of the
division investigating the case that a writ is being requested. The investigating offi-
cer is then told to appear in court to represent the police department .... After
the clerk has been informed of the petition, the attorney brings the writ and peti-
tion to the presiding judge's court, where it is handed to the clerk, who in turn,
notifies the judge that the writ is requested. The judge, upon receipt of the peti-
tion and the writ, immediately signs both, and arrangements are made for the
prisoner to be delivered to the court so that the matter can be disposed of.
AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION, LAW ENFORCEMENT IN THE METROPOLIS 74 (1967).
153. At one point Wayne County Sheriff Peter Buback, who was in official charge
of housing imprisoned disorder-related defendants, said that he had a list of all pris-
oners and their whereabouts, but that he didn't have enough staff to answer inquiries.
The Detroit Free Press, July 29, 1967, § A, at 3, col. 6. (But see note 300 infra.) Compare
Goodman's experience with a statement made by Sheriff Buback in an interview in
Detroit, Sept. 7, 1967, that upon being presented with a writ of habeas corpus, he
would immediately dispatch a bus to the appropriate prison and bring the prisoner to
court. According to Buback, to his knowledge six or seven writs were issued and
immediately honored in the early stages of the disorder.
154. This information is based on an interview with Ernest Goodman in Detroit,
Feb. 5, 1968.
155. According to Louis Simmons of Detroit, president of the Wolverine Bar
Association, an attorney from that organization, Richard Coon, also filed for a writ
of habeas corpus in the federal district court and was asked for a brief on the question
of whether state remedies had been exhausted. Argument on the briefs was set for
October 15. Interview with Louis Simmons in Detroit, in September 1967. For further
discussion of the possibilities of federal habeas corpus relief, see part II.C.3.c. infra.
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court and to deny prisoners the benefit of a time-honored tech-
nique 50 for gaining release. It also reinforced the court's policy of
keeping apprehended persons off the streets until the major portion
of the disorder had ended. Although the bar is scarcely blameless for
less than adequate efforts to pursue habeas corpus relief at this stage,
the conduct of the court suggests that any such efforts would have
been futile.
(2) Legality of judicial disposition of writ petitions during the
disorder. The law in Michigan with respect to habeas corpus is con-
tained in the state constitution, statutes, and court rules. The con-
stitution states, in language substantially identical to that of the fed-
eral Constitution, that "[tihe privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
shall not be suspended unless in case of rebellion or invasion the
public safety may require it.'
'157
Apparently the Recorder's Court did not refuse to hear the few
petitions which it received, nor did it postpone returns on those writs
for some indefinite period. In each instance a specific date was set,
and presumably-even if the disorder had not subsided by then-
hearings would have been held on that date. Moreover, there is no
evidence indicating that writ petitions, when heard, were denied on
156. See People v. McCager, 367 Mich. 116, 116 N.W.2d 205 (1962); R. WALKER,
THE CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL DEVELOPMENT OF HABEAS CoRPus AS THE WRIT OF
LIBERTY (1960); Carpenter, Habeas Corpus in the Colonies, 8 AM. HIsT. R~v. 18 (1902).
157. MICH. CONsr. art. 1, § 12; U.S. CONsr. art. 1, § 9, c. 2 contains the same language.
The suspension of the writ of habeas corpus is traditionally associated with a formal
declaration of martial law, and "martial rule can never exist where the courts are
open, and in the proper and unobstructed exercise of their jurisdiction." Ex parte
Milligan, 71 U. S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866). Moreover, that famous case made it dear that
"the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus does not suspend the
writ itself. The writ issues as a matter of course, and on the return made to it the
court decides whether the party applying is denied the right of proceeding any further
with it."
Further, though there is some doubt on the matter, it is probably for the legislature
rather than the judiciary to determine whether public safety requires suspension. The
wording of the Constitution is not entirely clear on the matter, but federal cases have
held that suspension is primarily a legislative function. See Ex parte Bollman, 8 U. S.
(4 Cranch) 75 (1807); McCall v. McDowell, 15 Fed. Cas. 1235 (No. 8,673) (C. C. D. Cal.
1867) (Congress is the exclusive judge, but may commit the judgment within proper
limits to the President.); Ex parte Merryman, 17 Fed. Cas. 144 (No. 9,487) (C.C.D. Md.
1861) (Congress is the only power which can authorize suspension, the President can
not.).
In Detroit during the disorder there was no declaration of martial law, the courts
remained open, and there was no specific finding by any of the governmental branches
that there was a rebellion which required, for the protection of public safety, suspension
of the writ of habeas corpus. Since the Michigan provision with respect to suspension
of the writ is substantially identical to the federal provision, it is likely that the
framers intended to adopt the same standards of application adhered to by the federal
courts in cases noted above. Therefore it can be said with some assurance that a
Michigan state trial court would have no authority to suspend the privilege of the
writ without authorization from at least the state legislature, and if the facts had
warranted a conclusion that the writ was in fact suspended by the Recorder's Court,
there would have been a violation of the state constitution.
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the basis that the privilege of the writ had been withdrawn from dis-
order-related defendants. It would therefore seem unnecessary to
grapple with such issues as when or by whom "suspension" of the
writ can be initiated. The limited evidence available suggests that
it would be more appropriate to question whether the court's con-
duct involved "unnecessary delay." The treatment accorded writ pe-
titions seemed to reflect a calculated estimate of when the situation
in the community might be expected to return to normal. The court
seemed to delay the petitions until a time when it would have an
opportunity to do something on its own about the mass detention.
A Michigan statute provides that "[a]ny court or judge empow-
ered to grant the writ of habeas corpus shall, upon proper applica-
tion, grant the preliminary writ (or an order to show cause) without
delay .. ."ull This statute is supplemented by a court rule which
provides that upon presentation or filing of the petition the court
shall issue a writ to the custodian of the prisoner ordering him to
bring the prisoner before the court "forthwith, or at the nearest
available time and place."' 59 The annotators of the Michigan Court
Rules have said of this requirement that "[t]he time for return is
tightened. Normally the return should be made within twenty-four
hours."' 60 Furthermore, in 1963 the Michigan Supreme Court issued
an order of superintending control 61 to all judges of courts of record
in which it declared the applicable standards for habeas corpus pro-
ceedings. The court retained the "forthwith, or at the nearest avail-
able time and place" formula and explained its meaning as follows:
"There should be no delay between issuance of the writ or order
and the required answer and hearing longer than reasonably neces-
sary to produce the prisoner before the court or judge issuing the
writ or order.' 62 And, adjournments of writ hearings are to be
granted "only for such brief delay as may be necessary"' 63 to allow
written answers by the respondent or the presentation of testimonial
or documentary evidence to establish the cause of detention.
158. MICH. ComsP. LAWS ANN. § 600.4316 (1968) (emphasis added). Recorder's Court
judges have the power to issue writs of habeas corpus. See MicH. CoMp. LAws ANN.
§ 600.4304 (1968); Micu. G.C.R. 712.1(1). An action for habeas corpus to inquire into
the cause of detention may be brought by or on behalf of "any person restrained of
his liberty ...under any pretense whatsoever." MicH. Comp. LAws ANN. § 600.4307
(1968). See also Micir. G.C.R. 712.7; MIcH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 600.4352 (1968); MICH.
Comp. LAws ANN. § 600.4313 (1968): "Any judge who wilfully or corruptly refuses or
neglects to consider an application, action, or motion for habeas corpus is guilty of
malfeasance in office."
159. MICH. G.C.R. 712.5(1)(a).
160. J. HONIGMAN & C. HAWKINS, 4 MICHIGAN COURT RuL. ANNOTATED 130 (1962).
161. Order of Superintending Control, Habeas Corpus Proceedings, 369 Mich. xxx
(1963). For the nature of the superintending control power, its scope, and possible ap-
plications to relief for riot defendants in custody pursuant to excessive bail, see text
accompanying notes 170-77 infra.
162. Order, supra note 161.
163. Id. See also MIcH. G.C.R. 712.18.
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It is questionable whether the delay occasioned by the practice
of some Recorder's Court judges of ordering habeas petitions return-
able within a week to ten days complies with any of the above stan-
dards. The normal practice of the court is to make writs returnable
immediately, 1 4 with hearings scheduled within a few hours of the
petition. Absent overriding necessity, a delay of several days would
therefore be unwarranted. In this regard a certain amount of delay
was to be expected during the disorder due to the problems involved
in finding the appropriate prisoner and getting him to the court
amid the chaos and confusion. Additional difficulties were probably
encountered in contacting the investigating official, or other repre-
sentative from the police department, so that he could testify, since
his services were desperately needed elsewhere. Beyond these, how-
ever, there did not seem to be any other excusable delays. It is in-
conceivable that the aforementioned factors would alone account for
the extended delays which in fact occurred.
Moreover, the court cannot seriously contend that there was in-
sufficient judicial manpower available to handle the petitions which
were or might have been presented since the judges themselves have
asserted that no such shortage existed at the arraignments. Indeed,
offers of aid by various circuit and municipal judges were rejected. 6 5
And, a habeas corpus petition does not seem to involve added bur-
dens on the clerical staff to the extent that a week or more would
be required to accomplish what normally can be done immediately.
The apparent conclusion is that it was simply "inconvenient" for
the court to entertain habeas petitions challenging detention while
it was actively engaged in implementing a bail policy designed to
compel the detention of all persons apprehended. Therefore, it
seems that the delays occasioned by postponements of hearings on
the petitions were not in fact "necessary" and the judges responsible
seemed to exceed their authority by not hearing them "forthwith, or
at the nearest available time and place."
b. State remedies for excessive bail. In Michigan the first step
in the appeal of an excessive bail order is a motion to the presiding
judge of the issuing court for a reduction of the amount. Normally,
there is little chance of success if no new evidence is presented along
with the motion. And given the prevailing judicial attitude during
the civil disorder in Detroit, such a motion would almost surely have
been denied-at least until the time the bail policy was reversed.
After the motion to reduce bail is denied in the trial court, the
defendant can petition the state court of appeals on a habeas corpus
petition alleging illegal detention because of excessive bail or on a
164. See note 152 supra.
165. See notes 61-64 supra and accompanying text.
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motion for an emergency hearing. 66 If relief is again denied, he can
then appeal to the state supreme court.16 7 Since the process of pro-
ceeding from one court to another, presenting motions and petitions,
attending hearings, and waiting out possible adjournments is apt to
be quite time-consuming, the problem during the disorder would
have been to obtain adequate review before the issue was mooted by
a reduction of bail or trial. In addition, it is presumed that the trial
court acted within its discretion in setting bail, and thus the risk of
nonpersuasion is on the petitioner.168 Of course, this risk was prob-
ably reduced as a result of the procedures employed by the Record-
er's Court during the disorder. Nevertheless, a prospective petitioner,
or his attorney, may still have been dubious about pursuing his state
remedies in light of statements by one Michigan supreme court jus-
tice that he would support the measures adopted by the Recorder's
Court to handle disorder-related defendants.
169
Another remedy available in Michigan to correct abuses in lower
courts is the writ of superintending control. This writ, which is dis-
cretionary,170 supplants the writs of certiorari, mandamus, and pro-
hibition,' 71 and its scope is quite broad. It may be used "in any fash-
ion necessary to implement the superintending or supervisory control
power of the court over inferior tribunals.'
7 2
[It is] an extraordinary power... hampered by no specific rules or
means for its exercise .... It is unlimited, being bounded only by the
exigencies which call for its exercise. As new instances of these occur
... courts . . . possess the power to invent, frame, and formulate
new and additional means, writs, and processes whereby it may be
exerted. 73
The state constitution and court rules grant the power to issue
a superintending control order to the supreme court, the court of
appeals, and the circuit courts.174 The only limitation is a statement
of policy in the court rules that such an order "should not be issued
166. MicH. G.C.R. 712.1(l).
167. Mxcir. Comp. LAws § 600.217(2) gives the supreme court jurisdiction to issue
the writ.
168. See note 79 supra and accompanying text. Apparently some courts even pre-
sume for the sake of reviewing bail that the petitioner is guilty. See Foote, supra note
118, at 1130-31.
169. See note 29 supra.
170. Wooster v. Calhoun, 150 Mich. 459, 114 N.W. 232 (1902).
171. MicH. G.C.R. 711.3.
172. MIcH. G.C.R. 711.1.
173. 14 AM. Juit., COURTS 265 (1941), quoted with approval in In re Huff, 352 Mich.
402, 417-18, 91 N.W.2d 613, 620 (1958). See also Jones v. Eastern Michigan Motorbuses,
287 Mich. 619, 283 N.W. 710 (1939); In re Brant's Estate, 269 Mich. 201, 256 N.W. 855
(1934); Amberg v. Welsh, 325 Mich. 285, 38 N.W.2d 304 (1949); Swift v. Wayne Circuit
Judges, 64 Mich. 479, 31 N.W. 434 (1887).
174. MIcr. CONsT. art. 3, § 4(13); MicHr. G.C.R. 711.4(1).
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if another plain, speedy, and adequate remedy is available to the
party seeking the order.' u75 Whether other adequate remedies are
available is determined by the court being petitioned.176
A failure to proceed according to law and an abuse of discretion
beyond excuse or reasonable justification have been recognized as
appropriate grounds for interference with lower court proceedings
by means of writs of superintending controlY Therefore, this writ
could have been used during the disorder to cure or check the abuses
of the Recorder's Court. Indeed, given the inadequacy of the normal
appellate process, due to the time limitations involved, the writ was
probably the only real relief available for civil disorder defendants.
The primary obstacle would have been to find a court willing to
exercise its discretion and order the lower court to tidy up its proce-
dures. According to Justice Souris of the Michigan supreme court,
the attitude of the Michigan judiciary toward those involved in the
disorder was generally one of intolerance. 78 Thus, it is doubtful that
any higher court would have been amenable to interfering with the
Recorder's Court in the performance of its duties during the dis-
order.
It is most distressing that, beyond the few petitions for habeas
corpus filed in the Recorder's Court itself, none of the various state
remedies for excessive bail was pursued. Consequently, the policies
of the court at the arraignments on the warrant were not legally
tested. Possibly this speaks ill of the legal profession in Detroit as a
whole. Certainly it indicates the need for effective counsel at this
stage in the proceedings if remedies are to be adequately pursued
and the rights effectively protected.
c. Federal relief without exhausting state remedies. The avail-
ability of federal relief for abuses in state court proceedings is gen-
erally dependent on a prior exhaustion of state remedies by the peti-
tioner. This requirement is largely a by-product of our concept of
federalism which, as a matter of comity, allows the court system
which has original jurisdiction of a cause of action to rule upon the
issues incident to that action before another court with concurrent
jurisdiction will intervene and review those rulings. 79 Nevertheless,
175. Ziegler v. Brown, 339 Mich. 390, 63 N.W.2d 677 (1954); MiCH. G.C.R. 711.2.
176. Lenz v. Cobo, 338 Mich. 383, 61 N.W.2d 587 (1953); Dyson v. City of Detroit,
333 Mich. 116, 52 N.WV2d 623 (1952).
177. See, e.g., Dyson v. City of Detroit, 333 Mich. 116, 52 N.W.2d 623 (1952);
Hood v. Spier, 298 Mich. 462, 299 N.V. 146 (1941).
178. Address and comments of Justice Theodore Souris of the Michigan supreme
court, Panel Discussion, supra note 140.
179. See, e.g., Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963) [citing Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200
(1950)]; Ex parte Hawk, 321 U.S. 114 (1944); Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 (1935);
28 U.S.C. § 2254; Note, State Criminal Procedure and Federal Habeas Corpus, 80 Hv.
L. Rnv. 422 (1966).
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there are certain instances where it has been deemed appropriate for
a federal court to assert jurisdiction despite the existence of unpur-
sued state remedies.
One method which can be used to accomplish this intervention
is a petition for habeas corpus. The applicable provision with respect
to federal habeas corpus states that an application for this writ will
not be granted unless it appears that state remedies have been ex-
hausted, "or that there is either an absence of available State correc-
tive process or the existence of circumstances rendering such process
ineffective to protect the rights of the prisoner."'8s0 Moreover, the
Supreme Court has held that the exhaustion requirement is limited
to those state remedies still open at the time of the application for
habeas corpus relief.' 8 ' During the disorder there were at least two
attempts by attorneys to secure habeas corpus relief in federal district
court following a failure to secure a prompt hearing on similar writs
in the Recorder's Court. 82 In both instances the applications were
denied on the basis that state remedies had not been exhausted. The
federal district court did not feel the circumstances warranted appli-
cation of either exception to the general exhaustion rule. Neverthe-
less, it would seem to be appropriate to explore whether the excep-
tions should have been applicable.
It probably could not be successfully maintained that there was
an absence of available state corrective process during the disorder.
The courts were open and, at least ostensibly, continued to function
normally. The writ of habeas corpus was not actually suspended in
Recorder's Court for the course of the disorder. And a defendant
could have prosecuted an appeal to a higher state court 8 3 or peti-
tioned a court in an adjoining county for a writ of habeas corpus.
8 4
However, it is possible that circumstances existing during the
disorder did render the available state corrective processes "ineffec-
tive to protect the rights of the prisoner[s]."' 8 5 To be effective, relief
during the disorder had to be speedy. In their public statements,
Recorder's Court judges indicated that the high bail policy was only
a stop-gap measure designed to help limit the disorder 80 and that it
would be unnecessary to continue it once order had been restored.
It is doubtful that a remedial process which is apt to be quite time-
consuming could have corrected the alleged abuses of the Recorder's
Court quickly enough to be meaningful. Moreover, the judicial
180. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (emphasis added).
181. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963). However, the federal judge has discretion to
"deny relief to an applicant who has deliberately by-passed the orderly procedure of
the state courts and in doing so has forfeited the state court remedies." 372 U.S. at 438.
182. See note 155 supra and accompanying text.
183. See notes 166-67 supra and accompanying text.
184. Micro G.C.R. 712.1(2).
185. 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
186. See text accompanying note 29 supra.
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treatment of state habeas corpus petitions, the apparent unwilling-
ness of higher state courts to exercise their superintending control
power, and the support for Recorder's Court policies voiced by one
justice of the Michigan supreme court suggest that even if an appeal
for relief had been prosecuted in time it was unlikely an adequate
remedy would have been granted.
Thus, there was little chance of remedying an apparent infringe-
ment of important federal rights under the fourteenth amend-
ment, 8 7 and probably the eighth amendment, unless federal jurisdic-
tion was assumed. This would seem to be the type of "extraordinary
circumstance" encompassed by the exception to the exhaustion of
state remedies requirement.
88
Another possible basis for federal intervention would have been
the judicial gloss put on the exhaustion rule in the case of Fay v.
Noia.'80 That case held that exhaustion of state remedies means ex-
haustion of those remedies still open to the petitioner at the time of
his application for federal habeas corpus.190 With respect to civil dis-
order defendants in Detroit it could be argued that although for-
mally there was not an absence of state corrective process during the
disorder, in fact the available remedies were not open (for much the
same reasons which would have justified a finding of "extraordinary
circumstances")? 91
Federal injunctive relief is another remedy which might have
been sought by disorder-related defendants. Generally the enjoining
of a state criminal proceeding is avoided, since it is "particularly in-
consistent with our federal framework" and there is a presumption
that "state courts and prosecutors will observe constitutional limita-
tions as expounded by [the Supreme] Court."'9 2 Therefore, to obtain
this type of equitable relief a petitioner must allege more than "a
mere possibility of erroneous initial application of constitutional
standards"; 93 he must allege that his is one of "those exceptional
cases which call for the interposition of a court of equity to prevent
187. "Vindication of due process is precisely [habeas corpus'] historic office." Fay
v. Noia, 372 391, 402 (1963).
188. See generally Wizner, Bail and Civil Rights, 2 LAw IN TRANSITION Q. 111
(1965) for discussion of relief of excessive bail under the "extraordinary circumstances"
formula and of various other avenues of federal relief.
189. 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
190. 372 U.S. at 435.
191. See text accompanying notes 185-88 supra.
192. Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 484-85 (1965); see also Cleary v. Bolger,
371 U.S. 392, 397 (1963); Stefanelli v. Minard, 342 U.S. 117, 120 (1951); Douglas v. City
of Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157, 163 (1943); Pugach v. Dollinger, 277 F.2d 739 (2d Cir. 1960),
aff'd per curiam, 365 U.S. 458 (1961). For a general discussion of federal injunctive
remedies see Warren, Federal and State Court Interference, 43 HARV. L. Rav. 345
(1930); Note, Federal Power To Enjoin State Court Proceedings, 74 Hsv. L. REv. 726
(1961); Note, Federal Injunctions Against State Criminal Proceedings, 4 SrAN. L. Rxv.
381 (1952).
193. Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 484-85 (1965).
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irreparable injury which is clear and imminent,"' 94 a situation "in
which defense of the State's criminal prosecution will not assure
adequate vindication of constitutional rights."1 95
Despite the rigidity of these standards, the bail policy adhered to
by the Recorder's Court during the early days of the disorder might
have provided sufficient basis for invoking this kind of relief. The
reasons why a defense to prosecution might not have assured adequate
vindication of constitutional rights were alluded to earlier."9 6 Fur-
thermore, the custody imposed by virtue of excessive bail constituted
irreparable injury even though the amount of bail set was subse-
quently reduced to a more reasonable level. Once custody had been
endured, the harm done could not be undone. 97 Finally, the injury
to those imprisoned pursuant to a failure to post bond was certainly
both clear and imminent.
It would seem, therefore, that disorder-related defendants in
Detroit had several possible avenues of relief, and yet, as mentioned
earlier, very little effort was made to take advantage of them. Prob-
ably the major reason for this failure was the absence of counsel at
the arraignment stage. The next section will therefore examine the
legal arguments with respect to providing counsel for defendants at
the arraignment on the warrant.
D. Right to Counsel at the Arraignment on the Warrant
1. The Due Process Argument
a. "Criticalness." The marked absence of counsel to represent
riot defendants at the arraignments on the warrant was documented
earlier. 198 The object of this section is to examine constitutional ar-
guments relative to whether counsel should be provided as a matter
of right at this stage.
Whether the sixth amendment' 99 requires the presence of counsel
at a pretrial stage depends on whether the stage in question is char-
acterized as "critical. '200 A critical stage is one at which there is a
194. Douglas v. Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157, 163 (1943) [quoted with approval in Stefan-
elli v. Minard, 342 U.S. 117, 122 (1951)].
195. Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 485 (1965).
196. See text accompanying notes 185-88 supra.
197. This was particularly true in the Detroit situation because of the deplorable
detention facilities and the loss of employment due to detention. See text accompanying
notes 262-68 supra.
198. See part III.B.2. supra.
199. Held applicable to the states in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
200. See, e.g., Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965); White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59
(1963); Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961); DeToro v. Pepersack, 332 F.2d 341
(4th Cir. 1964); cert. denied, 379 U.S. 909 (1964); United States ex rel. Cooper v. Reincke,
333 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 909 (1964). For a listing by jurisdic.
tion of cases accepting "criticalness" as the test of whether a right to counsel obtains as
pretrial stages, see 5 A.L.R.3d 1276 (1966).
1586 [Vol. 66:1542
May 1968] Comments 1587
significant possibility of prejudice to the defendant with regard to
either the ultimate determination of his guilt or innocence or his
constitutionally guaranteed right to a fair trial.201 If this possibility
does not exist, the defendant is not entitled to counsel as a matter of
right. 02
Traditionally, the procedure of setting bail has not been thought
to involve any possibility of prejudice to the determination of the
accused's guilt or innocence or to his right to a fair trial. It involves
only an assessment of the probability that he will return for his trial
and the imposition of a condition on his pretrial liberty.2 03 There-
fore, courts have not considered it a critical stage.204 Thus, it was
constitutionally permissible, under traditional doctrine, for the Re-
corder's Court not to recognize a right to counsel for disorder-related
defendants at the arraignments on the warrant. However, an exam-
ination of the role counsel could play at this stage of the proceedings
would seem to indicate either the inadequacy of the criticalness test
or the need to expand its scope to embrace the procedure of setting
bail.
b. The role of counsel at the bail-setting stage. There appear
to be three fundamental rights which counsel could help protect at
201. "It is central . . . that in addition to counsel's presence at trial, the accused is
guaranteed that he need not stand alone against the State at any stage of the prosecu-
tion, formal or informal, in court or out, where counsel's absence might derogate the
accused's right to a fair trial." United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 226 (1967). For ex-
ample, whenever a plea of guilty may be accepted and later used at trial, the stage at
which that plea may be entered is critical. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965); White
v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59 (1963); Bird v. Sigler, 241 F. Supp. 1007 (D.C. Neb. 1964);
In re Palmer, 371 Mich. 656, 124 N.W.2d 773 (1963).
The same is true at any point where a defense may be lost if not asserted [Hamil-
ton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961)], where statements made by the defendant may be
used against him later at trial [Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964); Massiah v.
United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964)], where witnesses against the defendant are allowed
to testify and their testimony may be used later at trial without adequate opportunity
for cross-examination [Pettit v. Rhay, 62 Wash. 2d 515, 383 P.2d 889 (1963)], or where
any further proceedings could be obviated if defendant were successful at a particular
stage [Harris v. Wilson, 239 F. Supp. 204 (D.C. Cal. 1965)].
202. See, e.g., Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965); Shelton v. United States, 343
F.2d 347 (D.D.C. 1965); Gallegos v. Cox, 341 F.2d 107 (10th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 381
U.S. 918 (1963); United States ex rel. Cooper v. Reincke, 333 F.2d 608 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 379 U.S. 909 (1964); De Toro v. Pepersack, 332 F.2d 341 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 379 U.S. 909 (1964); Latham v. Crouse, 320 F.2d 120 (10th Cir. 1963), cert.
denied, 375 U.S. 959 (1963).
203. Of course, the fact that the sole constitutionally proper purpose for the amount
of bail to be set is to assure of the presence of accused at trial does not necessarily
mean that the effect is thus limited.
204. For explicit denial that the right to counsel attaches at stages the sole or
primary function of which is to set bail, see Taylor v. King, 272 F. Supp. 53 (1967);
Ahlstrand v. Tahash, 266 Minn. 570, 123 N.W.2d 325 (1963). See also Pointer v. Texas,
380 U.S. 400 (1965); De Toro v. Pepersack, 332 F.2d 341 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S.
909 (1964), and United States ex rel. Cooper v. Reincke, 333 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1964),
cert. denied, 379 U.S. 909 (1964), in all of which ball-setting was part of a broader
procedure which the courts held not to be critical.
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the arraignment on the warrant: (1) the right of the defendant to
secure the lowest bail possible; (2) the right to be informed of the
charge against him and of his constitutional rights, and to under-
stand that information; and (3) the right to be able effectively to
pursue remedies for possible abuses by the court.
The only legitimate consideration in setting bail is the amount
needed to insure the presence of the accused at trial.2-0° Neverthe-
less, it is a common practice in trial courts today to disregard this
factor and rely instead on such criteria as a predetermined schedule
of relatively inflexible amounts based on the nature of the offense,
'200
3
the accused's prior criminal record,20 7 or the personal predilections,
prejudices, or "quiet instinct" of the bail-setting magistrate.218 In-
deed, studies indicate that in the absence of counsel such relevant
information as the defendant's residence, marital, employment, or
health status is rarely even presented to, let alone considered by,
the court.209 The defendant's right to be informed as to the charge
against him and his constitutional rights may also be impaired if
no attorney is present to insure compliance with the rudimentary
requirements of explanation, or to interpret the legal phrases the
defendant is asked to comprehend. The arraignment-on-the-war-
rant proceedings during the Detroit disorder produced many alleged
instances of defendants being confused about court procedures
210
or the nature of the charges against them. In fact, some defendants
insisted that they honestly did not know what the word "curfew"
meant, even after they were remanded to custody on $10,000 bail.
21 '
Finally, and perhaps most important, the defendant's right ef-
fectively to pursue remedies for possible abuses by the court may
be meaningless without the aid of counsel. Obviously time is of the
essence in obtaining relief from an excessive bail order. Moreover,
it is probably true that most defendants do not have the vaguest
idea of how to appeal a bail order. The result is that for all prac-
tical purposes relief is unavailable until counsel is retained, or ap-
pointed-and by this time the issue may well have become moot.21:
Of course, the immediate effect of not having counsel present
at the arraignment on the warrant to protect the aforementioned
205. See notes 74-80 supra and accompanying text.
206. See note 15 supra.
207. Id.
208. See Note, Preventive Detention, 36 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 178, 180 (1967).
209. See, e.g., AIERICAN BAR FOUNDATION, LAw ENFORCEMENT IN THE METROPOLLS
120-21 (1967).
210. See note 57 supra and accompanying text.
211. As reported by Birmingham Municipal Judge John Emery in a Panel Dis-
cussion, The Detroit "Riot": A Challenge to Society and the Legal Profession, pre-
sented at the University of Michigan Law School, Oct. 11, 1967. (A transcript is avail-
able for inspection in Michigan Law Review files).
212. "As a practical matter, a writ of habeas corpus is available to a suspect only
if he has counsel." W. LA FAvE, ARsRM 407 (1965).
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rights is to increase the possibility that the accused will be detained.
The ultimate issue, however, is whether the fact of detention has
a significant adverse effect on the eventual determination of the
guilt or innocence of the accused. If it does, the procedure of set-
ting bail should be subsumed under the "critical stage" rubric.
Perhaps the most significant effect of pretrial detention on the
guilt-determining process is that it may constrain the preparation
of an adequate defense. Both the fact-finding aspect of preparing a
defense and the attorney-client relationship can be impaired.
213
While in custody, it is difficult for the defendant to assist effectively
in the all-important search for witnesses or evidence which may be
vital to his defense.214 This task is thrust upon his attorney, if he
has one at the time, or upon others. Moreover, communication be-
tween attorney and client may be curtailed because of time limita-
tions or inhibited by the absence of an atmosphere conducive to
free and open discussion.21
5
This does not mean an adequate defense can never be prepared
while the defendant is in custody, or that he is completely precluded
from assisting in the effort. However, it does indicate that the fact
of detention can affect the adequacy of the preparation, and there-
fore the determination of the defendant's guilt or innocence. The
extent will vary depending on the circumstances of the particular
case.
10
It is significant that the Supreme Court has recognized that the
"traditional right to freedom before conviction permits the un-
hampered preparation of a defense." 217 Of course, at times, the state
is justified in limiting this right (in order to insure the presence of
the accused at trial) by imposing bail in an amount which the de-
fendant cannot pay. In these cases the attendant restrictions on the
213. See generally Foote, The Coming Constitutional Crisis in Bail, 113 U. PA. L.
REV. (pts. 1-2) 959, 1125 (1965); Packer, Two Models of the Criminal Process, 113 U.
PA. L. Ruv. 1 (1964); Rankin, The Effect of Pretrial Detention, 39 N.Y.U.L. REv. 641
(1964).
214. "The deficiencies of the bail system will operate to deprive most [indigent de-
fendants] even of their physical freedom prior to trial. Thus, not only will they be
unable to pour any money into the search for evidence but, however ill-equipped they
are to do so, most of them will also be unable to throw themselves into the search."
Kamisar, Betts v. Brady Twenty Years Later: The Right to Counsel and Due Process
V7alues, 61 MICH. L. REv. 219, 227-28 (1962).
215. See Foote, supra note 213, at 1147.
216. Another effect often attributed to the inherent prejudices of detention to the
guilt-determining process is the increased propensity of the defendant to plead guilty.
See Foote, supra note 213 at 1146 and Packer, supra note 213, at 39-40 n. 8, for the
suggestion that a defendant who has experienced considerable pretrial detention is apt
to lose perspective of the long-range effects of pleading guilty and unwisely attach un-
due weight to his immediate objective of release. Thus, if he is offered the opportunity
of release at the cost of a conviction on his record, he will, the argument runs, be more
apt to forgo trial and the assertion of his innocence than would be a defendant with-
out similar detention.
217. Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 4 (1951).
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preparation of a defense are also justified. However, since the best
defense possible is a basic desideratum of our system of criminal
justice, the imposition of such restrictions should be permitted only
in those instances where they are clearly necessary. The presence
of an attorney will remind the court of this point.
The detention for most persons arrested during the Detroit dis-
order may have been so short as to have a negligible effect on the
preparation of a defense. In most cases prisoners were released within
a few days,218 and trials were not held for several months afterward.
2 19
Nevertheless, a certain amount of preparation for the preliminary
examination, 220 held in many cases within ten days of the arraign-
ment,221 could have resulted in a dismissal and eliminated the need
for a trial. Moreover, circumstances incident to a civil disorder may
make it imperative that evidence and witnesses be secured within a
short time after arrest. With the community in chaos and nearly
everything perishable, securing certain evidence or taking the de-
positions of transient witnesses may not infrequently be a now-or-
never proposition. To the extent that this was true in Detroit the
detention of defendants during this critical period may have been
detrimental to the preparation of an adequate defense. 
2
218. "Over 3,000 were released within a few days through bail review; by August 4,
only 1,200 remained in detention." COMMISSION REPORT 185 (GPO ed.), 342 (paper ed.)
n.9.
219. Trials for disorder-related defendants began in January 1968.
220. For the scope of a preliminary examination in Michigan criminal procedure,
see part III infra.
221. For an analysis of the "ten-day rule" and adherence to it during the civil dis-
order, see part III.B.l.a. infra.
222. Recent statistical studies tend to support the conclusion that the fact of pre-
trial detention may render a defendant substantially more likely to be convicted and
to be sentenced to prison on conviction. See, e.g., Rankin, supra note 213, at 642; Wald,
Foreword, Pretrial Detention and Ultimate Freedom: A Statistical Study, 39 N.Y.U.L.
Rav. 631 (1964); Foote, Markle, and Wooley, Compelling Appearance in Court: Ad-
ministration of Bail in Philadelphia, 102 U. PA. L. RaV. 1031, 1054 (1954); Note, A
Study of the Administration of Bail in New York City, 106 U. PA. L. REv. 693, 727
(1958). The study by Rankin, based on a sampling of defendants arraigned in New
York City in 1961-1962, found that 73% of those in custody pending trial were convicted
and 64% were given prison sentences. Comparable figures for those not detained
pending trial were 53% and 17%.
There are apparent objections to reliance on studies of this type. One difficulty is
isolating detention as the sole or major factor in the differential between the resulting
percentages. Moreover, it is difficult to assess the significance of why the defendant is
in jail in the first place, as that fact bears on the issue of guilt or innocence; that is,
those for whom bail is set in an amount beyond their financial means may for various
reasons (e.g. the strength of the evidence against them-a factor which might have been
considered by the judge in setting bail) be more likely to be convicted without regard
to whether or not they are in custody. Rankin attempts to combat these objections by
controlling his statistics with respect to the variables of the defendant's prior record,
the amount of bail, and whether the defendant was represented by retained or ap-
pointed counsel. His results were substantially the same under variations of these
factors.
Whether or not statistics may be called to the aid of the argument that detention
is prejudicial to the determination of guilt or innocence, for the purposes of assessing
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c. Fair play. A separate line of cases, apparently applied only
to post-conviction stages in the criminal process thus far, suggests
that there is a right to counsel whenever an attorney might be nec-
essary to secure "fair play" for a defendant at the hands of the
court. -2 The rationale of these cases marks a significant departure
from the "critical stage" test since it focuses on possible types of
prejudice not necessarily related to the ultimate determination of
guilt or innocence.
In the recent case of Mempa v. Rhay224 the issue before the Su-
preme Court was not whether the defendant was innocent or guilty,
but whether and under what conditions he was to serve his sentence.
After noting that in a probation revocation proceeding the judge
was required, by statute, to supply "various information about the
circumstances of the crime and the character of the individual" 225
to the parole board, the Court pointed out:
Obviously, to the extent such recommendations are influential in
determining the resulting sentence, the necessity for the aid of
counsel in marshalling the facts, introducing evidence of mitigating
circumstances and in general aiding and assisting the defendant to
present his case as to sentence is apparent.
226
The applicability of this kind of reasoning to the procedure of
setting bail is readily discernible. First, the distinction between pre-
trial and post-conviction proceedings, perhaps valid in other con-
texts, seems insubstantial in light of the similarities in the types of
prejudice which may arise in setting bail before trial and examin-
ing conditions of probation after conviction. The same danger of
detention without adequate presentation of mitigating circumstances
is present in both proceedings. And the same kind of assistance is
necessary in marshalling and presenting facts to demonstrate that
it is commensurate with the legitimate interests of the state for the
defendant to avoid custody. Furthermore, the presumption of inno-
cence, which is present during the setting of bail but disappears
upon conviction, would seem to strengthen the case for requiring
"criticalness," it is sufficient to show that pretrial detention may impair the prepara-
tion of an adequate defense and thus may prejudice the guilt-determining process. As
the court in Hamilton v. Alabama [368 U.S. 52, 57 (1961)] made clear, "[w]e do not
stop to determine whether prejudice resulted" when deciding whether a particular
pretrial stage is critical. It is the demonstrable possibility of prejudice, rather than a
finding of actual prejudice, which is determinative. At the bail-setting stage, that pos-
sibility seems evident.
223. See, e.g., Wade v. United States, 388 U.S. 218 (1967); Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S.
128 (1967); Moore v. Michigan, 335 U.S. 155 (1957); Townsend v. Burke, 384 U.S. 736
(1948).
224. 389 U.S. 128 (1967).
225. 389 U.S. at 135.
226. 389 U.S. at 135.
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the provision of counsel to assist in the presentation of the defen-
dant's case against custody.
The help counsel can provide with regard to protecting the
rights of the accused at the arraignment on the warrant was dis-
cussed above, as was the frequent practice of trial courts of ignoring
the relevant factual considerations bearing on the defendant's prob-
able appearance at trial.22 7 With that discussion in mind it is appro-
priate to consider the language of Justice Jackson in Townsend v.
Burke,228 quoted with approval in Mempa: "Counsel might not
have changed the sentence, but he could have taken steps to see
that the conviction and sentence were not predicated on misinfor-
mation or misreading of court records, a requirement of fair play
which absence of counsel withheld from this prisoner." 229 It would
seem that the same fair play is withheld from a prisoner who, with-
out counsel, is remanded to custody before trial because of bail set
without regard to the relevant, and perhaps mitigating, circum-
stances the court ought to have considered.
In addition to protecting the rights of the prisoner at the ar-
raignment, counsel could aid the court with regard to the practical
aspects of making a judicious determination of the appropriate
amount of bail. In particular an attorney could obtain and verify
the necessary facts while attempting to secure the lowest bail pos-
sible for his client.
The difficulties which may be encountered in obtaining infor-
mation about defendants were most apparent during the civil dis-
order. Those few judges who attempted to acquire knowledge about
defendants not contained in the court files had to rely on volunteers
whose availability and expertise were limited.20 Had counsel been
present the information obtained would have been more consistent
and reliable. Moreover, those judges who refused to consider the
possibility of securing this kind of data would have been forced to
explain their conduct for the record.
2. The Equal Protection Argument.
It was noted earlier that in Detroit's Recorder's Court those
who desire counsel, and can afford it, may be represented during
the arraignment on the warrant, but counsel will not be appointed
for indigents.231 Under such circumstances, the denial of an attor-
ney's assistance to indigents may be a deprivation of the equal pro-
tection of the laws guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment. 
2
227. See parts II.C.1.-2. supra.
228. 334 U.S. 736 (1948).
229. 334 US. at 741, 389 U.S. at 133.
230. See text accompanying notes 53-56 supra.
231. Text accompanying note 13 supra.
232. The issue here should be distinguished from others closely related. This dis-
cussion is not concerned with the question of whether the requirement of any bail at
1592 [Vol. 66:1542
Comments
The notion that equal protection requires counsel for indigents
at the bail-setting stage in Detroit is derived primarily from Doug-
las v. Californiaa and Griffin v. Illinois.34 In Griffin the Supreme
Court held that if a state grants a right of appeal to all accused per-
sons in criminal cases (even though it need not grant such a right
to any person) and a transcript is necessary to process that appeal,
the equal protection clause requires that the state furnish indigents
with transcripts free of cost.2-5 "In criminal trials" observed the
Court, "a state can no more discriminate on account of poverty than
on account of religion, race, or color. .. .There can be no equal
justice where the kind of trial a man gets depends on the amount
of money he has."23
At issue in the Douglas case was a California procedure which
permitted state appellate courts, upon the request of an indigent
for counsel on his first appeal, to make an independent investiga-
tion of the record and determine whether it would be advantageous
to the defendant or the court to appoint counsel. Relying on Griffin,
the Supreme Court struck down this procedure as a violation of
the equal protection clause:
[T]here is lacking that equality demanded by the Fourteenth
Amendment where the rich man, who appeals as of right, enjoys
the benefit of counsel's examination into the record, research of the
law, and marshalling of arguments on his behalf, while the indigent
is forced to shift for himself. The indigent... has only the right to
a meaningless ritual, while the rich man has a meaningful appeal.237
Denial of counsel to indigents at the arraignment on the war-
rant may be sufficiently analogous to the situation in Douglas to
warrant a similar conclusion with respect to the requirement of
equal protection. Surely the "rich man" who is able to retain coun-
sel to assist him in asserting his rights and avoiding the potential
all from indigents is a violation of equal protection, an important issue already alluded
to. Nor is the concern here so much for the effect of absence of counsel at this stage or
the right to a fair trial, as is the fundamental concern of due process. Instead the focus
here is on the discrimination inherent in denying counsel to indigents at the bail stage,
and the question is whether that discrimination is so arbitrary as to violate the equal
protection clause. Inevitably the closely related concepts of due process and equal pro-
tection may overlap. Thus, "[d]iscrimination is a part of denial of due process, just as it
is a part of denial of equal protection. Denial to all equally of a privilege which due
process does not in absolute terms exact, may come to violate due process if the denial
is arbitrarily applied to some persons but not to others. And yet arbitrary discrimina-
tion is the traditional way of violating the equal protection clause. Thus, the two
concepts overlap." Wilcox and Bloustein, The Griffin Case-Poverty and the Four-
teenth Amendment, 43 CoRNEu L.Q. 1, 22 (1957).
233. 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
234. 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
235. 351 U.S. at 19.
236. 351 U.S. at 17, 19.
237. 372 US. at 357-58.
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prejudices of pretrial detention is in a better position than the in-
digent who must "shift for himself." Furthermore, the basis of that
advantage is just as inappropriate at pretrial proceedings as on ap-
peal.
Though the function of an attorney on appeal may differ some-
what from his function at the arraignment, in each instance he pro-
tects important rights of the accused. The broad language of Douglas
would seem to indicate that whenever defendants are deprived of
significant rights because of their poverty the equal protection clause
is violated and the state is obligated to eliminate those distinctions
due to wealth.238 With respect to the procedure of setting bail, the
easiest solution would be to recognize a right to counsel in all cases.
III. THE PRELIMINARY EXAMINATIONS
A. Purpose and Normal Operation
The underlying basis of the preliminary examination in Mich-
igan, as elsewhere, is the belief that prosecution and its attendant
hardships on the defendant should be avoided unless and until there
is sufficient cause to believe that the defendant has participated in
some form of criminal activity.239 In Michigan this belief finds
statutory expression in the requirement that, before a formal in-
formation can be filed240 and within ten days after the arraignment
on the warrant, 241 an accused must be brought before an examining
magistrate to determine whether a crime has in fact been committed
and whether there is probable cause to believe that the defendant
committed it.242 Only if both issues are resolved in the affirmative
is the accused bound over for trial.
243
Normally, the date for the preliminary examination is set at the
arraignment on the warrant, and the defendant, if not in custody,
238. See Kamisar & Choper, The Right to Counsel in Minnesota: Some Field Find-
ings and Legal-Policy Observations, 48 MINN. L. Rv. 1 (1963):
Nor-reading the case for all it may be worth-does Douglas stop at discretionary
review and post-conviction proceedings. Indigent persons may find that they also
have been awarded absolute rights to assigned counsel in justice courts, juvenile
proceedings, probation revocation hearings-everywhere a rich man may appear
with counsel.
239. AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION, supra note 209, at 122 (1967). See generally People
v. Becktel, 80 Mich. 623, 45 N.W. 582 (1890); Thies v. State, 178 Wis. 98, 103, 189 N.W.
539, 541 (1922); 2 AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION, DEFENSE OF THE POOR IN CRIMINAL CASES
IN AmERICAN STATE COURTS 357 (1965) [hereinafter DEFENSE OF THE POOR]; Hunwald,
The Right to Counsel at the Preliminary Hearing, 31 Mo. L. Ra,. 109, 117 (1966);
Miller & Dawson, Non-Use of Preliminary Examination: A Study of Current Practices,
1964 Wis. L. RFv. 252; Note, The Preliminary Hearing-An Interest Analysis,
51 IowA L. REv. 164, 173 (1965); Comment, Preliminary Examination-Evidence and
Due Process, 15 KAN. L. Rav. 374 (1967).
240. MicH. ComP. LAws § 767.42 (1948).
241. Id. § 766.4 (1948).
242. Id. § 766.5 (1948).
243. Id. § 766.13 (1948).
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is informed by mail at which courtroom and before which judge
he is to appear. 44 If the defendant is in custody, it is the respon-
sibility of the sheriff to present him at the appointed hour.
Michigan accords the right to counsel to all defendants at the
preliminary examination, and the court is required to appoint coun-
sel for indigents.245 Normally, for the purpose of defending indi-
gents, counsel is chosen from among members of the "Clinton Street
Bar," 246 a group of local attorneys specializing in court appoint-
ments.
247
The accused may waive his right to the preliminary examination
either at the arraignment on the warrant or just prior to the exam-
ination itself.2 48 It may, under some circumstances, be to the defen-
dant's advantage to waive his examination, most notably to avoid
preservation of testimony which might not otherwise be available
at trial.2 40 The prosecution, however, may exercise its right to a
preliminary examination despite the defendant's waiver.250
The rules of procedure applicable to preliminary examinations
are more flexible than those followed at trial. For example, it is not
244. Both the defendant and his attorney are sent letters from the Recorder's Court
Clerk's Office notifying them of the date of the preliminary examination; the time at
which it is scheduled; the courtroom, including the floor; and which judge will preside.
Telephone interview with Frances Harrison, Recorder's Court Clerk, March 5, 1968.
245. MIcH. Co~mp. LAWS ANN. § 775.16 (1968).
246. See PsInrENT's CoMMIssioN ON LAw ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF
JusrIcE, TASK FORCE REPORT: Tim COURTS 136-37 (1967) [hereinafter TASK FORCE RE-
roRT: THE COURTS]:
It is estimated that there are fifty to seventy-five full-time criminal defense law-
yers in Detroit; they monopolize almost the entire practice in the recorder's court.
The range of competency among these lawyers appears to be comparable to that in
other cities, with a small group of prosperous, well-respected lawyers at the top
and about 15 "police court lawyers" (the Clinton Street Bar) at the bottom.
247. See Emery, Criminal Justice-A Challenge to the Bar, 35 DEraorr L. 35, 36,
38-39 (1967).
248. See AimCAN BAR FOUNDATION, supra note 209, at 123.
249. Testimony taken at the examination is admissible at trial if the witness is
unavailable. People v. Wilcox, 303 Mich. 287, 6 N.W.2d 518 (1942); MicH. Coma'. LAws
§ 768.26 (1948).
250. Mic. CoMP. LAws § 766.1 (1948). In People v. Wilcox, 303 Mich. 287, 6
N.W.2d 518 (1942), the Michigan Supreme Court upheld the right of the state to
demand a preliminary examination, in spite of waiver by the accused and over his
protest.
Several attorneys noted that it is common for a prosecutor to attempt to induce
waiver of the examination in order to save time. E.g., Interview with attorney Byron
Wahls, in Detroit, March 7, 1968. On February 6, 1968, one of the writers sat in
Judge Colombo's courtroom to note whether the procedures varied to any appreciable
extent from those earlier observed during the civil disorder. Before Judge Colombo
appeared on the bench to begin the session, a defense attorney walked up to a detec-
tive to talk about a case. The detective suggested to the attorney that he should waive
examination, since the prosecution had two witnesses and a good case. The attorney
seemed as if he would not waive examination since his client wanted it to be held.
The detective became noticeably aggravated, saying, "We might just insist on a trial




error to bind a defendant over for trial even though improper,
irrelevant, and immaterial evidence is received at the examination,
so long as there is sufficient competent testimony to do S0.251 The
prosecution is required to produce sufficient evidence to show only
that a crime has been committed and that there is probable cause
to believe that the defendant committed it,252 and all evidence must
be considered most favorably to the prosecution. The standard of
proof appears to vary with the individual judge, forcing the parties
to be aware of the attitudes and predilections of various judges.253
Typically, the defense presents no witnesses and the defendant does
not testify.
254
The preliminary examination may be a useful discovery tool for
the defense. Cross-examination of prosecution witnesses may reveal
strengths and weaknesses in the prosecution's case. The preliminary
examination seems not to be used to its full potential as a discovery
device, however, both because local defense attorneys often regard
other avenues and methods of investigation as more fruitful, 25 5 and
because Recorder's Court judges often attempt to hasten the exam-
ination by curtailing cross-examination by the defense once prob-
able cause has been established to their satisfaction.
256
At the close of the preliminary examination the defendant's bail
may be reviewed if he is bound over for trial and the judge feels that
an adjustment is desirable.
B. Preliminary Examinations During the Disorder
1. Preparation for the Preliminary Examinations
a. Scheduling examinations-the ten-day rule. By statute Michi-
gan requires that an accused be examined within ten days after the.
arraignment on the warrant.257 This so-called "ten-day rule" may,
251. People v. Matthews, 289 Mich. 440, 286 N.W. 675 (1939).
252. MICH. ComP. LAws § 766.13 (1948). See AmERICAN BAR FOUNDATION, supra note
209, at 124.
253. See AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION, supra note 209, at 124.
254. Cf. MicH. Comp. LAws § 766.4 (1948).
255. See TASK FORCE REPORT: THE CoURTs 133:
The preliminary examination is the only formal screening device in the Re-
corder's Court ....
Despite the opportunity for obtaining discovery or perhaps dismissal of the case,
defense counsel waived the preliminary examination in two-thirds of all cases in
1965 .... However, the court statistics show that about 20 percent of all examina-
tions result in dismissal. And from our observations it appeared that the examina-
tions were fairly comprehensive and that the defense attorneys gained valuable in-
formation for later use at trial or for their negotiations with the prosecutor.
The high waiver rate may suggest that adequate informal discovery devices are
available to the defense and that preexamination screening by the prosecutor's
office eliminates most weak cases. On the other hand, it may suggest that since most
lawyers anticipate eventually pleading their clients guilty, they may not feel that
expending their time on an examination is of great advantage.
256. See AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION, supra note 209, at 123.
257. MIC . CoMP. LAws § 766.4 (1948).
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however, be waived by the court under circumstances deemed suffi-
cient to outweigh the right of the accused to a prompt examination.2 58
The Recorder's Court, then, was arguably free to disregard the
mandate of the ten-day rule and devise a schedule for examinations
which would lessen the burdens of both the court and the defendants
as much as possible.
However, the court appears to have defaulted and scheduled the
examinations according to no specific plan. Although it is somewhat
unclear what, if any, criteria were applied by the judges in setting
dates for the examinations, they appear to have neither waived the
ten-day rule nor strictly complied with it. It appears that those who
had their examination date set at their arraignment on the warrant
and who were released on bail were examined on the date set, gen-
erally within the ten-day limit. On the other hand, the great majority
of the defendants, in custody because they were unable to post bail,
were delivered by the sheriff to the court by bus, in no specific order,
and examined as breaks between scheduled examinations per-
mitted.259 The result was confusion, overcrowding of court facilities,
judicial impatience, and an exaggerated emphasis on speed. 260 Al-
though some additional strains on the judicial process were clearly
unavoidable regardless of the mode adopted for scheduling exam-
inations, it seems that there were less burdensome alternatives, some
of which were in fact suggested to and rejected by the Recorder's
Court.
It was suggested, for example, that the ten-day rule be waived, that
the court concentrate initially on those in custody, and that examina-
tions be scheduled in order of date of confinement. The reasoning
for this suggestion was twofold-to reduce the strain on detention
facilities and to permit the release of those whom there was no further
cause to hold.2 61 Four specific points should be noted in favor of this
approach. First, the detention facilities in which the great majority
of those initially arraigned were still confined were unsanitary and
inadequate. Most were grievously overcrowded, and many were at
considerable distance from the court in Detroit. Men and women
were in some cases cramped together in restraining depots; food and
258. See In re Peoples, 47 Mich. 626, 14 N.W. 112 (1882).
259. Paul Krause, the docket clerk of Recorder's Court, stated that things were
happening so fast, and there was so much confusion, that he really was not sure as to
procedure. It seemed to him that as prisoners became available, busloads were brought
in, and that there was no order other than to do them all as quickly as possible.
Telephone interview with Paul Krause, Recorder's Court Docket Clerk. Feb. 9, 1968.
260. This is the evaluation of the writers based upon our own observations and
interviews.
261. Mr. Philip Colista, Dean at the University of Detroit School of Law, made
this suggestion to Executive Judge Brennan. Interview with Philip Colista, in Detroit,
Aug. 16, 1967.
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toilet facilities were often unsatisfactory; 26 2 and defendants generally
had little or no opportunity to communicate with friends, family, or
attorney.26 3 Accordingly, it would have been to the advantage of all,
prisoners and the state alike, to have scheduled the examinations in
such a way as to clear out the detention centers as quickly as possi-
ble.264 Second, a sense of fair play on the part of the court should
have dictated that those in custody be examined first. It is obvious
that but for the arguably unconstitutional excessive bail imposed at
262. According to William Bledsoe, Assistant State Attorney General assigned to
the Civil Rights Commissions:
[People] were standing in there where there wasn't room enough to lie down. Or
at least, people would take turns lying down. If you did find a place and get
enough space to lie down you didn't dare get up, because if you did, somebody
else would take your place .... Men and women were housed under these con-
ditions together, without sanitary facilities, with perhaps one or two balogna
sandwiches a day, if that.... A couple of the investigators from the Commissions
who were assigned to these places . . . were escorted from the Police stations at
the end of bayonets, but finally . . . they were permitted to stand in the pre-
cinct station.
Panel Discussion, The Detroit "Riot": A Challenge to Society and the Legal Profession,
presented at the University of Michigan Law School, Oct. 11, 1967. (A transcript is
available for inspection in Michigan Law Review files.)
Though the strain had been lessened to a considerable extent by August 1, when
the preliminary examinations began, many of the inadequate facilities were still being
used, though with fewer prisoners in them. Thus, observers reported that some
prisoners were kept all day on buses which contained no sanitary facilities; the Wayne
County Jail continued to be terribly overcrowded and unsanitary; and "bullpens" in
the Court were filled with tired, hungry people.
The Detroit Free Press, July 29, 1967, § A at 3, col. 3-4 reported that:
Of the 4,000 prisoners arraigned . . . since the riots began, 1,200 were sent to
Jackson State Prison, 200 to the Federal Penitentiary in Milan, 175 to Michigan
Reformatory in Ionia, 105 to Ingham County Jail, 50 to Monroe County Jail, 50 to
Washtenaw County Jail, 700 to the Wayne County Jail and 750 to bullpens in the
Recorder's Court.
The 1,000 who had not been arraigned by Friday afternoon were mostly in a
temporary bullpen in basement garage of Police Headquarters ....
263. Mr. Ernest Goodman, a Detroit attorney, said that he immediately began
getting calls from relatives of those arrested, but generally couldn't find the client since
there was no way to do so. When he did find somebody, he couldn't get to him as
there was no procedure by which a lawyer could interfere with the administrative
procedures of the police in checking them. There was no real effort to comply with
the elementary right of the defendant to see his lawyer. He concluded that it was
futile to try anything. Interview with Ernest Goodman, in Detroit, Feb. 5, 1968.
See also the experience related by Donald Hobson, supra note 136.
From interviews with the families of several defendants at the preliminary ex-
aminations, it generally seemed to be the case that they had not seen each other since
before the time of arrest. Several stated they did not know where the object of their
concern was being held, and others that they had not been allowed to visit even after
they had found out where he was being held.
It should also be recognized that the above illustrations involve retained attorneys
who did not succeed in consulting with their clients before examination, but who, to
a limited extent, could begin to prepare for their defenses in other ways. The vast
number of indigents who saw counsel for the first time at examination had only a
matter of minutes to discuss their situations with defense counsel.
264. Sheriff Buback said that 1,999 riot prisoners remained in jails on Monday,
July 31, 1967. Of these 1,999, 1,134 were being held outside Wayne County. The Detroit
Free Press, Aug. 1, 1967, § A, at 3, col. 1.
Comments
the arraignment on the warrant,265 many of those still confined at
this point would have suffered no custody at all. That is, had rea-
sonable bail been imposed initially, many more would have been able
to obtain release pending examination. If the court felt compelled
to set high bonds for the purpose of clearing the streets during
the disorder, the least that might have been expected when the
shooting had stopped is an effort to undo this hardship as soon as
possible. Moreover, the longer the period of confinement, the greater
chance there was for loss of employment266 and hardening of the
attitude of defendants about the fairness of the law.267 Third, those
free on bond or personal recognizance would suffer no real prejudice
by having their examinations delayed, and whatever uncertainty
would in fact result would be clearly outweighed by the exigencies
of the situation and would be dearly warranted by the statute.
Finally, since one of the purposes of the ten-day rule is to insure
that an accused, once arraigned, is not confined for an unreasonable
period before probable cause is established,26s the spirit of the rule
would be best fulfilled by examining those in custody first.
Even if the judges had originally set reasonable bail and only a
normal percentage of those arraigned had been remanded to custody,
265. See part II.C.I. supra.
266. Attorney Louis Simmons had several clients who lost their jobs as a result of
their incarceration. One of them had been assistant manager of a Robert Hall's Clothing
Store. He was arrested very late on Sunday evening, July 23, on the street a few blocks
from his home, while searching for his nephew at the request of his mother. Given
no chance to explain his presence on the street, he was told he was being charged
with a curfew violation, but when he appeared for arraignment on the warrant, the
charge had been raised to entering without breaking with intent to commit larceny.
After his client had spent over a week in jail, Simmons was able to explain the circum-
stances to the prosecutor, who accordingly moved for dismissal of the charges when the
defendant's preliminary examination was called.
The defendant later related, that his immediate superior went on vacation about
the time that the defendant was arrested and said that he had to hire another as-
sistant. The defendant felt that his superior had assumed his guilt because he had
been arrested. After an offer of a lower-paying job elsewhere he was finally given
another job at a different Robert Hall's Store, but altogether lost three weeks' work.
Interview with Louis Simmons, Detroit attorney and President of the Wolverine Bar
Association and his client in Detroit, September 1967.
According to William Brune, a personnel director of Chrysler Corporation, one of
the largest employers of Negroes in Detroit, there is a provision in Chrysler employ-
ment contracts that states if a person doesn't contact his plant for five consecutive
days, it is considered that he has quit his job. For the majority of those employees
who were jailed either a wife, friend, or minister called to inform Chrysler that he
would be absent from work, thus preventing the five days from beginning to run.
However, if someone called and said only that the employee wouldn't be in the next
day, giving no other notice about future absence, a certified letter of separation
would be sent after five days.
A lenient policy, however, was taken when later the employee returned to explain
his absence. Returning employees were generally required to come in with a letter
from the court telling of the charge. Telephone interview with William Brune,
Chrysler Corp., March 5, 1968.
267. See notes 409-14 infra and accompanying text.
268. See sources cited supra note 239.
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it might still make sense to examine those in custody first when it is
impossible or impractical to examine all within ten days. The prob-
able effect of reasonable bail would be that only indigents and those
charged with serious offenses would be in custody. In this situation,
by examining those in custody first, the prosecution would best be
able to preserve testimony against the more serious offenders.2 69 This
may be particularly important in the context of a civil disorder where
much of the evidence may come from such sources as National
Guardsmen, who may be unavailable to testify at a later date.
270
At the other extreme were those who suggested that the court
adhere strictly to the ten-day rule. Their arguments were (1) that
with double court sessions2 1 and a significant number of volunteer
attorneys,27 2 all examinations could have been held within ten days of
arraignment; (2) that it was not clear that the court could, on its
own initiative, waive the ten-day rule;27 3 (3) that the rule is an in-
tegral part of an accused's constitutional right to a speedy trial; 274
269. The "serious" offenses included homicide, rape, robberies, felonious assault,
assault and battery, resisting a police officer, breaking and entering a business, enter-
ing without breaking, larceny, receiving stolen property, carrying a concealed weapon,
drunkenness, arson, malicious destruction of property, and miscellaneous other
offenses. On the other hand, the "relatively minor offenses" include curfew violations
and other misdemeanors, as well as looting offenses in cases where no violence or
weapons were involved. There were 1,014 prosecuted arrests for misdemeanors, 935 of
which were for curfew violations, out of the total of 4,881 prosecuted arrests. From
the statistics available relating to the 1,647 unprosecuted arrests and the 703 juvenile
arrests, it appears that at least 1,037 of the unprosecuted arrests were for misdemeanors.
Detroit Police Department, Statistical Report on the Civil Disorders (unpublished
mimeos).
270. MiCH. COMP. LAws § 768.26 (1948) provides:
Testimony taken at an examination, preliminary hearing, or at a former trial
of the case, or taken by deposition at the instance of the defendant, may be used
by the prosecution whenever the witness giving such testimony cannot, for any
reason, be produced at the. trial, or whenever the witness has, since giving such
testimony become insane or otherwise mentally incapacitated to testify.
271. "Only slightly more than half of the 600 cases scheduled yesterday were heard
as the overload continued to tax the court, which is working a double shift to expedite
the cases." The Detroit News, Aug. 4, 1967, § A, at 3, col. 6. See also 1967 ANN. REP, oF
THE RiEcORDER's COURT OF THE CITY OF DERoIT, 4.
272. According to John C. Emery, Jr., chief defender for the Detroit Bar Asso-
ciation, who coordinated the volunteer attorneys, there were approximately 703 volun-
teers who agreed to serve wtihout fee, generally for either one 9:00 A.M. to 3:00 P.M
session or one 3:00 P.M. to 9:00 P.M. session in a courtroom. Emery noted that this
figure represented only 10-15% of the membership of the Detroit Bar Association. In
addition, it was observed that by the middle of the second week of preliminary exam-
inations it was becoming more and more difficult to get volunteers to come to the
court, and many attempts at persuasion over the telephone were necessary. Panel
Discussion, supra note 262.
273. It appears that the Recorder's Court Judges were somewhat hesitant to waive
the ten-day rule on their own initiative. Thus Judge Brennan stated that they always
set the examination date within ten days of the arraignment on the warrant, and if it
became evident that it could not be held before the eleventh or twelfth day, the reason
for the delay was placed in the record and the attorneys would specifically waive the
rule. Interview with Judge Vincent J. Brennan, Exec, Judge of Recorder's Court, in
Detroit, Jan. 29, 1968.
274. Cf. In re Peoples, 47 Mich. 626, 14 N.W. 112 (1882); People v. Den Uyl, 320
Mich. 477, 31 N.W.2d 699 (1948).
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and (4) that under existing record-keeping practices, the preliminary
examinations could be handled more efficiently by adhering to
standard procedures. 275
The arguments seem unconvincing. First, it is clear that in spite
of double sessions and volunteer attorneys, without further adjust-
ments it would have in fact been impossible to hold all examinations
within ten days of arraignment.2 6 Second, better reasoning supports
the view that the court may on its own initiative waive the ten-day
rule whenever circumstances warrant such a waiver .2 7 Third, al-
though the ten-day rule is in fact designed, at least in part, to protect
the right to a speedy trial, under the circumstances prevailing in the
courts following the disorder, it seems that both the objectives of the
rule and the ends of justice would have been more effectively fur-
thered by waiver of, not adherence to, the letter of the rule. Fourth,
it is doubtful that waiver of the rule would have engendered any
more clerical confusion than already existed.2rs
In summary, it appears that the decision made by the court as
to scheduling preliminary examinations was unsound as a matter of
policy, and that a waiver of the ten-day rule would have more
effectively preserved the respective interests of the accused and the
state by allowing examinations of those in custody in the order of
their confinement.
b. Offers of assistance. Although the Recorder's Court rejected
all offers of clerical and judicial assistance during the arraignments
on the warrant,279 some limited help was accepted during the pre-
275. George Marcia, an experienced clerk in Recorder's Court, analyzed the obvious
delay in the preliminary examinations by saying that the sorting of files was not nearly
so difficult as the sorting of persons scattered all over the southeastern part of the state.
He suggested that the delay was basically a police problem, and indicated that the
Clerk's Office was not inordinately busy. Interview with George Marcia, Recorder's
Court clerk, in Detroit, Aug. 16, 1967.
276. This opinion is based upon the personal observations of the writers as well as
interviews with defense counsel. This conclusion might also be drawn from the number
of the criminal files for civil disturbance cases in Recorder's Clerks Office.
277. See Micn. Comp. LAws §§ 766.1, 766.4, and 766.7 (1948), which, when read
together, arguably allow the examining magistrate to delay the examination whenever
he feels in his discretion that strict necessity requires the delay in order to avoid a
manifest injustice. Since the statutes are clearly designed to protect the accused and
safeguard his constitutional and statutory right to speedy trial, it would appear that
some delay would be justifiable in order to ensure the due deliberation to which the
accused is entitled. Cf. People v. Den Uyl, 520 Mich. 477, 31 N.W.2d 699 (1948).
278. Despite the feeling of some that the confusion at the preliminary examinations,
particularly the first few days, was basically a police logistics problem, it was often
observed by the writers or reported by attorneys that the criminal files were missing
at the time the defendant was scheduled to be examined. This of course necessitated
some sort of delay or adjournment until the presence of the defendant and his file
could be coordinated. See notes 300-01 infra.
279. One of the first offers came from the Wayne County Circuit Court, which
both in writing and over the telephone volunteered the services of some of its
twenty-six judges. This offer was refused. Interviews with Wayne County Circuit Court
Judge Horace Gilmore, in Detroit, Aug. 17, 1967.
When asked whether the utilization of more judges would have lessened the
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liminary examinations. In addition to some minimal clerical assist-
ance, 280 the court accepted the services of four or five Wayne County
Circuit Court judges and of one Traffic Court judge to replace ab-
sent or vacationing Recorder's Court judges.28 It should be noted,
however, that no over-all increase in total judicial manpower re-
sulted,282 and that the failure to accept the services of the other
twenty-two Circuit Court judges at this stage may have significantly
impaired the effective administration of justice in the Recorder's
Court. It seems clear that the addition of these judges would have
greatly reduced the pressures on the court, allowed examination of
more defendants in a shorter period of time (possibly even to the
extent of permitting adherence to the ten-day rule), and helped to
individualize the process by providing additional time both for de-
fense attorneys to consult with their clients and for the examinations
themselves.28 3
confusion which seemed to exist in the Recorder's Court, Judge Frank Schemanske
stated that the Court could not have used the additional help. He felt that the con-
fusion was caused by the problems involved in getting the defendants over to the court,
and in his opinion, more judges would have added to rather than abated the con-
fusion. Interview with Judge Frank Schemanske, Recorder's Court Judge, in Detroit,
Aug. 4, 1967.
280. Judge George Crockett related that approximately twenty-five nuns were
allowed to volunteer their services, but complained that no other faith was invited.
Interview with Judge George Crockett, Recorder's Court judge, in Detroit, Aug. 8, 1967.
George Marcia, a derk in Recorder's Court, said that experience had indicated that
judges and clerks unfamiliar with Recorder's Court procedure often proved more
trouble than they were worth. Nevertheless, in the fifth or sixth day after the beginning
of the disturbance a man was dispatched from the Clerk's Office to instruct Circuit
Court clerks in working with Recorder's Court files. After a day of frustration, the
plan was abandoned. Interview with George Marcia in Detroit, Aug. 16, 1967.
281. This was determined through interviews with court clerks from the Wayne
County Circuit Court.
282. Interview with Judge Frank Schemanske, in Detroit, Aug. 4, 1967. There are
presently thirteen Recorder's Court judges. See 1967 ANN. REP. or Tm REcoRDER'S CouaRT
or THE CITY OF DEmorr.
283. These attorneys generally argued that although admittedly much of the
confusion was due to the difficulties encountered in transporting defendants into the
proper courtrooms for the time at which their examinations had been scheduled,
there were other factors calling for the utilization of additional judges. First, one of the
major criticisms by attorneys at the preliminary examinations was the lack of adequate
time to speak with clients and the haste with which some judges proceeded through
the examination. This problem could have been alleviated to a large extent by
making use of extra judges and opening the six unused courtrooms (empty because
the judges were on shifts). Despite doubts cast upon the ability of judges from
outside the Recorder's Court to contribute significantly to the Recorder's Court's
efforts (see note 280 supra), it seems unlikely that judges already familiar with
criminal procedure in other courts would have found mastery of Recorder's Court
procedure impossible.
Second, part of the confusion was caused by the inadequate courtroom facilities
in the forty-odd year old building. The courtrooms were generally filled well be-
yond capacity, with friends and relatives of the defendants lining the wails and
police officers scheduled to testify at that session overflowing the jury box and sitting
or standing in the gallery. The resulting commotion and background noise sometimes
made it difficult to proceed in an orderly and dignified manner as people were con-
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It is difficult to understand the aversion of the court to what ap-
parently would have been a meaningful contribution to the effort to
process disorder defendants. The same objections to the court's
refusal to accept help noted in the discussion of the arraignments
on the warrant seem equally, if not more, forceful in the context of
the preliminary examinations.
c. Providing defense counsel. It was readily apparent that the
sheer numbers of arrested persons would render inadequate the
normal method of assignment of counsel for indigent defendants.284
Not only would it have been impossible to supply sufficient numbers
of attorneys from the ranks of those normally available for court
appointments, but also compensating court appointments under
the normal system would have been extraordinarily expensive. 28 5
Accordingly, on Friday, July 28, Executive Recorder's Court
Judge Vincent Brennan requested the Detroit Bar Association to
assist by supplying a sufficient number of volunteer attorneys to
stantly walking in and out, looking for a relative or friend. It seems likely that if the
other courtrooms would have been utilized and other judges made available, this prob-
lem might have been significantly diminished.
Third, there were problems in consultation between attorney and client even where
the time itself may have been adequate. For one thing, the "bullpens," barred deten-
tion rooms located between courtrooms, were jammed wel beyond capacity. In some
instances, the attorneys were required to locate their clients and then interview them
through the bars of the bullpen, which would seem to make it extremely difficult to
carry on a normal conversation, let alone the dignified and confidential discussion
necessary to the effective defense of the particular defendant. It should be noted that
those who instructed the volunteer attorneys before each session instructed them to
have their client taken into the jury room where there would be more privacy, rather
than attempt to communicate through the bars of the bullpen. They felt that this
advice was generally followed by the volunteers. Again, by using all the courtrooms
and improvising additional facilities for attorney-client discussions, this serious prob-
lem could have been mitigated.
Some might contend that this could not be done because the prosecutor could not
afford to spread his staff of thirty-five men so thin. However, since normally all of
the courtrooms in Recorder's Court are functioning and presumably an assistant prose-
cutor is present at all times, and since normally prosecutors are likewise deployed in
the Wayne County Circuit Court which was temporarily closed, it is difficult to imagine
the lack of enough prosecutors to fill all the courtrooms. Even if there was a shortage
of prosecutors because of their necessary utilization in other areas, it seems conceiv-
able that some prosecutors from surrounding localities would have made themselves
available for the emergency, just as did the volunteer attorneys and judges.
284. There were 1,881 felony examinations and 940 misdemeanor dispositions held
before examining magistrates. The remainder of the 4,881 prosecuted, remained pend-
ing or resulted in waiver of preliminary examinations, issuance of writs of capias for
nonappearance, unserved warrants, or commitment of the defendant to the Department
of Mental Health. Recorder's Court Statistics on Civil Disturbance Cases (unpublished
mimeo).
285. See MicH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 775.16 (1968). In 1966, the fees paid court-
appointed counsel for representing 2,552 indigent defendants in the Recorder's Court
totaled $328,685.37, an average fee paid of $128.79 per indigent. 1966 ANN. REP. OF
'm REcORDER's COURT OF THE Crry oF DETorr. In 1967, the year of the disorder, the
fees paid to court-appointed counsel for representing 3,769 indigent defendants in the
Recorder's Court totaled $568,882.81 or an average of $150.93 per indigent. See 1967
ANN. RnP. OF THE REcoRD s'S COURT OF THE Crry OF Dmorr at 10.
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provide all defendants with adequate representation at the prelim-
inary examinations.2 8 6
The Detroit Bar Association responded promptly, and representa-
tives of that group,2 7 together with other interested parties, 28 8 met
on July 30 to formulate plans for providing defense counsel for all
indigents at the examinations. A goal of 500 volunteers was set, each
volunteer to donate six hours of time2s9 The response of local at-
torneys was generally favorable; 703 eventually offered their serv-
ices.2
90
Many, if not most, of the volunteers had never practiced before
the Recorder's Court and were thus unfamiliar with the procedures
of that court and, usually, with criminal law in general. Recognizing
these problems, the coordinators of the volunteer group developed
two methods of familiarizing volunteers with the techniques of
representation at the preliminary examinations. Prior to each court
session, a short meeting was held at which a representative of the
Detroit Bar Association 291 explained the purposes and mechanics of
a preliminary examination to the volunteers scheduled to appear be-
fore the court in that session. Moreover, after each such lecture ses-
sion, volunteers were given a fifty-page mimeograph pamphlet ex-
plaining various defense tactics in more detail.2 92 Despite the haste
with which this pamphlet was prepared, it was considered so effective
and efficient a guide to procedure and tactics that several "regulars"
2 13
286. Address by John C. Emery, Jr., in Panel Discussion, supra note 262.
287. Mr. John Feikens, President of the Detroit Bar Association, was present along
with John C. Emery, Jr., the newly appointed chief defender for the Detroit Bar
Association who assumed control of the effort to coordinate the volunteer attorneys;
David Rosenthal, who became Emery's chief assistant; and Thomas Munson, a former
president of the Detroit Bar Association. Interview with Dean Philip Colista, in Detroit,
Aug. 16, 1967.
288. Also present were Claudia Shropshire of the Detroit Legal Services; Father
Harbrecht, then Dean of the University of Detroit School of Law; Philip Colista, present
Dean of the University of Detroit Law School; and an NAACP observer. Id.
289. Id.
290. Address by John C. Emery, Jr., in Panel Discussion, supra note 262.
291. Either John C. Emery, Jr. or David Rosenthal, or both, generally conducted
these meetings, which were held at approximately 8:30 A.M. and 2:30 P.M. each day
of the preliminary examinations in a vacant courtroom on the fifth floor of Recorder's
Court. This room was the headquarters for the volunteer attorneys and all coordinat-
ing efforts emanated from it. Interview with John C. Emery, Jr., in Detroit, Aug. 2,
1967.
292. This pamphlet was put together in twenty-four hours by law professors and
law students. These materials contained the statutes under which most defendants
were charged, explained what elements were necessary to find probable cause and short
statements from some of the leading cases construing the statutes. The procedure in
Recorder's Court was explained, as well as practical advice to consider in conducting
an examination. Interview with Dean Philip Colista, in Detroit, Aug. 16, 1967. See
Materials for Preliminary Examinations, prepared by the research staffs of the Urban
Law Program of the University of Detroit School of Law and the Detroit Neighborhood
Legal Services Program [hereinafter Materials for Preliminary Examinations].
293. The "regulars" referred to are those attorneys who are generally assigned to
represent indigent defendants in Recorder's Court. See Emery, supra note 247, at 38,
39, for a criticism of the assigned counsel system used in Detroit's Recorder's Court.
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picked up a copy for reference. 294 Some members of the court, on the
other hand, apparently considered portions of the practical advice
contained in the pamphlet to be unduly disrespectful of the judicial
machinery. 95
After their orientation, volunteers were assigned in teams to
particular courtrooms rather than particular defendants, each team
to represent all indigent defendants whose cases were assigned to that
courtroom for that court session. While one volunteer attorney was
conducting an examination, others would interview defendants and
prepare their cases.
296
It should be noted that not all attorneys representing defendants
at the preliminary examinations were volunteers, and that a signifi-
cant number of defendants, perhaps as many as thirty per cent, were
represented by retained counsel.297
The decision of Recorder's Court judges to use the services of
volunteer counsel resulted in at least some representation for all
accused persons at the preliminary examination, a commendable
difference from the arraignment on the warrant. While most of the
volunteers were inexperienced in criminal law, efforts to acquaint
them with the criminal process were largely successful, allowing at
least a greater opportunity for competent individualization of justice
than would otherwise have been possible.
2 98
2. Problems in Conducting the Examinations
a. Difficulties of individualizing the process and providing ef-
fective representation. As noted earlier, the presence of volunteer
counsel provided the opportunity for greater individualization of
justice at this stage than existed at the arraignment on the warrant.
Moreover, the clerical logjam had by this point been relieved, at least
294. Interview with Dean Philip Colista, in Detroit, Aug. 6, 1967.
295. According to Dean Colista, who had discussed the situation with Recorder's
Court judges, they were very sensitive and reacted to something unaccustomed-the
notion of telling people "how to beat cases." Some of the judges feared that certain
volunteers might be prompted by the manual to "sabotage" the court. He said that
those who prepared the pamphlet simply wanted to tell the "facts of life" to attorneys
with no criminal or Recorder's Court experience. It appeared to Colista that at least
some judges viewed the volunteers as being there to accommodate the court in expe-
diting matters, rather than as true adversaries present to defend their clients' rights
vigorously. Interview with Philip Colista, in Detroit, Aug. 16, 1967.
296. Interview with John C. Emery, Jr., in Detroit, Aug. 2, 1967.
297. Cahalan, The Detroit Riot, 3 TE PROSECUTOR 430, 433 (1967); the consensus
of attorneys interviewed was that from 20-25% of the defendants at preliminary exam-
ination had retained counsel.
298. However, John C. Emery, Jr., noted:
In retrospect, I still have to question whether the Detroit Bar Association
should have undertaken the task of representing these defendants at preliminary
examination in the first place. I say this because I am not at all sure about the
effectiveness of counsel under the circumstances. Nevertheless, the volunteer attor-
neys did a commendable job and tried extremely hard to represent each client as
a "special case."
Address by John C. Emery, Jr., in Panel Discussion, supra note 262.
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to the extent necessary to make police and court files on each indi-
vidual available for use during the preliminary examinations.09 The
disorder having largely spent itself, the court could now operate
in an atmosphere no longer quite so dominated by the hysteria and
fear of the week before. Despite these favorable factors, however,
countervailing difficulties arose which adversely affected both the
individualization of the process and the effective representation of
defendants.
(1) Coordinating defendants and their files in the proper court-
room at the proper time. Both those remanded to custody following
the arraignment on the warrant and those released on personal
recognizance experienced difficulties in getting to the appropriate
courtroom for the preliminary examinations. As noted earlier, the
Sheriff's Office, in charge of those in custody, was unable to supply
information on defendants' whereabouts. Often this resulted in long
delays and adjournments until the scheduled defendants could be
found and brought to the court.300 Moreover, those released on per-
299. It was observed by the writers that the criminal files containing the police
write-ups were generally brought into the courtroom prior to the beginning of each
session and placed on the table in the center of the courtroom where the prosecutors
and chief detectives sat. As the cases were called for examination or as the defense
attorneys came over to request it, the particular criminal file was pulled from the
others in the pile and handed to the defense attorney who proceeded to look it over,
some scrutinizing it much more closely than others.
300. See note 153 supra. Some claimed that the records were inadequate. See, e.g.
The Detroit News, Aug. 4, 1967, § A at 3, col. 6. "[A]ttorney, Harry Pliskow, said
that police have been unable to find one of his clients, who was supposed to face
examination two days ago. He said police are now checking the rolls in Jackson State
Prison to see if the defendant may be there."
Attorney Louis Simmons related that two of his clients were brothers whose exam-
ination had been scheduled for 3:00 P.M. in Judge Olson's courtroom on August 2.
When he went there the file was missing since Judge Schemanske had taken some of
Judge Olson's files and tried to hold examinations at 9:00 A.M. instead. One of the
defendants was missing so the case was adjourned until August 3. When Simmons
checked at Jackson Prison, prison officials didn't know which of the brothers they had
in custody. Interview with attorney Louis Simmons, President of the Wolverine Bar
Assoclation, in Detroit, in September 1967.
Detroit attorney Byron Wahls said, "There is absolute and inexcusable confusion
as to where some of these defendants are. When their name is called for preliminary
examination the police cannot even say where they are being held." Detroit Free Press,
Aug. 5, 1967, § A, at 3, col. 8.
This type of incident was also observed by the writers. Some of the difficulty was
apparently due to the giving of fictitious names by some defendants. Interview with
Judge Robert DeMascio, Recorder's Court judge, in Detroit, Aug. 4, 1967.
"Operation Find," an emergency program set up by United Community Services of
Metropolitan Detroit during the civil disturbance of July 1967, carried on activities
designed to locate persons displaced by the disorder. The final report of "Operation
Find" points out the difficulties encountered in the process of assisting these individ-
uals and in includes recommendations for the future should such an event recur.
The major thrust of "Operation Find" was in the area of locating 2,090 different
persons who had been displaced directly as a result of the civil disturbance. The
greatest difficulty encountered by "Operation Find" was the inadequate information
given by the local police authorities about the location of displaced persons. Numerous
persons could not be located on the lists provided to "Operation Find" by the police
Comments
sonal recognizance were apparently notified only of the date at which
to appear at the court and instructed to report to the presiding judge.
As a result, many were hopelessly confused about what to do and
where to go, missed their examination, and caused additional ad-
journments and confusion.301 Furthermore, although files had by this
or sheriff's office, even though interested inquirers had heard from the police that their
relatives were being detained. Even though an "Operation Find" worker may have
located a person and his arraignment number on a police list, the inquirer discovered
when contacting the specific detention facility that the displaced person was not there.
Inquiries Regarding Dislocated Persons by
Whereabouts of Dislocated Persons
Whereabouts Number Per Cent
Total 2,090 100.0
1. On lists provided by Detroit Police
Department and the Wayne County
Sheriff's Office 1,323 63.3
Found immediately on lists 827 39.6
Found after follow-up activity 496 23.7
2. In various detention facilities but
not on any lists provided 172 8.2
3. In eight major hospitals 63 3.0
4. Returned home 384 18.4
5. Whereabouts unknown 148 7.1
301. In normal times the defendant and his attorney are sent a letter from the
Recorder's Clerks Office notifying them of the date of the preliminary examination;
the time it is scheduled; the courtroom, including the floor it is on; and which judge
will preside. See note 244 supra. However, during the disorder, though letters were
sent out, they did not contain this detailed information. Instead they instructed the
defendant to report to the presiding judge on a particular day, who would then tell
the defendant to which courtroom to report. Much of the confusion seemed to stem
from this procedure, since many people were not sure where to go or what to do when
they got to the courthouse. Consequently, it was observed that often defendants out
on bond either reported late or to the wrong courtroom, or never arrived at all. Tele-
phone interview with Frances Harrison, Recorder's Court clerk, March 5, 1968.
According to E. Burke Montgomery, Clerk of Recorder's Court, there were 183
adjournments and 129 writs of capias issued for nonappearance during the preliminary
examinations or a total of 262 adjournments. Interview with E. Burke Montgomery,
in Detroit, Aug. 81, 1967.
While it is impossible to be certain, it is conceivable that a significant percentage
of these adjournments was due to the confusion over which courtroom defendants out
on personal bond were to report to, along with the failure on the part of the Wayne
County Sheriff's Department to locate in-custody defendants and present them for
examination at the scheduled time. Later statistics from Recorder's Court point out
that from the earlier total of 262 adjournments, 199 preliminary examinations subse-
quently took place while there were still 41 writs of capias for nonappearance outstand-
ing, along with some still pending examinations and other miscellaneous dispositions.
See Recorder's Court Statistics on Civil Disturbance Cases (unpublished mimeos).
Though the number of writs of capias for nonappearance had been reduced from
129 to 41, a drop of 88, not one case has been found in which a judge required for-
feiture of a personal bond. Charles Goldfarb of Goldfarb Bonding Co., the largest
bail bond agency in Detroit, stated that he did three months worth of business in
one week, writing over seven hundred bonds and that there was tremendous confusion
on the part of defendants out on bond as to where to go for their examinations. He
added that the judges were very lenient in not cancelling bonds, and that to his
knowledge no one was jailed for being late. Interview with Charles Goldfarb, in
Detroit, Sept. 5, 1967.
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time been made available, the wrong files were often sent, or on
occasion the right file was sent but to the wrong courtroom, adding
more delay.3
02
The result of this logistic difficulty was that examinations often
proceeded on a haphazard basis marked by confusion, inconve-
nience, and pressure to examine immediately anyone for whom the
necessary ingredients for examination were present, regardless of any
predetermined schedule.
30 3
(2) Time allowed defense for preparation. One significant by-
product of the atmosphere of confusion and pressure in the court
during the examinations was the reported lack of adequate time for
some defense attorneys to consult with their clients and prepare
their cases. The Detroit News reported:
Troubled Recorder's Court, already overwhelmed by the hundreds
of cases resulting from the arrests made during last week's rioting,
was criticized today by the volunteer attorneys who are handling
many of the cases. The attorneys .. .said they were not allowed
enough time to discuss cases with their clients.
3 04
Other observers voiced similar views.
Generally, the volunteer attorneys were allowed approximately
ten to fifteen minutes to prepare a case after it had been called by the
court. In that time, they were expected to obtain all the necessary
background information, determine the facts surrounding arrest, and
formulate defense strategy. Moreover, attorneys sometimes found
themselves defending more than the number of defendants originally
assigned to them.30 5
Recorder's Court judges were reported to be generally unrecep-
tive to requests for additional time to prepare and to objections to
the addition of defendants to an attorney's case load. Even if the
requested continuances or adjournments were granted, the clients,
who might even have been free on bond before the preliminary ex-
amination, were in danger of higher bonds and resultant detention
for the interim period.30 The Detroit News reported that "[t]he
attorneys, supplied by the Detroit Bar Association ... charged that
302. Observation of the writers.
303. Observation of the writers.
304. The Detroit News, Aug. 4, 1967, § A, at 5, col. 6.
305. This was determined through the observations of the writers as well as with
interviews with volunteer attorneys, including those who were charged with coordi-
nating the effort.
306. Detroit attorney Pierre Heftier related (interview in Detroit, Jan. 4, 1968) that
just such a situation befell two of his clients. Another attorney, Birmingham Municipal
Judge John C. Emery, Jr., chief defender for the Bar Association, also complained
(interview in Detroit, Aug. 2, 1967) about cash bonds being issued for defendants in
place of their original personal recognizance bonds. On the other hand, Prosecutor
William L. Cahalan asserted that "[iln those instances where defense counsel needed
more time to prepare, the court granted an adjournment." Cahalan, The Detroit Riot,
3 THE PROSECUTOR 430, 433 (1967).
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judges were unfairly imposing higher bonds on defendants whose
cases could not be heard on schedule." 307
Adding to the burden on volunteer attorneys in preparing their
cases were the inadequate facilities available for consultation. A
number of attorneys complained about having to consult with their
clients in crowded, noisy courthouse hallways, through the bars of a
packed court bullpen, in the confusion of the noisy courtroom itself,
or, at best, in a jury room where many simultaneous attorney-client
conversations were being held.30o Neither the time allowed nor the
conditions under which consultation was conducted was thus con-
ducive to either complete and free disclosure by the client or effective
representation by the attorney. 30 9
(3) Mass examinations. As noted with respect to the arraign-
ments on the warrant, it was common to have group treatment from
arrest on through the court process. This was again apparent during
the preliminary examinations; court records show that it was not un-
common to have six to eight defendants examined at one time, with
as many as fourteen appearing simultaneously in at least one case.310
Although mass examinations tended to relieve the pressures on
detention facilities and hasten the disposition of cases, they had at
least three kinds of possible adverse effects. First, to the extent the
judge considers the defendants as a unit, individualization may be
sacrificed for expediency. Second, there is the danger, heightened by
the chaotic circumstances of arrest during a civil disorder, that inno-
cent bystanders will be swept into the process and prosecuted without
distinction from those arrested with them. Third, the practice of
appointing one attorney to represent several defendants being ex-
amined at the same time may result in denial of the right to effective
counsel for some or all of those so represented.3 11
An extreme example of the dangers inherent in mass examina-
tions, especially during the chaos of a civil disorder, arose out of the
Detroit disturbance. One defendant, arrested and arraigned along
with five others, was injured while awaiting examination in jail.
While this defendant was being treated in a hospital, the examina-
tion of the entire group was called and waived by the members of the
group present, the clerk noting on the file that all defendants had
waived. The examining judge then reduced bail to personal recogni-
zance for all defendants. The hospitalized defendant, however, was
307. The Detroit News, Aug. 4, 1967, § A, at 3, col. 6.
308. See note 283 supra. This was also determined through the observations of the
writers and interviews with defense counsel.
309. The legal analysis of the denial of the right to effective counsel is discussed
in part III.C.2. infra.
310. This was determined through a random sampling of the civil disorder files
in the Recorder's Court Clerk's Office. See, e.g., File No. 139,373 in Recorder's Court
Clerk's Office.
311. See text accompanying notes 305 supra.
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never informed of either the preliminary examination or the reduc-
tion of bail. He was instead returned to custody from the hospital,
was again lost in the shuffle at the arraignment on the information,
and remained in jail until February 1968. The rest of the group had
been free since August.312 How many others were similarly "mis-
placed" to their detriment at some point during the court procedures
following the disorder is unknown, but it seems clear that mass ex-
aminations may have enhanced that possibility. As a California inter-
mediate appellate court reflected in People v. Zammora:
[Although] a joint trial of numerous defendants speeds the wheels of
justice and provides not only an expeditious but a less burdensome
method for disposing of criminal cases [it] furnishes no valid argu-
ment for depriving a defendant charged with a crime of his right to
effective and substantial aid of counsel at all stages of the proceeding.
To do that, as was said in Powell v. Alabama. . . "is not to proceed
promptly in the calm spirit of regulated justice but to go forward
with the haste of the mob.1
313
(4) Lack of screening by the prosecutor. Under normal circum-
stances, a case does not reach the preliminary examination stage until
it has passed a rather extensive screening process. Cases with little
chance of resulting in conviction, or those to which there are strong
policy objections to prosecution, are dropped by the prosecutor before
the defendant is required to stand examination. 314 This preliminary
screening process apparently operated poorly during the disorder.
The apparent reason for this lack of screening was the sheer lack of
time, manpower, and information to review the thousands of cases
within the time between arrest and preliminary examination.31 5
Yet the special circumstances of a mass civil disorder present, it
seems, an even stronger case for the desirability of preliminary
312. This incident was related by Detroit attorney Byron Wahls, in an interview
on March 7, 1968.
313. 66 Cal. App. 2d 166, 285, 152 P.2d 180, 215 (1944).
314. See AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION, LAW ENFORCEMENT IN THE METROPOLIS 124
(1967).
315. See COMMISSION REPORT 184-85 (GPO ed.), 339-40 (paper ed.):
[lle masses of arrestees in the major riots so overwhelmed processing and pre-
I procedures that facilities and personnel were not free to deal adequately
with serious offenders or with evidence of their crimes. Personnel in police sta-
tions were overwhelmed by the sheer numbers of accused persons to be booked,
screened, detained, and eventually brought to court. Minor and major offenders
were herded unselectively through the process.
Normal screening procedures were overrun in the chaos of the major disorder.
Rational decisions to prosecute, delay prosecution on good behavior, or dismiss,
to release with or without bail pending trial, to accept a plea to a lesser charge
or to press for conviction on the original charge, to impose a just sentence-require
access to a comprehensive file of information on the offender contributed by police,
prosecution, defense counsel, bail interviewers and probation officers. Orderly
screening requires time, personnel, deliberation. These elements were absent in
the court proceedings of participants in the major riots.
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screening than is present during normal times. Certainly many of the
pressures on the court, the defendants, the prosecution, the defense
attorneys, and on the community might have been lessened by a
judicious screening of cases which normally would not have been
prosecuted to the examination stage. Had this been done, the case
load might have been substantially reduced, allowing a more orderly
and careful deliberation of those cases which merited consideration
and the release of those defendants against whom there was no case
or a very weak case. Thus, congestion in the detention centers could
have been reduced, as well as incidents of illegal and unfair deten-
tion. Moreover, both the prosecution and the defense would have
been able to spend more time with fewer defendants, with a resultant
preservation of some semblance of an adequate adversary process.
Finally, tensions in the community involved in the disorder might
have been alleviated by a screening process to the extent that it
could help to dispel the image of the court as an instrument of
oppression rather than justice.
The obvious practical difficulties attending any effort to provide
a workable screening process during a civil disorder point up the
necessity that the legal system and legal profession make advance
preparation for contingencies of this sort. Specifically, the clerical
techniques and facilities must be prepared to provide correct and
complete files of arrested persons to make screening possible. More-
over, there should be some plan for deputizing volunteers to act
as assistant prosecutors, armed with reasonable criteria and sufficient
discretion to make sound judgments in matters of this kind.310
b. Evidentiary problems. (1) Evidence to identify defendants. A
major problem for the prosecution at the preliminary examinations
was that of adequately identifying the defendant as the person ar-
rested and booked on the charge in question. It was quite obviously
impossible for the arresting officer to be able to identify, from mem-
ory, each of the perhaps scores of persons he had arrested during the
week, or to correlate the face with the circumstances of arrest. To
meet this problem, which the police had anticipated, a procedure
was developed whereby, at the booking,
the arresting officer and the accused were photographed with a Pola-
roid camera side by side with the loot piled on the floor before them.
On the back of the photo, particulars of name, location of arrest, etc.,
were noted. These photos were placed in the police file folder of the
case and were referred to by the arresting officer just before his
taking the witness stand for the purpose of refreshing his recollec-
tion... 317
316. For a discusion of possible solutions to the problems incident to mass arrests,
see COMMISSION REPORT 189-95 (GPO ed.), 347-59 (paper ed.). See also INTERIM REPORT,
DSTmicr OF COLUMBIA COMMITTEE ON THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE UNDER EMERGENCY
CONDITIONS 27-43 (1968).
317. Cahalan, supra note 806, at 430-31 (1967).
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This procedure appears to be very useful; indeed, it might be con-
sidered essential to fair and accurate courtroom identification of the
defendants arrested during any massive civil disorder. If the pictures
are to serve their proper function, however, the trial judge must
exercise a good deal of care with regard to their use.
It is generally allowable for a witness to consult a prior memoran-
dum, whether or not itself admissible as evidence, "for the purpose
of refreshing his recollection."3 18 After so doing, however, the wit-
ness must testify independently of any such memorandum. 319 It is
this latter requirement which proved most troublesome at the pre-
liminary examinations of disorder defendants. The thin line between
"refreshing one's memory" and making an identification from the
photograph alone proved most difficult to define or observe. But as
the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has observed:
Properly, the burden to ascertain the state of affairs, as near as may
be, devolves upon the trial judge, who should in the first instance
satisfy himself as to whether the witness testifies upon a record or
from his own recollection. It is upon this satisfaction that the recep-
tion of the evidence depends, for if it appears to the court that the
witness is wholly dependent for the fact upon the memorandum he
holds in his hand, the memorandum acquires a significance which
... brings into operation certain guiding rules. Similarly, the trial
judge must determine whether the device of refreshing recollection is
merely a subterfuge to improperly suggest to the witness the testi-
mony expected of him.320
While this is a matter for the trial judge's discretion, it is one which
should be considered carefully in any case in which it arises.32'
The quality of some of the photographs was described as poor;
the facial characteristics of the defendant were unclear in some
instances. This would seem to bring into question the reliability
of an identification based on such photographs. The following
318. C. McCoRMICK, EVIDENCE 15 (1954); see also United States v. Riccardi, 174 F.2d
883, 895 (3d Cir. 1947).
319. 174 F.2d at 888; C. MCCoRMICK, supra note 318, at 18.
320. 174 F.2d at 889.
821. In one case observed, five defendants charged with entering a food market
without breaking and with intent to commit larceny were being examined. The ar-
resting officer studied their pictures as he walked to the witness stand. When the
prosecutor asked him if he could identify the defendants as those whom he had
arrested, the officer pointed in the direction of the defendants and said yes. Judge
Crockett then stated that it was not enough to say there were five persons arrested
and that those five were sitting where the accused normally sit.
The prosecutor next gave the police officer a list whereupon the officer began
reading the names of the defendants. Judge Crockett interrupted and again said that
this was not enough.
The officer then looked at the picture and said that he was refreshing his memory.
He stated to Judge Crockett that he didn't feel that the court could expect him to
know each defendant's name but that he did recognize the faces of all defendants.
The court thereupon found probable cause to bind all five defendants over for trial.
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sequence of events was observed in Judge Crockett's courtroom
during the preliminary examinations in which a number of officers
inexperienced in testifying had difficulty in making positive iden-
tifications. On direct examination by the assistant prosecutor the offi-
cer, after having viewed a Polaroid photograph, generally would make
a positive identification; on cross-examination, however, the categori-
cal identification would sometimes disappear and the officer would
hesitate to make a positive identification. Judge Crockett dismissed
some of the cases in which this happened. After a number of hesitant
identifications and dismissals, the more experienced officers appear to
have educated the less experienced officers. After a short meeting of
police officers held during the noon recess, it was observed that at
subsequent examinations the younger officers made very positive,
unwavering identifications of defendants.
322
Strictly as a matter of law there would seem little reason for not
permitting this use of imperfect pictures to refresh the witness'
memory. Courts in the past have permitted imperfect photographs
to be used to refresh a witness' memory about a scene to which he was
to testify.323 However, as stated previously, the judge usually must
determine "[w]hether the witness' recollection has been refreshed by
the memorandum .... ,,324 Therefore, it would seem appropriate to
have required the court to have made an independent determination
of the quality and clarity of photographs to see whether in fact
they were clear and representative enough to refresh a witness'
memory. The problem in the post-disorder Detroit preliminary ex-
aminations was that the Recorder's Court judges apparently never
made inquiries in individual cases to determine the permissibility
of using a particular Polaroid picture to refresh the memory of a
particular witness.
325
Under circumstances in which the police sometimes used the
technique of "mass arrests... to clear the streets [and] those arrested
often included innocent spectators and minor violators along with
major offenders," 320 it would seem that as a matter of policy the court
322. These events were observed by Richard Earle, a University of Michigan law
student, who assisted the NLS during the preliminary examinations of the civil dis-
turbance defendants, and who saw many of the pictures used for identification purposes.
During this court recess, approximately twenty-five officers waiting to testify in
Judge Crockett's courtroom moved into an adjoining room. They were addressed
by an older officer and two men who appeared to be assistant prosecutors, and they
carried the pictures with them into this meeting. Two policemen at the door told
Earle (supra note 322) to leave. The younger officers were thereafter much more un-
equivocating in the afternoon in identifying defendants. Interview with Richard Earle
in Ann Arbor, Feb. 1, 1968.
323. See, e.g., Henowitz v. The Rockville Say. Bank, 118 Conn. 527 (1934), 173
A. 221.
324. 118 Conn. at 530, 173 A.2d at 223.
325. This determination is based on the observations of the writers made while in
the Recorder's Court.
326. COMMISSION REPORT 184 (GPO ed.), 339 (paper ed.).
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should have been especially careful about using photographs to re-
fresh officers' memories. By exercising such care the court could have
helped insure that the innocent would not be caught in the web with
the guilty, and that persons would not be kept in prolonged deten-
tion without adequate cause being shown.
(2) Evidence used to establish "probable cause." As noted
earlier, the prosecution is not limited at the examination by the
stricter rules of evidence which obtain at trial.3 27 So long as sufficient
competent evidence is introduced to show probable cause, the de-
fendant may be bound over for trial regardless of how much other
improper, irrelevant, and immaterial evidence is received. 28 The
determination of whether or not probable cause has been shown by
the evidence produced is largely within the discretion of the exam-
ining magistrate.329 The dismissal of a case for lack of probable cause
at the preliminary examination, however, does not prejudice the
right of the state to issue another warrant and proceed to another
preliminary examination,83 0 if the prosecution deems that desirable.
During the examinations of civil disorder defendants in Detroit,
there was a notable lack of judicial inquiry into the competency
of evidence relied upon to bind defendants over for trial. Yet certain
evidence, or types of evidence, seemed on its face to be suspect, and
to warrant further examination to safeguard the rights of defendants.
Some evidence introduced at the examination stage was appar-
ently obtained as the result of police searches of the defendants'
homes or apartments. Though defense counsel frequently moved to
suppress such evidence on the grounds that it was illegally seized,a33
327. People v. Zaleski, 375 Mich. 71, 133 N.IW.2d 175 (1965).
328. People v. Matthews, 289 Mich. 440, 286 N.W. 675 (1939). See also People v.
Rice, 206 Mich. 644, 173 N.V. 495 (1919).
329. See, e.g., People v. O'Leary, 6 Mich. App. 115, 120, 148 N.W.2d 516, 519 (1967):
A finding of probable cause does not require that the guilt of the defendant be
established beyond a reasonable doubt. Even though the trial court or this Court
may not agree with the magistrate, we cannot substitute our judgment for the
magistrate's determination of probable cause unless there has been a dear abuse
of discretion.
See also People v. Carr, 370 Mich. 251, 121 N.W.2d 449 (1963); People v. Morklein, 358
Mich. 471, 101 N.W.2d 348 (1960); People v. Davis, 343 Mich. 348, 72 N.W.2d 269
(1955).
330. No Michigan statute would forbid such a practice, and Palko v. Connecticut,
302 U.S. 319 (1937), as long as it stands, would seem to imply its constitutionality.
331. According to Hubert Locke, at that time Assistant to the Police Commissioner
(interview in Detroit, Aug. 10, 1967), during the week of the disorder the Detroit
Police conducted a number of searches of apartments and residences looking for stolen
merchandise or weapons. These searches were supposedly made on the basis of "tips"
received by the police but without search warrants. Often heavily armed police would
knock on a door and request the resident's permission to search the premises. Mr.
Locke stated that two teams of police officers composing special search units carried
out the searches. On Saturday, July 29, the police commissioner slightly varied this
procedure by requiring that searches for loot could be conducted only through either
a search warrant or signed permission of the residents on a printed form. On August 7
this printed form was amended to read that the residents were not required to let the
police into their homes if they did not want to.
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certain Recorder's Court judges were extremely reluctant to conduct
an inquiry into the legality of the searches or seizures. At least one
made the categorical statement that no motions to suppress evidence
would be entertained in his courtroom.
32
In cases where other competent evidence sufficient to establish
"probable cause" is introduced, there seems to be no reason to
require the court to entertain motions to suppress, as a defendant
may renew such motions at any time before trial.8 3 However, where
the seized evidence was determinative or was the only evidence
proffered, the court should not have found probable cause without
first testing the legality of the search and seizure; to do otherwise
would seem to be a clear abuse of discretion.
33 4
It is questionable whether very many of the waivers obtained by heavily armed
law enforcement officers were valid. As an illustration, the writers observed one case
in which the charge against the defendants was receiving stolen property. The owner
of a store had received information that some of his goods were being taken into a
home. He then went to this address along with a team of police officers. The address
turned out to be a two-family residence. The police did not have a search warrant
but instead requested permission to enter and searched both apartments, finding no
loot. The defendants testified at the examination that they opened the door after
hearing a knock and saw several heavily armed policemen. When asked whether they
gave the officers permission to come in and look around, one of them replied, "Sure,
what would you do if you opened a door and saw rifles staring you in the face?"
The officers then searched a common garage behind the house and confiscated a
television, pole lamp, and stereo set which the store owner identified as his merchan-
dise. When the prosecutor attempted to introduce these items as evidence, the defense
attorney promptly moved to suppress the evidence due to an illegal search and seizure.
Recorder's Court Judge Thomas Poindexter denied the motion and bound the defen-
dants over for trial, emphasizing he would deny it again if it happened to come before
him later.
332. In denying the motion to suppress the evidence in the case observed by the
writers as described in note 331 supra, Judge Poindexter stated that this search was
"reasonable under the circumstances" so that the evidence was admissible. Judge Poin-
dexter apparently was finding a presumption of such reasonableness which was up to
the defendant to rebut by proving that the waiver was coerced, and perhaps went
so far as to find that all of the searches were "reasonable per se," regardless of the
question of a valid waiver.
Judge Poindexter later explained to the writers that given this mass disorder and
not enough police officers, these searches were reasonable under the circumstances and
thus he would deny any motion to suppress evidence. He said he felt it was necessary
to protect a person's "essential rights," a phrase that was not clarified. Judge Poindexter
added that if an officer enters a house without a search warrant, there should be a
method of validating the search after it was made if the circumstances indicate that
a warrant would have been issued. He concluded that the police would still be subject
to lawsuit or disciplinary action if they act improperly. Interview with Judge Thomas
Poindexter in Detroit, Aug. 9, 1967.
Given the cumulative effect of the police search procedures and judicial sympathy
to them apparent in the cases observed, it may be argued that constitutional safe-
guards, though being adhered to in principle, were in reality either strained to the
utmost or virtually nonexistent.
333. MicH. CoMp. LAws § 767.76 (1948); People v. Heibel, 305 Mich. 710, 9 N.W.2d
826 (1943); People v. Nutter, 255 Mich. 207, 237 N.W. 384 (1931); cf. People v. Kerwin,
234 Mich. 686, 209 N.V. 157 (1926).
334. See cases cited in notes 327-29 supra; People v. Napolitano, 2 Mich. App. 601,
141 N.E.2d 356 (1966).
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Although it is unknown how many, if any, confessions were
obtained by police from disorder arrestees, none appears to have been
introduced as evidence at the preliminary examinations.8 5 However,
there were reliable reports that arrested persons were being interro-
gated at various detention facilities.336 In some cases this was ap-
parently done without the presence of counsel or waiver of the right
to counsel, and without the so-called "Miranda warnings." One
individual who experienced and described interrogation was James
Del Rio, a Negro state representative who was arrested and impris-
oned during the disorder.337 He reported that at the tenth precinct
police station, the police from time to time took a person out and
questioned him in a separate booth, and that "when they took me for
questioning, they said I couldn't call anyone. They tried to get me
to make and sign statements and I refused. ' 38 The extent of inter-
rogation seems to have varied with the place of detention. Obviously,
interrogation was necessarily limited by time and manpower con-
siderations. Under the circumstances described by Representative
Del Rio, it would seem clear that any inculpatory or exculpatory
statements obtained were inadmissible under Miranda v. Arizona.339
Accordingly, they could not have been used against the interrogated
defendants in any criminal proceeding.3 4
0
335. In fact, of all the examinations observed and criminal files examined, the
writers found only two confessions which the prosecution had requested to introduce
into evidence but whether or not they were actually so introduced is not known. See
the file for People v. Pyles, No. A138,257, in Recorder's Court Clerk's Office.
336. Some defendants interviewed stated they were neither spoken to by the ar-
resting officer nor questioned at the police precinct. Others told of being questioned
at the precincts and not being told of their right to remain silent. Some attorneys felt
that there was simply not enough time or personnel to interrogate thoroughly the
thousands of defendants charged with looting crimes and curfew violations, and as
a practical matter, almost all statements were exculpatory. See text accompanying note
338. See also Medalie, Zeitz, & Alexander, Custodial Police Interrogation in Our
Nation's Capital: The Attempt To Implement Miranda, 66 MicH. L. Rav. 1347 (1968).
337. During the week of the disorder representative Del Rio stated in a news release
that he was en route to a meeting of community leaders at a high school in the area
of the disorder when he observed three policemen instructing three older Negroes to
pick up some canned goods. He saw one of the officers strike a woman with a pump
shotgun. Del Rio got out of the car, identified himself, and told the officer to stop and
that he would help to get the three persons into the car. While the three were getting
into the patrol car, a man carrying a lunch pail walked by and one of the officers told
him to get into the police car. The man and Del Rio both objected to the arrest. The
man opened his lunch box; it contained two sandwiches. The police released the man
but, Del Rio said, a sergeant down the block who did not know Del Rio's identity,
ran over and jammed a rifle into his chest and said, "All right, nigger, you take his
place."
Del Rio added that none of the officers wore badges and thus could not be iden-
tified. The officers took him to the tenth precinct police station where he spent several
hours in detention on a charge of interfering with a police officer before he was re-
leased.
338. Telephone interview with State Rep. James Del Rio, Feb. 14, 1968.
339. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
340. It is entirely possible that the prosecutor and police had no intention of using
the confessions against the interrogated party. But they might well decide at trial to
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(3) Denial of the right to cross-examine witnesses. Another
difficulty was presented when some judges, feeling pressured for
time, hurried defense attorneys during the preliminary examina-
tions.341 In a few cases, this resulted in the restriction of the defense
attorney's right 42 to cross-examine the prosecution's witnesses. In
fact, one instance was reported of a judge denying a defense attorney
an opportunity to cross-examine because the judge felt that the
prosecution had established probable cause on direct examination
and consequently there was no need to waste court time with further
proceedings.3
43
The right to cross-examine at the preliminary examination is not
limited to witnesses produced by the prosecution but has been ex-
tended in some cases to include the right to call an adverse witness
(for example, a police officer) to the stand and to cross-examine him
as if he had been called by the prosecution.344 The only time the
try to use loot, weapons, and the like, the location of which was obtained through
interrogation, either against the interrogated person or against other parties. The use
of any evidence obtained as a result of an illegal interrogation against the interrogated
party is clearly prohibited by Miranda. 384 U.S. at 479. However, the legality of the
use of evidence obtained through the illegal interrogation of one party against another
party is unsettled in constitutional law.
341. See text accompanying notes 304-09 supra.
342. MICH. COMp. LAwS § 768.22 (1948).
343. Attorney Justin Ravitz reports that on August 4 a case before Judge Thomas
Poindexter involving five defendants was called for examination at approximately
2:50 P.M. Since double court sessions were being held at this time, Judge Poindexter's
shift was scheduled to end at 3:00 P.M. whereupon Judge Robert Colombo was to
take over. By 3:00 P.M., however, the people had presented their evidence but attor-
ney Justin C. Ravitz had not yet cross-examined the prosecution witness. Nevertheless,
the court stated, off the record, that it was "fairly well satisfied" that probable cause
had been found and thus bound the defendants over for trial on the charge of entering
a business place without breaking with intent to commit larceny, notwithstanding the
strenuous objections of defense counsel that his client had been denied his right to
cross-examine the witness in support of the prosecution, as well as his constitutional
rights to counsel and due process. Interview with attorney Justin C. Ravitz, in Detroit,
Jan. 16, 1968.
Excerpts from the transcript of the preliminary examination of the above case
follow:
Mr. Ravitz: Your honor, on behalf of defendant Floyd I have no questions at this
time. However, I would like to reserve the opportunity to cross-examine. (Dis-
cussion off the record.)
The Court: . . . Well, Gentlemen, we're going to have to adjourn this case. Judge
Colombo has requested we clear the courtroom so he can take over.
Mr. Ravitz: May it please the Court, and this is for the record, I suggest that it's
improper and error for the Judge to state off the record that the Court is fairly
well satisfied.
The Court: Very well, Mr. Ravitz.
Mr. Ravitz: We haven't cross-examined.
The Court: Very well, the Court does not feel in this instance that it is necessary
to conduct cross-examination. The Court is ready to rule at this time on the
question of probable cause ....
Mr. Ravitz: May it please the Court, the Sixth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution
and the Constitution of the State of Michigan...
The Court: You don't need to take this. (to court reporter)




court may, under Michigan law, restrict the cross-examination of
witnesses is when the defense attempts to go on a "fishing expedition"
and to convert the right to cross-examine into a broad right of dis-
covery.345 Accordingly, it appears that any restriction by the court of
proper cross-examination is in direct conflict with Michigan law and
procedure. Furthermore, since the testimony taken at the pre-
liminary examination is available for use at "plea bargaining"
sessions346 and may under certain circumstances even be admissible
at trial,347 the defendant may be denied his constitutional right to
confront witnesses348 if his attorney is not permitted to cross-examine.
Thus, under Pointer v. Texas,349 the testimony not subject to cross-
examination would have to be excluded from any later "critical"
stage of the proceedings. Therefore, by denying the defense the right
to cross-examine, a judge is only defeating one of the purposes of
the preliminary examination-the preservation of witness' testimony.
C. Right to Counsel at Preliminary Examinations Reconsidered
1. The Preliminary Examination as a "Critical" Stage
The right to effective counsel at the preliminary examination
stage appears to be guaranteed under Michigan law. In 1963 the
Michigan legislature passed a statute requiring the presiding judge
at the preliminary examination to appoint counsel for indigent
accused.33 0 The appointed counsel is supposed "to conduct the de-
fense" of the accused at the preliminary examination. 351 It is reason-
able to assume that the legislature did not intend the right to
counsel at the preliminary examination to be a mere formality; it
must have intended that the attorney be allowed effectively to con-
duct all aspects of his client's defense at the examination. Also, the
Michigan constitution's due process clause, like that of the federal
Constitution, might well be read to require counsel at the prelimi-
nary examination.3 52 However, any interpretation of the Michigan
statute or Michigan constitution is a matter of state law. For a Michi-
gan defendant to pursue an appeal to the United States Supreme
Court or to seek federal habeas corpus, he must establish that the
345. People v. Johnson, 8 Mich. App. 462, 154 N.W.2d 671 (1967).
346. See part IV infra.
347. MicH. CoArp. LAWS § 768.26 (1948); People v. Pickett, 339 Mich. 294, 63 N.W.2d
681 (1954); People v. Wilcox, 303 Mich. 287, 6 N.W.2d 518 (1942).
348. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403 (1965).
349. 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
850. MIcH. Comp. LAws ANN. § 775.16 (1968).
351. Id.
852. MICH. CONST. art. 1, § 17 provides:
No person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself,
nor be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law. The right
of all inviduals, firms, corporations and voluntary associations to fair and just
treatment in the course of legislative and executive investigations and heanngs
shall not be infringed.
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preliminary examination is a "critical" stage under federal consti-
tutional standards.
It seems clear that the due process clauses of the federal Con-
stitution and the Michigan constitution do not require a pre-
liminary examination in state criminal proceedings. 53 However, if
a state does provide for a preliminary examination it may become
a "critical" stage-under federal constitutional standards-in the
state's criminal proceedings. 354 The United States Supreme Court in
Hamilton v. Alabama3 53 and White v. Maryland356 held that a pretrial
proceeding is per se "critical" if a guilty plea entered at that stage,
even though not binding on the accused, can be introduced at trial.3 57
The general rationale of the Court in both cases appears to be that
a defendant without counsel may lose valuable rights at this stage
of the criminal process. 85s
In Michigan the accused is not required to plead at the examina-
tion but he may nevertheless lose valuable rights because what hap-
pens at the preliminary examination "may affect the whole trial."3 59
Absent counsel the accused may be prejudiced in a number of ways.
First, without counsel to inform him of the nature of the preliminary
examination, he may not be able to determine intelligently whether
or not he wishes to waive his right to a preliminary examination.3 60
The result of a waiver of the examination may be a loss of the ac-
cused's liberty pending trial. Second, an accused lacking "the guiding
hand of counsel"3 61 may not be able properly to exercise his right362
353. Lem Woon v. Oregon, 229 U.S. 586 (1913); People v. McCrea, 303 Mich. 213,
6 N.W.2d 489 (1942). The decision in Lem Woon was expressly grounded on the fact
that the Court had previously held that there was no right to a grand jury proceeding
under due process. The leading case for this previous holding, Hurtado v. California,
110 U.S. 516 (1884), was cited with approval in Lem Woon, 229 U.S. at 589. One of the
major reasons underlying the holding in Hurtado that grand jury proceedings were not
within the purview of due process was that "it is merely a preliminary proceeding, and
can result in no final judgment, except as the consequence of a regular judicial trial,
conducted precisely as in cases of indictments." Hurtado v. California, supra, at 538.
Recent Supreme Court decisions such as White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59 (1963) and
Pointer v. Texas clearly grant the accused more due process rights at the preliminary
hearing than he had in the past. Perhaps they indicate that there might soon be a
due process right to the hearing itself.
354. See Hunwald, The Right to Counsel at the Preliminary Hearing, 31 Mo. L.
REv. 109 (1966); Note, The Preliminary Hearing: An Interest Analysis, 51 IowA L. Rxv.
164 (1965); Comment, Preliminary Examination-Evidence and Due Process, 15 KAN.
L. Rxv. 374 (1967).
355. 368 U.S. 52 (1961).
356. 373 U.S. 59 (1963).
357. 373 U.S. at 60; 368 U.S. at 55.
358. 373 U.S. at 60; 368 U.S. at 54-55.
359. 368 U.S. at 54. See also De Toro v. Pepersack, 332 F.2d 341, 343-44 (4th Cir.
1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 909 (1964).
360. See Hunwald, supra note 354, at 118.
361. "[W]ithout it, though he be not guilty, he faces the danger of conviction be-
cause he does not know how to establish his innocence." 368 U.S. 52 at 54 [quoting
from Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932)].




to cross-examine witnesses. This is very important for an indigent
because, lacking the financial resources to carry on a thorough in-
dependent investigation, he may have no other real opportunity to
discover the scope and depth of the prosecution's case against him.363
Third, motions to suppress illegally seized evidence must be made
before trial,364 and the preliminary examination may be the only
practical stage at which the objection can be made. Only the expert
assistance of counsel can afford the accused adequate information
on the legality of a search and seizure. Fourth, counsel could perform
a function peculiar to the preliminary examination in that he may
be instrumental in obtaining reasonable bail for the defendant. This
could affect the gathering of exculpatory evidence by permitting the
accused to aid in its collection. Finally, if the purpose of the pre-
liminary examination is to insure that a person is not put to the
expense, humiliation, and duress of a public trial until "probable
cause" has been established for holding the defendant for trial, it
seems that counsel is absolutely necessary to a complete and fair
determination of that issue. For all these reasons the Michigan pre-
liminary examination should qualify as a "critical" stage. Accor-
dingly, the indigent accused at such proceedings should be entitled
to his sixth amendment right to have adequate and effective repre-
sentation provided for him.
2. Denial of Effective Counsel-Inadequate Time To Prepare
If the Michigan preliminary examination stage is classified as
"critical," the sixth amendment right to counsel attaches. It is argu-
able that the defendants at the post-disorder preliminary examina-
dons were not accorded the right of effective representation guaran-
teed by the sixth amendment. The Recorder's Court in its schedul-
ing and hearing of preliminary examinations deprived the accused
of a most important aspect of their right to effective counsel-it did
not allow the accuseds' attorneys sufficient time to prepare their
cases and consult with their clients. 65 The admonition given by the
363. See L. SILVERSTrEm, DFXNSE OF THE POOR 364, 370, 378-79; Hunwald, supra
note 314, at 120-21.
364. MicH. Comsp. LAWs § 767.76 (1948); cases cited supra note 334.
365. See notes 304-09 supra and accompanying text.
The denial of effective assistance of counsel alleged above should be clearly dis-
tinguished from the usual allegation of denial of effective counsel made by defen-
dants on appeal or in habeas corpus proceedings. Typically, a defendant will argue
that he has been denied adequate and effective counsel when his attorney did not
assert certain defenses which were available, or did not investigate certain aspects of
the case, or failed to make certain motions. The courts have usually held that there has
been no denial of effective counsel in these cases. One reason for this is that the deci-
sion to assert or not to assert a defense, or to investigate or not investigate a facet
of the case, or to make or not to make a motion is to a large extent a question of
professional judgment which the courts are reluctant to second-guess. E.g., United
States v. Dorn, 169 F. Supp. 144 (D.D.C. 1959). Another reason given by courts for
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United States Supreme Court in Powell v. Alabamas66 that the duty
to appoint counsel "is not discharged by an assignment at such time
or under such circumstances as to preclude the giving of effective
aid in the preparation and trial of the case ' 3 67 would seem to be just
as applicable to the post-disorder preliminary examinations as to the
trial itself.
Most cases discussing the problem of insufficient time for prepa-
ration have dealt with it in the context of the appointment of coun-
sel too close to the commencement of trial.368 In United States ex rel.
Davis v. McMann,36 9 the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit said
that "[w]hen a defendant is assigned counsel by the court the assign-
ment must be made in the manner which will allow the assigned
counsel time to present an adequate defense on behalf of his client,
for otherwise the assignment is of negligible value."370 What is suffi-
cient time to prepare for a full-scale trial will of course vary depend-
ing on the seriousness of the offense and the complexity of the case371
-preparation for trial may require days. But preparation for a pre-
liminary examination would seem to require considerably less time
and effort in most cases.
During the post-disorder preliminary examinations attorneys
were often allowed only ten to fifteen minutes to meet and consult
with their clients.3 7 2 This was hardly enough time to get essential
background information, let alone to obtain enough information to
make considered, professional judgments about what paths to explore
and what tactical moves are called for. There was often not enough
time to prepare adequately for effective, fruitful cross-examination
of prosecution witnesses or to obtain all necessary information to
urge bail reduction in proper cases. As one attorney stated, "It was
not right to ask lawyers to represent these people and then make it
impossible to carry out what they were asked to do."373 Accordingly,
it is believed that the indigent defendants were denied their right
to effective assistance of counsel at the preliminary examinations.
Usually courts will dismiss allegations of denial of effective assis-
dismissing allegations of denial of effective assistance of counsel is that to uphold
such an allegation is to censure the trial court for ignoring a denial of justice com-
mitted in the trial court's presence. United States ex rel. Feeley v. Ragen, 166 F.2d
976 (7th Cir. 1948).
366. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
367. 287 U.S. at 71.
368. See cases cited in note 371 infra.
369. 386 F.2d 611 (2d Cir. 1967).
370. 386 F.2d at 620.
371. See, e.g., Hintz v. Beto, 379 F.2d 937 (1967); United States v. Helwig, 159 F.2d 616
(3d Cir. 1947); Shapiro v. United States, 69 F. Supp. 205 (Ct. Cl. 1947); Abraham v.
State, 228 Ind. 179, 91 N.E.2d 358 (1950); People v. Snyder, 297 N.Y. 81, 74 N.E2d 657
(Ct. of Appeals of N.Y. 1947).
372. See notes 304-09 supra and accompanying text.
373. Interview with attorney Pierre Heftier in Detroit, Jan. 4, 1968.
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tance of counsel because to do otherwise would be to censure a trial
court for ignoring a denial of justice committed in its pres-
ence.3 74 In the Detroit post-disorder situation, even if this depriva-
tion of effective assistance of counsel was not the result of a consid-
ered, deliberate action of the Recorder's Court but rather the result
of the totality of events which led up to the preliminary examina-
tions, the court must have been aware of the pressures placed on the
attorneys and the consequent impediments to the attorneys' ability
to furnish effective representation. If it was aware, it deserves rebuke
for not doing its best to correct the situation.
IV. THE ARRAIGNMENT ON THE INFORMATION AND
"PLEA BARGAINING"
A. Purpose and Normal Operation
1. Arraignment on the Information
If the defendant is bound over for trial at the preliminary exam-
ination, the examining judge completes a form-the "Justice Re-
turn"--which recites his judgment that the state has shown that a
crime has been committed and that there is probable cause to believe
that the defendant committed the crime.375 The court reporter re-
ceives the form, prepares a transcript of all testimony taken at the
preliminary examination, and sends the completed file to the prose-
cutor's office, where a formal information is prepared.376 Upon com-
pletion of the information, the Recorder's Court docket clerk sets a
date for the defendant's arraignment on the information.
3 77
Typically, three to four weeks elapse between a defendant's pre-
liminary examination and his arraignment.378 The Recorder's Court
standard procedure dictates the scheduling of arraignments of in-
custody defendants before arraignments of defendants out on bail.3 79
On the appointed date the defendant appears in the presiding judge's
courtroom and is assigned counsel if he is indigent.
The arraignment on the information serves three basic purposes:
(1) to inform the defendant of the formal charges filed against him,38 0
(2) to advise him of his rights,31 and (3) to accept a plea to the
374. See The Supreme Court, 1963 Term, 78 HARv. L. REv. 143, 217 (1964); Com-
ment, The Right to Counsel Prior to Trial in State Criminal Proceedings, 17 U. or
MIAMI L. REv. 371 (1963); Note, The Right to Effective Counsel in Criminal Cases, 18
VAND. L. REv. 1920 (1965).
375. See AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION, LAW ENFORCEMENT IN THE METROPOLIS 125
(1967). See also MICH. Comp. LAws § 767.42 (1948).
376. See MICH. ComP. LAws § 767A0 (1948).







charges.88 2 This is the formal procedure, but the formal procedure is
perhaps the least significant aspect of the arraignment on the infor-
mation proceedings.
2. The "Plea Bargaining" Session
Prior to the defendant's appearance before the arraigning judge,
the defense attorney and the assistant prosecutor engage in a semi-
formalized "plea bargaining" session. In the narrow hallway outside
the courtroom defense attorneys whose clients are being arraigned on
that day wait their turn to negotiate with an assistant prosecutor. De-
fendants' attorneys seek either a withdrawal or a reduction of the orig-
inal charges. 38 3 In approximately one quarter of the cases the assis-
tant prosecutor will agree to a dismissal of all charges; 3 4 however,
more frequently the prosecutor specifies the charges to which he will
accept a guilty plea from the defendant. If an agreement to reduce
the charge is reached, the information is amended and the defendant
then appears before the judge and enters a guilty plea to the reduced
charge.88 5 Sentencing may occur at this time or at a later date set by
the court.386
Although the plea bargaining session is extra-legal and open to
criticism, 87 it does perform an important function in the adjudica-
tory process. Charges which as a matter of policy should not be
pressed are dismissed. Negotiated guilty pleas also avoid the addi-
tional burden upon the courts which would result if all charged per-
sons pressed for a trial. At the same time, the public is assured that
culpable parties receive some punishment for infractions of the
law.38 The functions of plea bargaining are recognized by the judges
and they seldom refuse to allow amendment of an information or
entry of a guilty plea.889
382. See MICH. Coamp. LAws § 767.37 (1948); Micir. G.C.R. 785.3(2).
383. AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION, supra note 375, at 132-33. (If no agreement is
reached at this time there may be plea bargaining sessions until trial.) See D. NEW-
MAN, CONVICTION: THE DETERMINATION OF GUILT 'WITHOUT TRIAL 79-80 (1966).
384. See AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION, supra note 375, at 132-34.
385. Interview with Assistant Proseutor Garber in February 1968.
386. See M xcH. G.C.R. 785.3(1).
387. See, e.g., Shiple v. Sigler, 230 F. Supp. 601 (D. Neb. 1964); PRESIDENT'S COM-
MISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE TASK FORCE REPORT:
THE COURTS 9-13 (1967); H. SUBIN, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN A METROPOLITAN COURT 42-50,
138-44 (1966); Newman, Book Review, 66 MICH. L. REv. 1058 (1968); Note, Judicial Plea
Bargaining, 19 STAN. L. REv. 1082 (1967); Comment, Plea Bargaining: Is Court En-
forcement Appropriate?, 17 STAN. L. REv. 316 (1965); Comment, Official Inducements
To Plead Guilty: Suggested Morals for a Market Place, 32 U. CHI. L. REV. 167 (1964).
388. See AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION, supra note 375, at 125-29, 132-35. See also D.
NEWMAN, supra note 383, at 77-83.
389. See AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION, supra note 375, at 332.
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B. The Post-Disorder Arraignment on the Information and
Plea Bargaining Sessions
1. General Background
The arraignment-on-the-information proceedings began in late
August 1967 and extended into March 1968.890 By the time these pro-
ceedings began, the city and Recorder's Court had returned to "nor-
mal"; the panic and disorganization which had characterized earlier
phases of the criminal justice process had disappeared. Some ques-
tionable practices were used at this stage, but most of these were
part of the court's normal procedure and thus unrelated to the dis-
order itself. The practices which appeared to stem primarily from
the disorder are discussed below.
2. Overview391
For the arraignment on the information proceedings the Re-
corder's Court abandoned the use of volunteer counsel and reverted
to the use of the assigned, paid counsel system. 392 The court paid
attorneys 200 dollars per day to represent all defendants assigned to
them. Defendants were usually assigned to an attorney in groups; the
apparent objective was to dispose of as many defendants as possible
each day.
Each assigned attorney was given time to look at his defendants'
case file, which included a prosecutor's notation about the reduced
charge, if any, to which the defendant would be allowed to plead
guilty. After examining the files, the defense attorney generally took
each of his clients into a vacant juryroom for a fifteen- to twenty-
minute conference, during which he explained the function of the
arraignment. He also told the client about any possibility of plead-
ing guilty to a reduced charge, informed him of the court's policy
of limiting sentences to time already spent in custody, and discussed
the detrimental effects of a record of conviction. At this point, the
attorney asked each defendant his position as to the charge filed
against him.
Many defendants elected to plead guilty. They did so either be-
cause they were charged with looting and were in fact in the build-
ing at the time of arrest 93 or because they simply wanted to "get it
390. There was no statutory time limit to encourage speed as in the case of the
preliminary examination. See part III.B.l.a. supra.
391. This overview is constructed from several interviews: with Byron Wahls (who
estimated that he represented sixty defendants per day for six days) in Detroit,
March 7, 1968; with John Murphy (who worked about six days at the arraignment
on the information stage) in Detroit, in March; Emmet Long (who represented over
fifty defendants) in Detroit, in March; with attorney Justin Ravitz in Detroit, in Janu-
ary 1968; and with Assistant Prosecutor Jay Nolan in Detroit, in February 1968.
Courtroom observations by the authors are also reflected.
392. See notes 245-47 supra and accompanying text.
393. The discussion in the text centers around persons charged with various forms
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all over with." The court's policy of lenient sentencing of persons
entering guilty pleas394 encouraged the latter group to plead guilty
to misdemeanor charges. Some defendants felt that they would be
vindicated at trial and refused to succumb to the subtle but institu-
tionalized coercion being applied to encourage guilty pleas.
If an individual decided to plead guilty, he was taken before the
examining judge; defendants were questioned rather closely to de-
termine the voluntariness of the plea. If satisfied, the examining
judge accepted the plea and passed sentence. In a few cases the
judges refused to accept guilty pleas which they did not consider
voluntary. In such cases, the arraignment was adjourned for twenty-
four hours. Defendants who chose to stand mute or to plead not guilty
were bound over for trial.
3. Observations
As could be expected, the "assembly-line justice" which to some
extent characterized all the disorder criminal proceedings appeared
at the arraignment-on-the-information stage as well.3 95 Moreover,
the disorder caused two significant deviations from the normal prac-
tice at this stage. One deviation was the prosecutors' policy of deter-
mining reduced charges for guilty pleas solely on the basis of
whether or not the defendants had prior criminal records. 896
There was no opportunity for defense attorneys to present mitigat-
ing circumstances or meritorious defenses to the prosecutors. Thus,
no real "bargaining" took place; the reduced charges were simply
offered on a take-it-or-leave-it basis.3 97
The second deviation appeared in the Recorder's Court judges'
sentencing policy. In most instances, the court sentenced disorder
of looting. "Looting charges comprised 84% of the felony arrests in Detroit." CoMMIs-
SION RExoRT 184 (GPO ed.), 339 (paper ed.). See also id. n.4.
394. The Recorder's Court judges generally sentenced those pleading guilty to a
misdemeanor to the time they had already spent in custody. See, e.g., Judge Donald
Leonard's practices described in Detroit Free Press, Aug. 7, 1967, § A, at 5, col. 8.
395. "A plan was adopted for arraignment on the information for riot-related cases
at the rate of 100 arraignments per 12-hour court day with jail cases on first call."
1967 ANN. REp. OF THE RFCORDER'S COURT OF THE CITY OF DETorr 4.
396. Most of the charges were for breaking without entering (a felony) and, de-
pending on the defendant's prior record, the prosecutor would either refuse a plea to
a lower charge or accept a plea to attempt (a felony) or accept a plea to entering
without permission (a misdemeanor). Interview with Assistant Prosecutor Jay Nolan
in Detroit in February 1968. The prosecutor's standards were (1) if a defendant had
two convictions arising out of a felony warrant (this includes later pleas to misde-
meanor when the original charge reduced) there would be no reduced plea; (2) if a
defendant had a prior record, other than a traffic offense, a plea to a lower felony
would be acceptable; and, (3) if the defendant had no prior record, a plea to a mis-
demeanor was acceptable. Interview with Assistant Prosecutor Garber in Detroit, in
February 1968.
397. Interview with Assistant Prosecutor Garber, supra note 396; Interview with
attorney John Murphy in Detroit in March 1968.
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defendants to time already spent in custody. Defendants were aware
of this policy before discussing with their counsel the plea "bargain"
offered by the prosecutors.398 It is possible to argue that the prose-
cutors' take-it-or-leave-it attitude with regard to charge reductions
was a reasonable policy which applied rigid criteria to permit rapid
disposal of a large number of cases. However, when this practice is
considered in the light of the court's sentencing policy, it is appar-
ent that many people pleaded guilty to charges that might have been
reduced further or dropped had real plea bargaining taken place,
or of which they might have been acquitted had they waited to go
to trial.8 99
It may be difficult for some to conceive of people who are inno-
cent-at least of the charged offense-pleading guilty to a reduced
charge. However, it must be remembered that most of the defen-
dants spent at least a portion of the week of the disorder in crowded
and unsanitary detention facilities under the supervision of often
hostile police officials.400 Other prisoners had remained in custody
through all the stages until the arraignment on the information.40 1
Thus, when the court began to sentence all defendants pleading
guilty to reduced misdemeanor charges to time already spent in
custody (or giving probation) 4 0 2 many prisoners decided to plead
guilty and "get it over with." 403 Only a few of the defendants who
were offered a reduced misdemeanor count chose to stand mute or
plead not guilty and await trial. 0 4
These problems seem to have grown out of the earlier disorder
proceedings. The large number of defendants to be examined each
day-approximately one hundred405 -resulted from the rapid pro-
398. The defendants were either told by their attorneys about the court's sen-
tencing policy or observed the policy in action while waiting in the courtroom.
399. Observations of attorneys Byron Wahis, John Murphy, Emmet Long, and
Justin C. Ravitz in interviews supra note 391.
400. See VANCE REPORT 44.
401. This information was obtained through interviewing defendants.
402. For example, during the days our observers were present, Judge Leonard was
uniformly sentencing persons pleading guilty to misdemeanors to time already served,
although attorney Byron Wahls stated that Judge Leonard had also been meting out
probation. Interview with Byron Wahls in Detroit, March 7, 1968. Judge Colombo
followed Judge Leonard's practice. Judge Crockett was not observed using probation-
only time-served sentences. Interview with Byron Wahls, supra; Interview with attor-
ney Justin C. Ravitz in Detroit, Jan. 16, 1968. Interview with attorney Emmet Long
in Detroit, in March 1968. In Judge Gills' courtroom, there were no suspended sen-
tences. Judge Gillis gave fines of $150 and one year probation. Interview with attorney
Emmet Long, supra.
403. Interviews with attorneys Emmet Long, Justin Ravitz, and Byron Wahls, supra
note 402. Our observers witnessed one particularly illustrative case in October 1967:
One defendant had spent forty-one days in custody. He pleaded guilty to a mis-
demeanor, was sentenced to forty-one days, and given credit for forty-one days.
404. Interview with attorneys Emmet Long, Justin Ravitz, and Byron Wahls, supra
note 402.
405. 1967 ANN. REP. oF =ra RacoPnimE's CouRT OF Tm CnTY oF Dm-aorr 4.
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cessing and lack of careful consideration of individual cases during
the earlier stages. The court was required to find an expeditious
method of disposing of the more than two thousand felony cases
thrust upon it. However, it is arguable that the judges' sentencing
policy renders the voluntariness of the proffered guilty pleas
suspect.40 6 In general, the problems observed at this stage would
appear to be self-correcting if the deficiencies which appeared in
the earlier stages of the criminal justice process are remedied.
V. A FINAL REFLECTION: THE EFFECT OF THE LEGAL PROCEEDINGS
ON THE ACCUSED AND THE GHETTO COMMUNITY
Perhaps the most important factor for consideration in any at-
tempt to evaluate the administration of criminal justice after the
Detroit civil disorder is the effect which the legal procedures that
were utilized had on the individual defendants and the community
in which they live. Because of the confusion which existed, some
observers of the legal proceedings in the wake of the disorder might
assert that this Comment presents a distorted view of the facts.
Judges may argue that they did strictly observe the rights of all
defendants; prosecutors may feel the same way; 40 7 and, some volun-
teer attorneys might insist that the proceedings were actually worse
than those described. Each individual judge, prosecutor, and attor-
ney has his own viewpoint and his own interest to protect. But, in
the final analysis, it is the effect on the individuals which is im-
portant; this must provide the framework for all considered evalu-
ation of the legal process. Whether lawyers are able to argue that
"due process" was followed is irrelevant to an individual arrestee;
what matters to him is what he saw and how he reacted to the legal
process.
Sociologists have stated that ghetto dwellers have a suspicious
view of the outside system,4 8 and this "system" clearly includes the
courts. This view is sometimes distorted-a product of their own
406. Several excellent books and articles are available which discuss judicial coer-
cion of guilty pleas. See, e.g., D. NEWMAN, supra note 383, at 77-83; Note, Judicial Plea
Bargaining, 19 STAN. L. REv. 1082 (1967); Comment, Official Inducements To Plead
Guilty: Suggested Morals for a Market Place, 32 U. Cm. L. Rv. 167 (1964); see also
Shiple v. Sigler, 230 F. Supp. 601 (1964); Comment, The Influence of the Defendant's
Plea on Judicial Determination of Sentence, 66 YALE L.J. 204 (1956).
407. Cf. Cahalan, The Detroit Riot, 3 Tnm PROSECUTOR 430 (1967):
Despite the fact that the criminal justice process was being flooded with extraor-
dinary numbers of law violators, valiant efforts were made by all concerned, from
the policeman to the judge, to see to it that the full constitutional rights of each
defendant were protected. That many of the legal amenities of normal times
could not be maintained during the height of the chaos is undeniable; but, every-
thing considered, I doubt that in the history of civil disorder, a higher standard
of concern for the rights of the defendant has ever prevailed.
408. See, e.g., TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 387, at 139-51. See also CosMaassON
REPORT 183 (GPO ed.), 337-38 (paper ed.).
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socioeconomic position.4 9 If those who appeared before the Re-
corder's Court did have a distorted and suspicious view of society
as a whole, it seems that one of the court's objectives in processing
the defendants should have been to insure that this attitude was not
reinforced. The problem, as the President's Task Force on the Ad-
ministration of Justice stated it, is that
[t]he many persons who encounter ... [the lower] courts each year
can hardly fail to interpret that experience as an expression of in-
difference to their situation and the ideals of fairness, equality, and
rehabilitation professed in theory, yet frequently denied in practice.
The result may be a hardening of antisocial attitudes in many de-
fendants and the creation of obstacles to the successful adjustment of
others.410
The reinforcement of antisocial attitudes in some and the creation
of antisocial attitudes in others appears to have been one result of the
administration of criminal justice in the wake of the Detroit civil
disorder.4
11
409. See ComMISsioN REPORT 183 (GPO ed.), 337 (paper ed.):
Some of our courts, moreover, have lost the confidence of the poor. This judg-
ment is underwritten by the members and staff of this Commission, who have gone
into the courthouses and ghettos of the cities torn by the riots of 1967. The belief
is pervasive among ghetto residents that lower courts in our urban communities
dispense "assembly-line" justice; that from arrest to sentencing, the poor and un-
educated are denied equal justice with the affluent, that procedures such as bail
and fines have been perverted to perpetuate loss inequities. We have found that
the apparatus of justice in some areas has itself become a focus for distrust and
hostility. Too often the courts have operated to aggravate rather than relieve the
tensions that ignite and fire disorders.
410. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 387, at 29.
411. The effects of the post-disorder legal proceeding on the individual are best
gleaned from statements made by various released accused who were interviewed by
Dr. Nathan Caplan, a sociologist associated with the University of Michigan Institute
for Social Research. Dr. Caplan went into Detroit and interviewed a substantial num-
ber of persons who had been involved in the disorder; some of these had been arrested
and others had not.
One man, who was released at the examination because of lack of probable cause,
stated his attitude about what he would do if another civil disorder occurred. He said:
I will not stay here and watch. ... Why? You get the same treatment as the
rest of them. I might just as well be out rioting with the rest of them. I get the
same treatment. ...
They might kill me but they won't arrest me. You can believe that. I don't
intend to go through the same thing again....
Another man related his feelings after his case was dismissed because there was no
evidence against him. He said:
When I remember it I get angry. I get mean as hell, you know. That's an ugly
thing that you do to people. Then you expect them to be nice. You know, that
you pat them on the back and say, be nice little niggers and say conform to our
laws. Hell nol No we can't conform to your laws because you didn't give us the
due process of your laws. That's what.
Another portion of Dr. Caplan's interview with this particular individual is as
follows:
Dr. Caplan: Did he ever look up at you?
W: No, he didn't look at you. He just looked down at this thing and ripped
you on off.




Generally, the released arrestees displayed an extremely negative,
hostile attitude toward the Recorder's Court and the system which
supports it.412 This reaction resulted not only from the in-court
procedures but also from the effect which the in-court procedures
had on the arrestees' personal lives. Hurried mass arraignments
with little or no opportunity for defendants to justify their activities
at time of arrest, the imposition of high, unreasonable bails, and
the subsequent delay in the preliminary examination, meant that
each arrestee spent a considerable amount of time in a crowded,
unsanitary detention center.413 Time in detention facilities was
spent under the control of often hostile police officials; 414 little, if
W: I wanted to kill him. Cuz' I wanted to have a chance to explain. I wanted
to tell him that I just got a job this summer and I was trying to go back to school,
you know. And it was the first break I'd had in a long time. And I didn't get a
chance to say it. And because of it I lost my job, locked up in that joint, you know.
And there I was again, like I was last summer, trying to hustle getting back in
school. Some thing. You know each year you got to work a little harder and a
little harder, and these people don't care. You tell them and they say, sorry, regu-
lations. Man, damn your regulationsi You gotta give somebody a chance to live.
We can't meet up to your regulations and your rules. Because we haven't got the
tools. You don't give us anything to work with. That was the thing that really
got me when I didn't have a chance to say, "Look, I got a job." I'll come back
man, I ain't going no place. Look, I'll face it. If I did something, I'm gonna be
right back here you know, but let me go out and hold onto my job. This means
a living, and do what I want to do and, you know, have money to do it and live
like somebody. And he said . . . he didn't say nothing, he just said $3,000.
W: Then my court date came up. It was August 8, that was the day August
the 8th.
Dr. Caplan: That was two weeks after you were arrested.
W: Yeah.
Dr. Caplan: Two weeks?
W: It seemed like a hundred weeks to me. Well, I went to court and I walked
into the courtroom and the man, Judge Columbo, he just looked at me and he
say, I suspended your case, you know. That's all he said-he said, cause we ain't
got nothing on you. He told me to go on home. I turned around to that man-
I was like a beast let loose to the wilderness. That's just what I was, I was an
animal.
On outside I was yelling and screaming-I jumped down the street. I was just
like a hyena, I was an animal. I looked like one too. And I felt like one. Every
white face I passed I wanted to smash it. That's just what I wanted to do.
Dr. Caplan: How do you feel today?
W: I could knock some man's head off. I feel like this now: if one of you
should dare touch me again, try to dehumanize me again, I'd kill you.
Dr. Caplan: Are there many people who feel like you because they were
arrested?
W: We all do. We all do.
Dr. Caplan: How does being arrested and having all this happen to you
affect you?
W: Affect me? Before I was quite passive. You know, I couldn't hurt a fly.
I was really a passive person-hard working-trying to reach this goal, trying to
get that degree. That's what I wanted. And I wasn't messing with nobody. I didn't
break no laws or nothing. I got too much resentment inside me, or bitterness now,
to let it happen again-to let somebody say to me, you have to do this.
412. See note 411 supra.
413. See note 262, and notes 130-31 supra and accompanying text.
414. See COMMISSION REP ORT 58-59 (GPO ed.), 104-05 (paper ed.):
As hundreds of arrestees were brought into the 10th Precinct Station (in Detroit),
officers took it upon themselves to carry on investigations and to attempt to ex-
tract confessions. Dozens of charges of police brutality emanated from the station
as prisoners were brought in uninjured, but later had to be taken to Ohc hospital.
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any, contact with family and friends was permitted.415 A rushed pre-
liminary examination meant the possibility of more time in jail and
an increased likelihood that present employment would be lost.4 10
The pressures to plead guilty at the arraignment-on-the-information
stage meant that many individuals emerged from the legal process
with a sometimes undeserved but always detrimental criminal
record. To many defendants, all of this appeared to be happening
without reasonable justification. Because of the way the disorder
criminal proceedings affected their lives, both the innocent and the
guilty may well be more willing to respond to an agitator in the
future.
It can be argued that the court did the best it could under the
circumstances. As has been done in the past, it is possible to say
that during periods of strife the Constitution and its safeguards
must be pushed to the side in the interest of order.417 Some might
argue that it is impossible to accord the strict constitutional guar-
antees to all arrestees during an "insurrection." However valid this
argument might be in other factual contexts, its cogency is surely
subject to question in the context of the Detroit disorder and per-
haps in every similar disorder. This Comment has demonstrated
that there was no justifiable reason (except perhaps lack of plan-
ning, which is in itself unjustifiable) for the inadequate procedures
utilized in Detroit. Absent a sound and compelling reason for aban-
doning constitutional protections they must and should be rigidly
adhered to by all. The Constitution and its guarantees are appli-
cable to all citizens at all times. Panic, disorganization, and lack of
preparation should never excuse granting a defendant less than his
full measure of constitutional rights.
In the absence of the precinct commander, who had transferred his headquarters
to the riot command post at a nearby hospital, discipline vanished. Prisoners
who requested that they be permitted to notify someone of their arrest were
almost invariably told that: "The telephones are out of order."
A young woman brought into the station was told to strip. After she had done
so, and while an officer took pictures with a Polaroid camera, another officer came
up to her and began fondling her. The negative of one of the pictures . .
[was subsequently found and] turned over to the mayor's office.
415. See note 263 supra.
416. See note 266 supra.
417. Perhaps the most infamous example is Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S.
214 (1944).
